

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON STAR
19 August 1975

How Is Freedom of Information Working? Well, No One Knows

By Orr Kelly

Washington Star Staff Writer

A neatly printed sign hangs on one wall of the suite of offices occupied by the FBI's Freedom of Information Unit in the new J. Edgar Hoover building. It says:

WHEN IN DOUBT

CROSS IT OUT

James Farrington, director of the bureau's FOI unit — which has grown 1,000 percent since new amendments to the law went into effect six months ago — seemed a little taken aback when the sign was pointed out to him and he quickly assured a reporter it was not official policy.

But in a court deposition earlier this year, FBI Agent Richard C. Dennis Jr. described how the when-in-doubt-cross-it-out policy works in practice:

"We would take a black grease pencil and . . . probably would delete in most instances all the names mentioned in the file unless . . . I was positive that the information had been made public, that there was absolutely no invasion of privacy.

"I would probably delete the name of the individual it was about or who . . . gave us the information, and I would delete information which would tend to identify any of those individuals, based upon the fact that it possibly could be an invasion of the individual's privacy."

THE FBI, along with the CIA and the Internal Revenue Service, is among the worst in complying with the law designed to open up many government records to public inspection.

At the other extreme, surprisingly, is the Pentagon, which is often cited as doing one of the best jobs in complying with both the letter and the spirit of the law.

A recent Army bulletin, for example, advised officials dealing with freedom-of-information requests that it is better to "err on the side of waiving fees than to charge excessive or inappropriate fees."

"And remember," the bulletin said, in contrast to the sign at the FBI, "the key principle about collecting FOIA fees is, 'When in doubt, don't.'"

Since the new, more liberal, amendments to the act went into effect six months ago today, agencies throughout the government have been buried by a blizzard of requests for information — far more requests than anyone had expected. And, to attempt to handle these thou-

sands of requests, the bureaucracy has responded in typical fashion — by expanding.

When the amendments went into effect, the FBI's FOI office was inconspicuously located in two small rooms in the main Justice Department building with a total of some 700 square feet. Early in March it expanded to 1,500 square feet. By early

May it had moved into the new building, ballooning to 10,100 square feet. And by mid-July it was up to 11,200 square feet and growing.

At the CIA, the new task of providing information to the public occupies the time of between 50 and 80 full-time workers. In the week of July 3-10, 130 clerical workers put in 1,648 hours handling FOI requests and 154 professionals put in 2,223 hours on the same job.

"I THINK you will agree those are enormous figures," said a spokesman for the agency.

Despite that effort, the CIA seems bogged down in a morass of requests. In the first six months of the year, 4,038 requests were received. But as of July 10, 804 of those requests had not even been logged in — dated and stamped as having been received. In almost all cases, the agency was failing to meet the law's requirement that the person requesting information get a yes or no answer within 10 working days.

Still, the law has resulted in some major disclosures of information that would otherwise have remained hidden away in the bureaucratic woodwork.

It was in response to a suit filed under the FOI law by Morton Halperin, a former government official and one of the most active users of the law, that the CIA gave up CIA Director William Colby's report to President Ford on problems within the agency.

But the report was delivered to Halperin's attorney at his home at 8 o'clock one night and then immediately distributed to the news media with no indication that the release was in response to an FOI suit. Halperin suspects the agency hoped to get credit for the release of the information without calling attention to the fact that the FOI law

that are reluctant to release information.

Because the amendments are new and untested, there are sharp differences in the way requests are handled by different agencies.

At the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, any employee can grant a request. But only 16 officials in Washington and 10 regional offices have the authority to deny a request.

Thus, even though HEW agencies get an enormous number of requests — an average of about 1,800 a week to the Social Security Administration alone — the average requester receives a response in less than 16 days.

AT THE FEDERAL Trade Commission, the policy is just the opposite. Requests come to a Freedom of Information Office at the rate of 15 to 20 a week. But that office cannot grant requests — it can only deny them. If any of the nine exemptions under the law applies, the decision on whether or not to release the information must be made by higher officials in the agency.

"If you have everyone giving out information, someone is going to make a mistake" said Barbara Van Wormer, supervisor of the agency's FOI office.

There is, in fact, some justification for such caution.

Regulatory agencies such as the FTC and HEW's Food and Drug Administration are increasingly aware of what they call "reverse FOI law" — cases in which someone, usually a corporation, goes to court to prevent the release of information.

There were 222 lawsuits related to requests for information under the FOI law being handled by a new office in the Justice Department's Civil Division in the first half of this year. But there were also some 40 other cases in which the government was in court defending the release of information that someone claimed should not be

released.

MOST OF THE WORK of the litigation section, however, is obviously devoted to defending in court the decision of some agency to withhold information. Jeffrey F. Axelrad, who heads the office, says he now has six overworked lawyers ("I came in one Sunday," he says, "and the others were already here") and hopes to get more.

Mark Lynch, who runs a freedom of information unit for Ralph Nader and is one of a growing number of specialists in FOI law, says Axelrad is going to need them, at the rate things are going.

"Some of these agencies are taking a really arrogant, independent attitude," Lynch said.

Charles Hinkle, who has long headed the Defense Department's office of security review and who now has taken on the responsibility for clearing FOI requests received by the secretary of defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, agrees that the number of suits filed is a good measure of how well an agency is doing.

He is proud, he says, that the department has not been sued under the law — an indication that information has been denied only when there are solid reasons under the law for doing so.

By this measure, the IRS is clearly a problem area with 25 cases now in the courts.

Louise Brown, of the Public Citizens Tax Reform Research Group, tells of one request that produced some 800 pages of documents after months of delay. When Brown protested that there was an unexplained gap in the data, the IRS agreed to do some more checking. Finally, much later, the agency coughed up another 2,000 pages.

"This is just another method of keeping secrets," she said. "They give you a partial answer but they keep the really significant documents."

Lynch and Thomas M. Susman, chief counsel of the Senate subcommittee on administrative practices and procedures, who has been involved in FOI legislation for years, like to tell horror stories of experiences with some of the more recalcitrant agencies.

SUSMAN TELLS of the person who had a long exchange of correspondence

with the FBI — demands for additional identification, demands for more detail on the subject and then a demand for a notarized copy of the person's signature. The result was the release of two insignificant newspaper clippings.

Lynch recalls the experience of Daniel Ford, director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, in Cambridge, Mass.

Ford said in a telephone interview that his group asked for information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on its ultrasonic technique for finding cracks in pipes and got 38 pages of documents. They were told that the search for more information would cost \$39,000.

"We appealed — and caused the agency some embarrassment," Ford said. "They agreed to waive the fee and then provided us with something like 39 more pages of documents. This material was enormously interesting. It revealed that the ultrasonic technique is unreliable and that the agency didn't tell Congress the technique doesn't work."

Another incident recalled by Lynch — not so much a horror story as an illustration of how useful the law can be — involves the attempt of Advertising Age magazine to get information from the Army.

Early this year, the Army put out a fact sheet touching on the highlights of a five-volume inspector general's report on a \$40 million advertising contract, John Revett, senior editor of the magazine, recalled. "They said it summarized the report. We filed an FOI request for the parts of the report we were interested in."

BY THAT TIME the new amendments to the law had gone into effect and the Army had a new general counsel.

"What we got was substantially different from the fact sheet," he said. "We would not have known what really happened if we had not gotten the documents."

If it had not been for the successful use of the law, Revett said, the magazine would probably have been at a dead end in its pursuit of the story of the contract because its sources in the Army had been scared into silence.

In one particularly flagrant case, Lynch said, a State Department official certified in a court affidavit that some documents were properly classified. It

was later learned, Lynch said, that the official had not examined the documents — and that he couldn't have read them if he had because they were printed in French, a language he did not know.

Barbara Ennis, who has headed the State Department's FOI office since April, said she hadn't heard of that case. But she said she hoped those who say the department is doing a better job now than it used to are right.

The law requires reports from the agencies and from the attorney general next March to tell Congress how the law is working. At this point, no one in the government knows the total number of requests received nor how many of those are denied; no one knows the total number of persons involved in handling FOI requests, although it is certainly several thousands, and no one knows how much it is costing the government to provide information under the FOI law, although the cost is certainly many millions of dollars.

But there is a general feeling, both among those seeking information and those handling requests, that the law is providing significant amounts of information, not primarily to the news media, but to individuals and businesses.

IT IS OBVIOUS, from the experience of both large organizations such as the Pentagon and HEW and smaller agencies, such as the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Drug Enforcement Administration, that the law is workable. It is also obvious, from the experience of agencies that say they have had problems complying with the law, such as the FBI, CIA and IRS, that the appeals procedure and the chance to go to court will eventually result in the release of information for the persistent requester.

In the first six months, the law has resulted in the release of Red Cross documents on Vietnamese prisons; the Peers report on the My Lai Massacre; the Colby report to Ford; documents on the FBI's Cointelpro operations; a CIA study of "Restless Youth;" a virtually uncensored version of the Pentagon Papers; the Pumpkin Papers — and one page of the FBI phone book.

But none of the information disclosed so far seems to have justified fears within the administration that national security would be endangered by the release of information under the law.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 August 1975

Rusk disclaims recent charges against CIA

Santa Fe, N.M.

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk says he is convinced "that no foreign leader was killed by a smoking gun in the hand of any employee of the CIA or agent of the CIA."

Mr. Rusk, now a law professor at the University of Georgia, also told newsmen Wednesday that during his tenure as secretary of state under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson he never discussed the possible assassination of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

"I must say I was fully surprised to learn that somebody might have turned to the Mafia at some point. How in the world could anybody put the leaders of organized crime in the position to blackmail the government of the United States by getting them involved in something of that sort. It's stupid."

He said the role of the CIA in foreign affairs has been exaggerated. Mr. Rusk was in New Mexico to visit his son, David, and his family, who live in Albuquerque.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 18, 1975

Both Sides of Debate

NEW LAW TO GUARD NATIONAL SECRETS?

"Leakage of Secrets Poses a Great Danger"



Interview With
William E. Colby

Director,
Central Intelligence
Agency

Q Mr. Colby, in your view, is a new law needed to protect official secrets in this country?

A Yes. We need a new law because the present legislation is inadequate to protect our intelligence activities. The present law applies essentially only to people who turn secrets over to a foreign power with intent to injure the United States. It does not apply to employees or former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency who deliberately leak to the press the names of intelligence agents or information concerning some very sensitive technical system that we operate.

Q Is that a serious problem for you?

A Yes. A former CIA official is publishing a book here that names every individual, foreign and American, with whom he worked while he was employed by the Agency. He obviously includes in that list the names of many of our officers, many people who worked with us in foreign intelligence services, and many private foreign citizens who worked with us at various times. As a result, some of these people have been exposed to possible legal action in their own countries. Others have been exposed to terrorist action.

Q And there's nothing you can do about it?

A The CIA attorneys tell me there's practically nothing I can do about it—certainly nothing as far as criminal prosecution is concerned—even though all of us at the Agency signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment and as a condition of getting access to sensitive material.

Unlike a number of other Government departments, there is no law which the Justice Department may utilize to bring criminal proceedings against an employee or former employee of the CIA who merely reveals our sensitive material.

Q Do you mean that the CIA has even less power to protect secrets than ordinary Government departments?

A Very much so. An Internal Revenue Service employee who reveals your income-tax return without proper authorization can be prosecuted. A member of the Department of Agriculture who releases cotton statistics to some friend is guilty of a crime. A member of the Census Bureau who reveals an individual census return commits a crime.

Q The CIA has been operating for 28 years. Why has this problem suddenly become so acute as to require a new law?

A The main reason stems from the various investigations now going on. In these investigations we are taking an overall look at our intelligence system in order to update the old image. In the process, the amount of leakage of sensitive secrets poses a great danger to running an effective intelligence service in the future.

Q In what way have these leaks damaged your intelligence operations?

A A number of countermeasures have been taken by other countries because they learned of certain activities of ours. These countries have been able to frustrate our continued access to that particular form of information.

We're in a situation where we are losing agents. There's no

question about it. And I am sure there are situations in which a number of foreign intelligence agencies have considered whether to give us a particularly delicate item, and they've said: "Well, these days, no. It might leak." We are developing a reputation in other intelligence services of not being able to keep secrets in this country.

Q Isn't there a danger that a new law to protect intelligence secrets might be used to cover wrongdoings by CIA?

A I think we are going to eliminate the potential of cover-ups in several ways as a result of the investigations now going on. Looking ahead, I think we are going to have clearer lines of direction of the CIA and much better supervision within the executive branch and by Congress. The better the external supervision, the better the internal supervision. This will tighten up everything and would prevent the use of new legislation for anything other than a good reason.

Moreover, I think we've had a rather rich lesson in the last couple of years of the dangers of trying to cover things up. In a big Government bureaucracy you really can't cover up, because somebody always writes a memorandum or leaves the service and tells about it, and an enterprising reporter finds out about it.

Q Who would determine what are real intelligence secrets that require legal protection—the CIA itself?

A No. I would have no problem in demonstrating to a judge in chambers, if necessary, that any case brought under a new law involved a sensitive intelligence matter and was not an arbitrary or capricious prosecution. Only after a judge had established that fact would the case go to trial—in public. That would determine whether the defendant was guilty of communicating the secrets illegally. The secrets themselves would not be exposed in open court.

Q In your view, should the press be held liable for publishing intelligence secrets?

A I don't believe that I should be able to prosecute a newsman who picks up something and then publishes it, and the new law I proposed would prohibit such a prosecution. I do think the individual within the system who gave it to him should be punished, however. I am not in favor of the sort of Official Secrets Act that Great Britain has, which makes it a crime for anyone to release secrets—whether officials or newsmen.


Q What are your chances of getting the kind of legislation that you advocate to protect secrets?

A Well, if I were asking for this legislation on my own and in isolation, I admit the chances would not be good in the present climate. But in the process of taking a fresh look at our intelligence structure as a whole, we Americans cannot responsibly consider how to run an intelligence organization without resolving this problem of how to keep a few American secrets.

"We Already Have More Protection Than We Need"

Interview With
Senator
Alan Cranston

Democrat,
Of California



Q Senator Cranston, why are you opposed to a new law that would provide additional protection for official secrets?

A I believe that we already have more protection for

official secrets than we need. My main concern is that classification of information by the Government is out of control. Too many different people have authority to classify—and they often do it with excessive zeal to protect themselves and people higher up. They often seem more interested in job security than in national security. Not long ago someone with direct experience testified that more than 99 per cent of classified material should not be treated that way.

We would open up a very dangerous situation if we started to write laws that anybody who transmits or receives any classified information without proper authority is guilty of a crime.

Q What should be done to protect Government agencies against wholesale leaking of secret documents?

A I'm more concerned about the need for protecting reporters and the free flow of information to the public than I am about the need for protecting Government agencies. I think that we need a shield law to exempt reporters from prosecution for refusing to reveal their sources.

A great deal of the information that the American public gets about what its Government is up to does not come out in formal press releases. It comes from digging by the press and from leaks by officials who think the Government is doing improper things. If you close that off, you would threaten the free press and the ability of the people in this democracy to know what is going on.

Q Do you consider the leaking of official secrets desirable?

A Yes—if the official secret is information that the Government is improperly hiding from the public and which the public has a right to know. That is a very important part of democracy.

A free press is an essential restraint on government; it is basic to our constitutional concept of a government of limited powers. I think the Founding Fathers had a very acute understanding of that when they wrote the First Amendment. They were more concerned about protecting people against the abuses of government than enabling the government to do things for people—or to people.

Of course, there are areas where I am very strongly opposed to the revelation of classified information. But I want to be certain that the information is properly classified.

Q How would you do that?

A Well, it's necessary to define very precisely the categories of information that are really vital defense secrets. In my opinion, these would be limited to cryptographic information, plans for military-combat operations, information regarding the actual method of operation of certain weapons systems, and restricted atomic data. The disclosure of information in these categories obviously would be very damaging to the United States and should be against the law.

There are other areas of information involving national defense where disclosure would not necessarily be damaging—for example, cost overruns on weapons development. I think it would be proper for somebody to blow the whistle on that if he were aware of abuses. In this category of information, we need the tightest possible definition of what can be classified as secret. Also, we must take into account the intent of anyone who reveals this sort of information.

I am absolutely opposed to any catchall phrase—like national security—to cover information that should be classified as secret. We've learned in the Watergate and other scandals that the term "national security" is subject to the broadest possible stretching to cover up wrongdoings.

Q What about the CIA? Is additional legislation needed to prevent officials or former officials of that Agency from revealing names of agents and similar secrets?

A The CIA should have adequate protection, but we have to think out very thoroughly precisely what that protection should be. I think the naming of agents is improper. But if an agent acts in violation of the law, that's something else again. In a case of that sort, it's a matter of individual judgment whether or not it should be made public.

Basically, it's my view that the CIA has had too much power—and this has led to a lot of abuse. You can't really draw a distinction between the use of power by the CIA to protect sensitive information and the use of that same power to do almost anything they choose and then cover it up. We certainly need more control over the intelligence agencies—and that control must include a greater ability by Congress to decide what should and should not be classified as secret.

Q The news media have revealed a number of intelligence operations—such as the salvaging of a sunken Russian submarine and interception of telephone conversations between Soviet leaders and the Kremlin. Should the press be liable for compromising such espionage operations?

A No. I would leave the decision whether or not to publish to the professional judgment of the press. I don't think that you can start writing definitions of information that it is illegal for the press to publish, without making governmental restrictions on the availability of information subject to vast abuses.

Q Is it possible to operate an effective intelligence organization in this country in those circumstances?

A Yes. We obviously need an intelligence community, but we don't want to subvert what we are supposed to be protecting—which is our fundamental democracy—by giving Government agents power that is too sweeping.

Basically, I believe that because Government is getting bigger and bigger and ever more powerful, we have to be very much on guard against giving it authority and secret power without proper, constitutional restraints.

BALTIMORE SUN
13 August 1975

Ambassador Saxbe says he will quit if he finds CIA meddling in India

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 August 1975

'Afterthoughts on the CIA'

In his good column, "Afterthoughts on the CIA," Joseph C. Harsch wrote: "It is noteworthy that many newspapers both in the United States and abroad assumed that the Rockefeller Commission report would be a whitewash, and some rushed to a whitewash conclusion on the first day after publication. Only after reading the text was it generally realized that this was a remarkably honest job."

The comment needed to be made, and I am glad to see it in the Monitor. Many newspapers are still freaked out and trigger happy from their Watergate high. This hyped-up state causes them to display a distorted perspective in many areas of reporting and comment—to the disservice of the public.

Denver Philip Lattimore Carpenter

New Delhi (AP)—Declaring he is "fed up" with leftist charges of CIA involvement in India's political crisis, William B. Saxbe, the United States ambassador, said yesterday he has told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi he would resign if he learned of any U.S. meddling.

Mr. Saxbe, departing from the low profile he has maintained since arriving in March, said he has met in Washington with "the highest authorities in all agencies that might be concerned," and "I have assured myself there is no agency of the U.S. government that is in any way interfering in India."

Furthermore, Mr. Saxbe said, "I have told Mrs. Gandhi that if I found out to the contra-

ry I would resign."

The former attorney general and Republican senator from Ohio made his remarks in an informal interview after appearing in an embassy variety show where he donned judicial robes and sang a brief part from "Fiorello."

Mr. Saxbe said he is "fed up with some of the wild charges the radical left was making... that the state of emergency was brought on by the actions of foreign governments."

Mr. Saxbe said that in February and again in June he met with officials from the State Department and other agencies, and he was assured there was no "interjection or inter-

ference" in Indian affairs.

Asked specifically if he had met with Central Intelligence Agency authorities, Mr. Saxbe replied: "I had a close relationship with the CIA when I was attorney general and there was no problem with that."

Regarding the U.S. position toward Mrs. Gandhi's June 26 declaration of a state of emergency and suspension of civil liberties, Mr. Saxbe said the Indian government has said the crackdown is temporary, and "for the time being we have to accept that."

Mr. Saxbe said India had "substantial problems" and that only time would tell if Mrs. Gandhi's method of dealing with them would be effective.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 August 1975

Civil-servant rights vs. protecting U.S. secrets

By Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

A spotlight has been thrown anew here on a basic conflict: the right of the government to keep important information secret vs. the right of Americans to know all the facts they can.

The conflict occurs in an important section of a major bill now before Congress. In its entirety, this bill for the first time in years would recodify the nation's federal laws.

But the controversial section, as now pro-

posed, would punish — possibly by jail sentence — any government employee who discloses any classified government information to anyone not authorized to have it.

Proponents say this provision is important to protect important secrets from disclosures which could harm the nation's interests by providing important information to potential enemies.

Opponents say the section is so sweeping it would endanger the public's right to know government information not essential to national defense. They say that if legal punishment automatically awaits government officials who provide this information to the public, often by "leaking" it to newsmen, these officials will stop providing important but undamaging information which the public should have.

Without such leaks, they say, the facts about Watergate-related activities of Nixon administration officials might never have become known.

The man now aiming the spotlight is Indiana's Democratic Sen. Birch Bayh. A supporter of the basic recodification principle, he wants to separate the problems of legitimate national security from bureaucratic withholding of information the public should have. To accomplish this he proposed Tuesday changes in the existing bill.

Senator Bayh proposes that it "be an offense to transfer any classified information directly

to a foreign power or agent thereof with intent to injure the United States."

But the more difficult question, Senator Bayh notes, is "what type of information is so essential to the security of the United States that the government can legitimately punish its disclosure by anyone, the First Amendment notwithstanding."

In his amendment he proposes a two-pronged approach: "First, it very precisely and narrowly defines the type of information covered; and, second, it adopts an additional requirement taken from the Supreme Court's decision in the Pentagon papers case that the information's disclosure must pose a 'direct, immediate and irreparable harm to the security of the United States.'"

Senator Bayh would restrict to these areas the "vital defense secrets" whose disclosure could result in criminal punishment: "Our basic code mechanism"; operating plans for military combat operations; information regarding the actual method of operation of weapons system; "general atomic energy secrets."

First test for the Bayh amendment is expected to come late next month or early in October, when a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee takes up the amendment — and others to differing segments of the omnibus bill, which the Indianan and other committee members are proposing.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, August 11, 1975

Claim That Probes Hurt CIA Disputed

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

CIA chief William E. Colby has complained that the investigations into CIA activities are impairing U.S. intelligence efforts.

This is disputed by our sources on the inside, who insist that the CIA hasn't been seriously hampered in gathering the intelligence that really counts.

Most vital information needed to safeguard the nation is provided by planes, satellites, ships and stations loaded with technological wonders.

Through these magic eyes and ears, the CIA has been able to eavesdrop on conversations inside the Kremlin, photograph Soviet naval movements clearly enough to identify individual sailors and calculate where every factory in Russia is located, what it produces and how much it produces.

The hullabaloo over CIA abuses hasn't stopped the spy satellites from spinning around the earth several times a day and photographing the sights below. Nor has it kept the spy planes from completing their usual missions.

In aerial photographs of Somalia, Africa, for example, ana-

lysts first spotted a huge hole on the side of a hill. The aerial shots of Soviet ships in the area also disclosed some peculiar packing crates that the CIA had seen before.

Nations, like individuals, have certain habits, and the Soviet Union had a habit of crating technological gear in special crates. A whole section of the CIA is devoted to what insiders call "crateology."

By examining the photographs of the crates and noting a new excavation site, the CIA concluded that the Soviets were establishing a missile storage base in Somalia.

The Soviets are now fully aware of the techniques that the CIA used to spot their missile storage site. For that matter, the Soviets know far more about CIA operations than do the American people.

The investigations on Capitol Hill may hamper the CIA in abusing its powers but not in collecting intelligence. The CIA never had a license to violate the law. By overstepping its legal and proper bounds, the CIA brought the spotlight upon itself.

Strange Story—American authorities on Guam have called for an investigation of charges that several refugees were

drugged last spring to prevent them from returning to their homeland.

The refugees, now awaiting repatriation, insist they were drugged and hauled to Guam under duress. Their strange story sufficiently impressed Norman Sweet, then the top refugee authority on Guam, that he fired off a confidential cable to the State Department requesting a "thorough investigation of the charges."

The cable, which was sent through military channels on July 26, included a detailed statement from 13 refugees. According to their account, they had been caught up in the evacuation from Vietnam but had reconsidered and had asked to be sent home.

Instead, "three American colonels" told them they would have to continue with 2,000 other refugees from Thailand to Guam. When the 13 protested, the colonels allegedly "claimed they would send us to jail... We agreed to be sent to jail in Thailand. They stated they would shoot us. We knelt down accepting the execution."

Later that evening, the disaffected refugees charged, the Americans "hand-locked each of us and carried us to a room where we received sleep-induc-

ing injections... after we're awake (the next day) we realized that we were lying on a red-colored ground, full of dust. We're then told that we arrived in Guam.

They complained that the injections had caused pain and paralysis. So they were taken to a dispensary where, they said, "an American Dr. Captain asked us what kind of sickness. We told him about the story of our sleep-inducing injections. Unfortunately, he did not believe that."

"He asked us to undress so that he could see the injections. After discovering four injections on each of us, two on the arms and two on the thighs, then he believed the story and understood our situation."

Footnote: A spokeswoman for the refugee program said similar charges had been raised earlier by Vietnamese airmen. It was determined that they were under the control of the Thais at all times. The United States, therefore, had no part in their drugging if it occurred. The 13 repatriates who have now brought charges, she said, may be some of the original complainants. If so, the previous investigation will stand.

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SATURDAY REVIEW
9 August 1975

Failed Patriots

Inside the Company:

CIA Diary

by Philip Agee

Stonehill, 639 pp., \$9.95

Reviewed by Harrison E. Salisbury

So much has been written about the CIA in recent months that it is time to pause a moment and reflect on precisely what the Central Intelligence Agency is and how it got that way. There is a lesson in the origins and evolution of CIA that we must absorb if we are ever to cope with the critical problem it now presents. There is no point rushing into half-measures to try to "curb" the CIA if we do not comprehend the fundamentals of the problem. In this task, Philip Agee's comprehensive, often tedious, prolix, thoughtful, and remarkably illuminating study can be of great assistance.

CIA, it should be firmly stated, was not founded by evil men. It was not created as some kind of dark conspiracy to subvert American democracy. Quite the contrary, it was established by brilliant, intelligent, patriotic Americans who had accumulated substantial experience in intelligence and covert operations during World War II. Today's scandal is rooted in this very circumstance—the founding of the agency by men who won their spurs pulling off incredibly daring parachute entries into Norway, spiriting valuable scientists out of Nazi-occupied Europe, filching Nazi secrets out of the Wilhelmstrasse, and enlisting eccentric nationalists like Ho Chi Minh in the Allied war effort. The objective of these men, founders of the romantic, quixotic, remarkably successful OSS during World War II, was a simple one: to defeat the enemy—Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, jingoist Japan. In war anything goes: the dirty trick, the criminal deceit, blackmail, torture, brute force.

When CIA was established in 1947, its basic cadres and leadership came almost intact from OSS. These men saw their objective in 1941 terms. Only now the enemy was the Soviet Union. It was not yet hot war, but the Cold War was far advanced. The Soviet Union and its presumed allies, Communists and Communist states wherever they might be, were an enemy precisely as deadly as Nazi Germany. Maybe more so.

When their task is conceived in these terms, what was more natural than that these clever, sophisticated, often unconventional men should seek to fight fire

with fire? They knew, or thought they knew, a great deal about the Russians and the operations of their covert agencies and intelligence branches. The men of CIA set out to create an operation that could fight fire with fire—meet the Soviet intelligence networks, the KGB, and all the others on their own terms. If KGB bribed and subverted, so would CIA. If KGB had its execution teams, so would CIA. If KGB infiltrated democratic institutions, CIA would infiltrate Communist institutions. If KGB set up false-front organizations, so would CIA.

One has only to flip through the pages of Agee's book—only now released in this country because of earlier fears of CIA legal action—to see how successful CIA was in creating a mirror image of the Russian intelligence forces. In country after country, CIA penetrated the power structure of the local government, staged or encouraged coups d'état to put "reliable" men into power, bribed the press, falsified the news, manipulated local politicians, subverted elections.

And all of this, CIA and its leaders thought, was good. It was protecting America, protecting democracy, holding back the red wave of subversive Communist plotting that threatened to end our way of life. These words are clichés. The goal and thought of CIA was not. If the law had to be bent, if dirty hands had to be used, if scurrilous schemes had to be invented—these were all means to a noble end: the survival of the United States and the confusion of its enemies.

How THIS WAS DONE Agee details in page after page. He was a lower-echelon agent working in Latin America, but reading his account one soon realizes that it makes no difference which country he happened to be working in, because the story was always the same: be alert against any manifestation from the Left; support the military and the dictators, for they are the only persons upon whom we can really rely—they can be bought and will stay bought.

Slowly the terrible truth begins to emerge: the men who fought KGB not only imitated and improved upon its methods; they began to *think* like KGB. Only in Russia, and only among the most hard-line Stalinists, have I heard the kind of reasoning that CIA employed to justify its terrible means. A process that only an Ionesco could depict began to occur. The loyal, thoughtful, patriotic men of CIA began to look and act more and more like their counterparts—the ogres of KGB.

Gradually, even the goal of CIA began to disappear in the mirage of bureaucratic momentum. Its life as an ongoing institution became more important than the activities in which it was

nominally engaged.

CIA did not really notice that thanks to its efforts America's "friends" around the world more and more became the antithesis of democracy—the military dictators of the Middle East; the purchasable colonels of Latin America; the Francos, the Salazars, the Shahs, the Chiang Kai-sheks, the shabby rulers of South Korea and South Vietnam. Without noticing, the CIA became more and more distrustful of the essentials of democracy—free choice, free speech, the democratic process. Our allies in Western Europe began to arouse concern. Were they really safe? What if a left-wing government came to power in France? Who could say whether the British Labor Party was *really* secure?

As Agee notes—and the point can be stressed again and again—the CIA by its charter is not an independent agency. It is an arm of the President. It can undertake *nothing* on its own. It is a secret pair of eyes, an extra daring pair of arms for the White House. It is the President's instrument, nothing more nor less. Congress from the beginning abdicated its responsibility to oversee, and that is the way the CIA wanted it and still wants it.

THE PRESIDENT, whoever he may be, thus cannot escape responsibility for CIA. If CIA murdered foreign leaders or plotted to murder them or provided logistics to murder them, the responsibility is the President's. The CIA is preeminently "The President's Men." They have no life or responsibility of their own.

The CIA policy of supporting corrupt, rotten, dictatorial, anti-democratic elements has now come home to roost. By aiding the suppression of normal political give-and-take and of normal growth in the political process, and by suppressing wherever possible any manifestations from the Left or procedures leading to social change, the CIA has created a situation in which violent change and violent revolution become almost inevitable in the "backward" countries of the world. If the lid is slammed shut on the pot too long, the pot will eventually explode. And this is precisely what CIA has brought about.

This situation can obviously not be cured by a new congressional "oversight" committee nor by any number of Rockefeller investigations. It can be cured only if Congress and the President comprehend that CIA must be their joint instrument in the furtherance of American policy, and if both work hand in hand to lay down guidelines which ensure that in fighting communism CIA does not succeed in destroying democracy at home as well as abroad. □

Harrison E. Salisbury is author of the forthcoming novel *The Gates of Hell*, a panoramic study of Russian life in the last half-century, to be published in October by Random House.

SOVIET ANALYST
7 August 1975

Questions of Evidence

by ROBERT CONQUEST

A recent short piece in the London *Times* (25 July 1975) on the 'revelations' of the Czechoslovak Secret Police defector, Josef Frolík, put forward a curious argument for rejecting them. Frolík, the correspondent (Patrick Brogan) argued, had on reaching the West got in touch with the CIA. Anything he said was therefore suspect. The *Times* writer demonstrates, in a truly exemplary manner, the pervasive way in which myth becomes the accepted thing in the media.

It is not the purpose of this piece to discuss Frolík's allegations, nor even to note that the Patrick Brogan formulation must automatically lead to the dismissal of all information from all Soviet official defectors, since these are always in touch with the CIA. For the *Times* man gave one substantive argument, or rather assertion. He asserted quite flatly that the *Penkovsky Papers* sufficiently illustrated the unreliability of any material which could conceivably have passed through the CIA mill.

Now it is certainly true that some documents relevant to Soviet activity are dubious, or at any rate touched up. The existence of such documents is often put forward as though it refuted genuine ones of almost identical content. The Zinoviev Letter was a few years ago once again "exposed", with no fresh arguments or evidence whatsoever, by a team of journalists. (In fact, the real issue was not the genuineness of the document so much as the use or abuse made of it by the Conservatives in the 1924 election). Though even on this, real proof is still lacking: the document itself, on the balance of probability, appears not to be an authentic original. But all of its substance and virtually all of its phraseology come from genuine documents issued by the Comintern.

(In her recent memoirs, the widow of the late Politburo member Otto Kuusinen tells of how, when a team of monoglot British left-wing investigators of the matter went to Comintern headquarters, the more secret of these documents were understandably removed before they were shown the file, to the amusement of all participants).

This is relevant to present-day matters, as there is a certain parallel here, or so it seems, with the document recently published by the Portuguese Socialists, which purported to be instructions from the Soviet Central Committee to the Portuguese Communist Party. Appearing in Paris in the absence of any Socialist newspaper in Lisbon, this was instantly denounced as a forgery by the French Communists.

They have now abandoned this line of argument, since it can be shown without question that the instructions were precisely those given under the signature of Boris Ponomarev to the Western Communists as a whole, so that the "forgery" would amount in any case to no more than the specification of Portugal and the Portuguese Party as recipients. (see *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 4, No. 14)

As to the *Penkovsky Papers*, it is quite untrue that they have been shown to be falsified in any way. Mr. Victor Zorza, it is true, urged this view. Far from his arguments being generally accepted,

they remain quite idiosyncratic. Indeed he himself, much to his credit, is including in his next collection (the forthcoming appearance of which is another reason to advert to the matter) a brief summary of the objections made to his views at the time.

An automatic acceptance of any advocacy tending to support a correspondent's view as being absolute established fact is, unfortunately, one of those things which seem to be inseparable from partisan journalism. But the case of the *Penkovsky Papers* is worth reviewing once again, since apart from mere information they constitute one of those documents (like those of Svetlana Allilueva and Milovan Djilas in their time) which give a particularly profound insight into the whole nature and conduct of the Soviet ruling caste — and if not genuine, of course, do not *gratuitously* mislead. Colonel Penkovsky, it will be remembered, transmitted a vast amount of information to the West before his arrest and execution. The *Papers* naturally do not include the sensitive intelligence side of his reports. They are, rather, that section of his communications in which he, as he made it clear himself, tried to put on record his motives, experiences, and judgments. To that extent, and unarguably, they have been "edited". Penkovsky's motivation

Mr. Zorza's arguments against the authenticity of these *Papers* is two-fold: general and particular. His general argument is little more than to the effect that Penkovsky "would not have" done so-and-so or so-and-so. He would not have sent anything but intelligence reports, owing to the greater risk.

But it is clear that Penkovsky wished to put on record in the West with great urgency everything he could convey about life in Russia. The notion that over a couple of years he would have refrained from, or been unable to, intermingle in his straight intelligence reporting a good deal of this other material seems baseless. Nor can it sensibly be held that this could have brought him greater risk than he was running already: the discovery of a manuscript or microfilm of hostile gossip in his drawer would have been a trifle compared with the military information and espionage equipment.

On the other hand, such conditions of reporting account for the repetitive and sometimes strained and emotional nature of his communications — the "often discursive, verbose, almost conversational" style Mr. Zorza thinks is the opposite of what one would expect in material written under difficult circumstances. On the contrary, it is concise and careful writing that is the product of calm and time.

But Mr. Zorza continually says that a man like Penkovsky "would not have" done this, that or the other, in circumstances in which others feel that he might well have. Penkovsky's description of his earlier career, which shows every sign of being written under less pressure than other parts of the book, includes a few pages on the course of the war in Russia and his part in it — easy to write,

quite uncompromising if found, and entirely natural if originally planned as the background to a more coherent autobiography than proved possible; but for Mr. Zorza even this is suspect. It does seem possible that at least some of the material may have been taped directly during his interviews in London; if so, its inclusion can hardly be objected to. (It would, however, mean that there was no "Russian manuscript". The stress which Mr. Zorza lays on the negative point of the non-production of such a manuscript seems anyhow misplaced, since even the written material would presumably be intermingled with intelligence reports, and unlikely to be released.) In fact, in general, it does not seem that any weight need be attached to these external criticisms, which are the merest assumptions. Mr. Zorza's internal, textual, criticism is "cumulative", and we must deal with a number of details. In the first place, some of his points are scarcely points at all. For example:

(a) Penkovsky says he learned of the Berlin Wall four days before East Berlin was actually closed off; but, says Zorza, he was in London at that time. In fact, he was in Moscow on 10 August, and the Wall went up on the 13th, a discrepancy, in an account written some time later, of one day.

(b) Mr. Zorza condemns a reference to an "RSFSR Communist Party leader" on the grounds that there is no separate Communist Party of the RSFSR. But there is a separate Party Bureau for the RSFSR and the official described (Churaev) was its Deputy Chairman. So the description is both correct and natural.

(c) Of a number of phrases, Mr. Zorza simply says that they are not the usual conventional Party expression. But why should they be? If Khrushchev had spoken of Zhukov's "Bonapartist tendencies", how does this stop Penkovsky from describing this as an accusation of "Napoleonic characteristics"?

(d) Russians do, in fact, speak on occasion of "Europe" when they mean non-Russian Europe, as against Zorza's assertion to the contrary.

(e) Mr. Zorza's remarks that while Penkovsky reports that several Soviet launches of manned sputniks took the lives of their crews, the West would have detected this through its monitoring of ship-ground signals indicating manned flight. Penkovsky is quite explicitly not asserting fact but only reporting what he has heard. The sentence which does not lay the point on thick (as a forgery might). But in any case, the monitoring argument could not possibly disprove the point, as the majority of rocket accidents take place on or near the launching pad.

Strategic view misunderstood

Above all, it is my impression that Mr. Zorza has largely misunderstood Penkovsky's chapter on strategy, which is central to his argument. Penkovsky is stating a case indeed: he is deeply concerned with the common "first strike" view of nuclear war prevalent in Soviet military circles. But he does not, as Zorza implies, claim that it was not opposed. On the contrary he frequently says that many generals did oppose the "first strike" theory, maintaining only that it was the theory that the dominant faction was coming

round to in Khrushchev's time. This might be disputed, but it fits in with most other information.

Certain other of Mr. Zorza's objections seem, if anything, to prove the opposite of what he imagines. For example: (1) Penkovsky ironically describes seeing in uniform with some genuine soldiers "a certain N. S. Khrushchev" whom he had not seen before. But of course (Mr. Zorza points out) he must have known of Khrushchev, at that time First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. Yes, and what of it?

(2) Penkovsky speaks of Khrushchev's removal in 1957 of the "Anti-Party Group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin"; but Bulganin, though involved in the Group, was not actually removed until 1958. This, too, is a fact known even to the most superficial student of Soviet affairs.

In both these cases, one can surely take for granted that an organisation disposing of numbers of independent experts would excise the solecisms, if only on the ground that they drew unnecessary suspicion. In a genuine manuscript, however, they are not in the least unnatural, being at most hasty condensations. What Mr. Zorza (who otherwise seems to rely on what looks like minor translating slips) is asking us to believe is that an organisation capable of large-scale biographical detail of minor military and political figures is ignorant of, or incapable of producing, the most widely known facts of Soviet political history.

That Mr. Zorza's arguments are unsound does not, of course, prove the authenticity of the *Papers*. Indeed, it is difficult to see how "proof" could be forthcoming. But the considerations in favour of authenticity are very weighty. A large amount of factual detail is given, none of which has been shown to be false. The material, in general, concerns much less the high officials who would be the best sensationalism-value, than (apart from the soldiers) men like Churaev and Gvishiani, of great interest to students but almost unknown to the public. The description of Soviet society is similar to (though more detailed than) accounts given by a variety of Russian writers. The tone is extremely consistent, and the impression of a single personality — angry, urgent, under heavy stress and full of determination — is pervasive.

Mr. Zorza seeks to impose on this real Penkovsky an imaginary "efficient spy" who "would not" have written in this way, and clearly to find that this impersonal figure is incompatible with the material is to prove nothing. Unless prevented by "arbitrary incredulity", it seems that we should accept the authenticity of the *Penkovsky Papers*, at least until far more cogent reasons are given for not doing so.

Meanwhile, even in the present Washington climate of moronic CIA-bashing, it is a little odd to find the fact of one expert on Soviet affairs thinking that a document put out in the name of a dead man was fabricated being taken as destroying the credibility of evidence advanced more than a decade later by a living defector — which is quite obviously "authentic" in the sense that Zorza claims the *Penkovsky Papers* are not: for there is no doubt that he in person is actually putting it forward. Josef Frolik's statements must be judged on their merits. So must newspaper reports.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 August 1975

A SECOND U.S. PLAN ON CHILE IS CITED

Proposals to Use Military and Diplomatic Pressure to Block Allende Reported

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 12—The Nixon Administration planned a covert campaign to keep Salvador Allende Gossens from becoming President of Chile in 1970 through military and diplomatic channels separate from operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, authoritative Government sources said today.

According to these sources, the Nixon Administration planned to prevent Dr. Allende from assuming the presidency through the C.I.A. on one hand, as reported earlier in The New York Times, while looking into the possibility of applying traditional, though secret, military and diplomatic pressures on the other hand. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is examining both channels through witnesses from the C.I.A. and military agencies.

The outlines of what one Government source called a "two-track" approach was encompassed in a subpoena issued today by the Senate committee. The committee is attempting to obtain documents, tapes and other materials from Presidential papers of Richard M. Nixon covering events between Sept. 4 and Nov. 3, 1970.

The subpoena requests any materials relating to a series of meetings between Mr. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, who was then his adviser on national security affairs, and various officials of the State Department, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.

The papers are not in Mr. Nixon's custody. Congress enacted a law stating that the papers, tapes and other materials accumulated by the President while he was in the White House were the property of the people. Mr. Nixon is contesting this in court. Meanwhile, custody is temporarily held by the White House.

The subpoena was directed to Philip Buchen, counsel to the President, and Arthur Sampson, director of the General Services Administration, who has temporary custody.

Part of the Nixon Administration's approaches in 1970 were outlined by authoritative Government sources to The New York Times last month. Eleven days after Dr. Allende, a Marxist, won a plurality in Chilean elections on Sept. 4, 1970, President Nixon met with

Richard Helms then the Director of Central Intelligence.

According to these sources, he forcefully ordered Mr. Helms to make every effort to come up with ideas to keep Dr. Allende from taking office. Three days later Mr. Kissinger met privately with Thomas Karamessines, then chief of covert operations for the C.I.A.

This meeting, not previously disclosed, was held at Mr. Kissinger's request, according to one knowledgeable source. "Mr. Kissinger was concerned about the harsh orders given by President Nixon," this source said. There are no minutes of the meeting, but the Senate committee has interviewed Mr. Karamessines about its content and has obtained his handwritten notes, this source said.

Economic Steps Discussed

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Karamessines discussed "economic methods" of taking action against Dr. Allende, this source said.

Later, the Government sources have said, Mr. Karamessines told Mr. Kissinger of a plot of retired military personnel and other rightists to kidnap Gen. René Schneider, chief of the Chilean General Staff, and thus lay the base for the military to step in to "restore order."

"Mr. Kissinger, these sources said, joined with Mr. Karamessines in the conclusion that this plan could not work and rejected offering support for it.

"Mr. Kissinger testified before the Senate committee for over three hours today on this subject. In a brief meeting with reporters, he declared that during the Nixon Administration "there was no policy to assassinate any foreign officials or leaders or any plot to assassinate any foreign leaders."

"The Senate committee today subpoenaed any materials from Mr. Nixon's papers "including plans for a military coup, the passage of machine guns, other weapons, gas masks, gas canisters, or the kidnapping or death of Gen. René Schneider, the bribery of Chilean politicians, the use of propaganda, including media personnel on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the use of private business interests."

According to authoritative sources, during this period of planning with the C.I.A., the Nixon Administration was also examining whether it could apply what one source called "more traditional pressures" to keep Dr. Allende out of power.

On Sept. 22, 1970, a White House meeting was held by Mr. Kissinger. It was attended by U. Alexis Johnson, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David Packard, Secretary of the Army, Mr. Helms, Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vernon Peter Vaky, a staff member of the National Security Council, John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Karamessines.

LONDON TIMES
25 July 1975

The extraordinary Czech 'spy caper'

Washington

Mr. Josef Frolík, a major in the Czechoslovak secret police who defected to the West in 1963 with an accumulation of dossiers giving names and records of all Czech spies in the West, has made in a book* a number of sensational claims about his success in winning agents among leading members of British trade unions, and mentions three Members of Parliament who he claims were Czech spies.

According to Mr. Frolík, who was "labour attaché" in the embassy in London from 1964-66, there was a plot to lure Mr. Edward Heath—then an up-and-coming Tory Minister—to Prague and there incriminate him.

Mr. Frolík, who now lives in anonymous obscurity in America, says the Czechs conduct a very extensive spying operation in Britain, presumably to supplement the activities of the KGB. He regularly changes jobs and aliases, and believes that his former comrades found his hiding place recently and tried to murder him.

Such an act of revenge is not very surprising if Mr. Frolík's memoirs are to be believed.

He does not name his MPs, although the identities of two of them are perfectly clear. Nor does he name the union leaders, although at least one of them is easily identifiable. The allegations are so serious, and in the nature of things cannot be substantiated, that Mr. Frolík's testimony must obviously be treated with the utmost caution.

Furthermore, he is under the wing of the CIA (he was welcomed on his arrival in Washington by the Director of the CIA, Mr. Richard Helms himself) and the Penkovsky papers are a sufficient example of the need to treat CIA material, ex-CIA agents and CIA protégés with much scepticism.

Mr. Frolík says that his evidence against the three MPs was hearsay: he did not control their activities himself. He was a witness at the trial of Mr. Will Owen, MP, under the designation "Mr. A".

Mr. Frolík emerged briefly into the limelight last December (he says that the

story was leaked by the British Secret Service) when he was said to have suggested that Mr. Joan Stonehouse had probably defected. He admitted in an interview here that he had made that suggestion to a representative of MI5 who flew to America to ask him for any suggestions he might have of Mr. Stonehouse's whereabouts.

He will not reveal the identity of his third MP, except to say that it was a woman who is no longer in the House.

He names no names in his book, for fear of libel and to do his new British friends a favour, he says. What he is claiming is that three or four of the dozen most important union leaders in Britain, general secretaries of huge organizations who are not known to be communists, are KGB agents.

He says that they are not spies but that they are ready to disrupt the British economy or bring it to a complete halt on orders from Moscow. "Mr. — was a great friend of mine. We often talked about this", he said. But he offers no substantiation beyond his own memory and his own word.

The "Heath caper", according to Mr. Frolík, consisted of bringing a distinguished Czech musician, Professor Jaroslav Reinberger, to London and getting him to invite Mr. Heath to Prague to try out the organ in the Church of St. James's there. The idea was to provoke Mr. Heath to commit some folly, and then to blackmail him.

Mr. Frolík says the invitation was at first accepted and then, at the urging of British counter-intelligence, rejected.

The rest of Mr. Frolík's book is the more usual stuff of spy stories. He claims that his colleagues had a "Czech Philby" in a special section of British Intelligence which dealt with Czechoslovakia, who betrayed the whole network to the Czechs in the 1950s. He says that this chapter was heavily censored by MI6, but that he will restore the cuts in the American edition.

Again, this would be more convincing if Mr. Frolík were not already suspect because of his unsubstantiated charges against trade unionists. *The Frolík Connection*, by Josef Frolík, published by Leo Cooper, £3.95.

Patrick Brogan

WASHINGTON POST (PARADE)
10 August 1975

Q. The sins of the CIA—is it not fitting and right that these should accrue to the various Presidents of the U.S. under whose authorization the CIA performed acts both legal and illegal?—G. K. K., Falls Church, Va.

A. It is fitting and right. The CIA did not and does not perform major operations without the approval

The KGB's secret war against the world

Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the Committee of State Security or the KGB, is the most important single institution in the Soviet Union. It is the powerful secret force that keeps Soviet Communism in power and seeks to keep foreign governments and their leaders under observation and control. Inside the Soviet Union it is referred to in whispers. Outside it is an object of curiosity and terror. The KGB may have as many as 90,000 agents around the world. Today and on Monday the mysterious KGB will be examined by Robert Conquest, a leading British authority on Soviet affairs and author of "Great Terror" and "Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R."

By Robert Conquest

LONDON—The recent appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Iceland, may not sound like a very important event. But when one adds that the man in question, Georgi Faraanov, is a KGB officer specializing in political subversion and when one considers the efforts being made simultaneously in Lisbon to neutralize NATO's other key Atlantic outposts in the Azores, it falls into place as one more highly significant move in a worldwide secret war against the non-Soviet nations.

Meanwhile, the last few months have seen extraordinary developments on the "intelligence" front. The KGB's Disinformation Department has contrived to get published in minor Arab periodicals, to be then, weightily reported in the Moscow press, strong suggestions that the CIA was responsible for the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

Apart from the massive buildup of KGB operations based in Lisbon, South America has been swept by rumors of strange CIA activity, while Washington itself is full of investigators apparently determined to obtain and publish that organization's allegedly dreadful secrets.

The attempt to put responsibility for the murder of King Faisal on the CIA went as follows: Pravda [in its International Review on March 30, 1975, and again in its Commentator's column on March 31] publicly launched the suggestion.

Without flatly asserting it, Pravda used such expressions as "many observers" and "commentators in a number of foreign newspapers" who were allegedly asking: "Was not the long arm of the CIA involved in the shots in Riyadh?"

This story which, as every possible political and other consideration makes clear, is quite certainly untrue, is a typical product of the KGB's important Disinformation Department, which has been particularly active lately. It [and its Czechoslovak and Polish subsidiaries] is

putting a massive effort into planting false information about various individuals and organizations regarded as hostile to Soviet interests. The targets upon which the department now appears to be concentrating are the CIA, Radio Liberty, and various Russians now in the West—Alexander Solzhenitsyn for one.

There seems little doubt that many of the current campaigns against the CIA in certain countries are largely sponsored by the Disinformation Department. There is nothing new in this. As long ago as 1964, a number of forged documents were passed to the Indonesian government purporting to prove a CIA assassination plot on President Sukarno's life, and even a planned Anglo-American invasion of Indonesia.

This was largely done thru a Czechoslovak intermediary, and full details of the operation became known after 1968 when one of the Czech deception specialists, Ladislav Dittman, defected to the West.

One major disinformation operation now being currently waged—under cover of the idea of detente—is that against Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. The channel here has normally been the Poles. And the method is a reliance on forged documents in implicating some of the radio stations' Eastern Europeans in pro-Nazi activities. It has been possible in recent cases to expose the forgeries.

These attacks on individuals are part of a larger scale campaign to destroy or emasculate the "free" radios. The Radio Moscow and Radio Warsaw continually pump out anti-Western propaganda on their English language and other foreign services, these countries' representatives in the West spend much effort trying to persuade Western statesmen—like former Sen. J. W. Fulbright [D. Ark.]—that beaming to their own populations opinions not approved by their government is bad for international amity.

There is also some indication that a few of the more naive figures in the U. S. State Department tend toward restricting these libertarian voices in the hope of obtaining some sort of illusory "detente" advantage from the Russians.

The Disinformation Department is, of course, only one of the various divisions into which the KGB's vast apparatus is organized. That body still has its headquarters at the notorious Lybyanka Prison, scene of some of the most notorious executions of the Soviet period and an easy walk from Moscow's main tourist area. There, its chief, Yuri Andropov, sits in the third-floor office from which no less than five of his predecessors have been dragged to the cells below, and later to the execution cellars still further down.

HIS ESPIONAGE and terror activities abroad are run by his First Chief Directorate with its main offices outside Moscow, well away from foreign viewers. [Operations against foreigners in the U. S. S. R. come under the Second Directorate.] This First Chief Directorate is divided into 23 subdirectorates, Special Services, Special Departments, and Ordinary Departments. Ten of these latter cover the world on a geographical basis.

In addition, there is GRU, the intelligence arm of the Soviet armed forces, theoretically an independent organization. There was always a certain amount of rivalry between the KGB and the GRU.

The secret police shot two successive heads of military intelligence in Stalin's time. But the GRU is a considerably smaller organization than the KGB. And since the discovery in 1963 that the GRU had itself been penetrated by the British and Americans thru Col. Penkovsky, the smaller organization virtually lost its independence, and may now be regarded as little more than a branch of the KGB.

The First Directorate conducts the major part of its foreign operations thru Soviet embassies. All reports indicate that approximately 40 per cent of Soviet diplomats and other citizens abroad are full-time employees of the KGB, while the others are on call for assistance when required.

Even ambassadors may be KGB officers—in fact Soviet secret policemen are given major posts in all sorts of organizations, and in the most casual-looking and unembarrassed sort of way.

Just as they thought nothing of appointing a couple of secret police generals to the Supreme Court in 1967, so we find such extraordinary figures as that of KGB Gen. Pitovranov as senior vice president of the Soviet chamber of commerce. His previous activities included top espionage assignments in Berlin, and a post as KGB resident in Peking. Now he turns up at trade fairs and congresses for the protection of patent rights.

An even odder appointment, if that were possible, is that of Dzhermen Gvishiani as vice chairman of the State Committee on Science Technology with special responsibility for foreign economic negotiations. He formally served in the GRU, and is not only a lifelong professional secret policeman [his father M. Gvishiani was one of Beria's most notorious assistants], but he is a member of that caste to the extraordinary extent of having an artificial first name composed of the first syllables of the two first chiefs of the Secret Police, Dzherzhinski and Menzhinski. It is natu-

ral enough that Western businessmen in contact with the U. S. S. R. should be regarded as prime KGB targets, but this sort of thing seems to indicate a marked contempt for them—in many cases only too well justified.

Whether a top diplomat is the KGB "resident" or that post is held by a "chauffeur," he works in a locked and closely guarded room, the *Referentura*, from which even the ambassador (unless himself a serving KGB officer) is barred.

THIS VAST effort in intelligence and subversion is the main reason for the enormously inflated size of the Soviet representation abroad. There have recently been complaints—typical enough ones—from Thailand, that the total staff of the Soviet embassy in Bangkok is 250. The Thais have five at their mission in Moscow. It is true that there are only 25—that is only five times as many—who are listed as "diplomats" in the Soviet Bangkok setup, but unlike the Thais in Moscow, the Russians in Bangkok use Soviet citizens for every conceivable post such as maid or driver. The Thais are thus in the unhappy position that all the ancillary staffers of the Thai Embassy in Moscow consist of KGB agents, while, with notable lack of reciprocity, those in the Soviet embassy in Bangkok are KGB agents, too.

The Thai case is a glaring one and the Thai newspapers have personally listed not only embassy figures such as the second secretary, Anatoly Smirnov, as

KGB officers, but also the local Tass representative, officials of the Thai-Soviet shipping organization, and of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline. The Soviet trade compound in Bangkok cost \$50,000 and houses 15 families. Between them the amount of trade they can raise is \$6 million worth [in 1973]. At least, in legal trade.

But thruout the world there is a disproportion between the number of staff members operating in Russian embassies in a given country compared with that country's embassy in Moscow. The British solution—of throwing out at least that section of the surplus—which is known to be engaged in active espionage—is clearly the right one. But in recent practice, almost everywhere, there has been a large increase in the Russian representation. This came, naturally enough, with detente.

The director of the FBI, Clarence M. Kelley, noted that Soviet bloc official representation in the United States has tripled during the last 15 years, while Soviet intelligence agents have increased fourfold. They had the added advantage, he pointed out, of a great increase of cultural and commercial delegations, all of which contained intelligence personnel.

When one considers that the FBI's total field force, which of course has to cover a large number of other types of crime, is limited to 8,500 and that there are now about 1,100 Soviet citizens living in the United States and employed by official Soviet agencies, it is remarkable

that good results are still obtained.

ONE SUCH was the recent three-years-old operation in which a Soviet translator at the United Nations was caught red-handed trying to obtain secret information at the other end of the country. [The Soviet permanent officials at the United Nations form a particularly useful KGB center and several of its leading officials have been identified as KGB men.]

In addition to the "legal" resident operating from his security room in each embassy, the KGB maintains an "illegal" resident. These men have no contact in the ordinary course of events, with official Soviet representatives, and their messages and information go to and from Moscow by other means, thru radio or highly illegal couriers. They have included such well concealed and effective characters as Col. Rudolph Abel.

A significant point about KGB operations is their extraordinarily massive scale, with which their rivals cannot compete. Well over 2,000 Soviet citizens have actually been identified to taking part in clandestine operations abroad, and this is to say nothing of satellite agents, and of recruits in the countries concerned. The West German government, which estimates that there are about 11,000 agents operating in its territory, has recorded 35,000 individual attempts to recruit West Germans during the last 20 years.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE

14 JULY 1975

Perspective

Rating the CIA and KGB

The giants in spying's

shadows

The KGB, the Committee of State Security, is the most important single institution in the Soviet Union. Its dual role is to keep the Communist Party in power to control foreign governments. Robert Conquest, a British authority on Soviet affairs, described on Sunday how the KGB moves to discredit its free-world opponents. Today, he compares the KGB with the CIA.

By Robert Conquest

LONDON—If the KGB is compared with its main opponent, the American CIA, various differences emerge. It is, of course, an enormous advantage to the KGB, that there is never any question of its coming under public criticism in the U.S.S.R.

To illustrate the difference, try to imagine recent events in the United States happening in the Soviet Union. An employee of the Soviet government hands over secret documents to Pravda; Pravda prints them; and the

man in question is tried on a minor charge and acquitted—that would be the Russian equivalent of the Daniel Ellsberg case.

A member of the Supreme Soviet—the equivalent of Michael Harrington—discovers and prints confidential information about KGB arrangements in, say, Chile; these are printed in Pravda and Izvestia; and the result is that KGB boss Yuri Andropov is forced to appear before a committee of the Supreme Soviet, to try to justify such conduct.

In that light it can be seen that the CIA operates under constraints which would be regarded as laughable to the point of lunacy in Moscow.

UNLIKE THE CIA, the KGB also operates—and on a far vaster scale again—inside Soviet territory. While the Americans divide their intelligence activities into two autonomous bodies, the CIA and the FBI, the KGB is a highly coordinated organization with considerable overlap even between the departments working at home and abroad.

For example, a foreign diplomat

[as in one case including a French ambassador] may be compromised sexually by agents in Moscow with a view to becoming a tool back home of the KGB external services. Nor would there be any of the curious jurisdictional legalisms by which the CIA is now charged with activity against American citizens while in America.

How anyone with a trace of common sense can imagine that it is suitable for surveillance of a suspect, perhaps on the briefest trip home, to cease at the airport and be handed over to a different organization unaccustomed to his habits, is a mystery.

This is one of the many problems the CIA has, but which does not affect the KGB. The latter is, moreover, a body exerting incomparably more political weight in its own right than its American counterpart, with its head, Yuri Andropov, ranking as a full member of the Politburo.

Recent allegations against the CIA

have been made by "defectors" from it, such as Philip Agee and Victor Marchetti. Much of our knowledge of the KGB also comes from "defectors." But again, we find a difference which is well worth noting. KGB defectors have to be carefully hidden, given false identities and placed where their late employers cannot find them.

A number of those for whom inadequate precautions were taken have been found dead in mysterious, and sometimes not so mysterious, circumstances—poisoned, shot, pushed out of windows. The new batch of CIA "defectors" on the other hand, live in comfort in countries allied to the United States; write their books and even have them published in New York.

The mere thought of a KGB man settling in Hungary, exposing his employers (let alone having his work printed in Moscow) does not begin to make contact with reality at any point.

In the competition with the CIA, the KGB has many other advantages. With hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans entering America in the last few decades it is clearly much easier for the Soviet authorities to put in trained "illegals," or to maintain "sleepers." In the comparatively easy-going political circumstances of the non-Communist countries, there must always be a proportion of people who will simply swallow pro-Soviet views, and be at least potential Soviet agents.

BESIDES, FEW countries have the huge police forces, "internal passports" and registration agents available to the Soviet security authorities. Then again, while there is no doubt that large numbers of Soviet bloc subjects would eagerly assist enemies of their government in any way possible, the KGB can prevent or monitor every such contact.

Foreigners in the U.S.S.R. are proportionately few compared with the security forces available to cope with them. From countries like the United

States there are hundreds of thousands of visitors to all parts of the world, where it is not difficult for them to be contacted without supervision. But Soviet visitors abroad are limited both in their numbers and their tested loyalty-quotient.

This does not always work, as the U.S.S.R. seems to be fairly unpopular even with its most loyal subjects. It is estimated that about 2,000 Americans are contacted overseas every year by the KGB with a view to recruitment, while similar attempts on Soviet subjects are rather few.

Few, but not negligible. And, moreover, the successful contacts of the CIA and other Western services include KGB men themselves. For one of the vulnerabilities of the KGB is the extraordinarily high rate of defection to the West. This applies not only to minor figures, but to some of its major operators, including illegal residents. These men, carefully selected and checked and counter-checked for highest political reliability, nevertheless come over at a rate which time and time again destroys whole KGB networks and gives information to the West.

THE WAYS in which the CIA is not being hindered and hampered by its own people are quite astonishing. It is already much smaller, and disposes of much fewer resources, than its giant opponent. It is not only a David fighting a Goliath, but a David additionally handicapped by a heavy ball and chain, and dazed by the occasional half brick hurled at him by one of his alleged supporters. On the face of it, one would expect a walk-over for Goliath-KGB. The remarkable thing is, even granted some terrific KGB successes, how well balanced the combatants are.

As for current anti-CIA hysteria in certain countries, it might be worth referring its sillier sponsors to the following analysis, from a source which even they might find authoritative—the official organ of a Communist Party:

"Among all the information and stories circulating in the country, especially recently, there are many which insist that many of our problems and difficulties are either inspired, or directly created by the CIA's activity."

However, when the sources and objectives of this kind of 'confidential' information and studied more closely, and when we analyze them more thoroughly, it will not be difficult for us to find that the 'CIA obsession' is being spread and encouraged in our country by . . .

At this point the Belgrade official newspaper, Borge [Oct. 31, 1967] goes on to blame a variety of enemies including, especially, pro-Soviet elements.

AND SO: There really is a worldwide confrontation between the KGB on the one hand and the CIA and the intelligence services of the other non-Communist countries on the other.

The present comparative relaxation in international tension has in no way resulted in any relaxation of pressure by the KGB. Indeed the larger influx of Soviet citizens and the setting up of new Soviet consulates has given it greater opportunities. The CIA, harassed at home and thinly spread in the field, has conducted largely a defensive operation, even tho accompanied by occasional brilliant forays into the Soviet side.

On the whole, and partly as the result of the KGB's blunders, the CIA probably has the slight advantage in spite of everything. The various recent successes of Russian and Communist foreign policy are in the main due to other reasons. The KGB, some of the Soviet leaders seem to feel, is not really pulling its full weight. This may have something to do with the current major attempt to destroy the CIA's effectiveness by concentration on the attacks now being launched against it by naive (or worse) elements in the United States itself.

—1975 Robert Conquest

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
12 August 1975

Who defines U.S. security?

"It would be most unfortunate," said Rep. Robert McClory, of Illinois, ranking Republican on the House Select Committee on Intelligence, "if even the appearance of refusal to cooperate with this committee was given."

Unhappily, the appearance is the reality so far. Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, appearing before the committee, has refused to give it much of the information it wants, on that familiar ground of "national security."

Let us say right off that the fact that the "national security" rationale has been much abused to cover up crime and corruption does not mean that there are no such things as legitimate secrets. That, however, does not resolve the conflict between gen-

uine national security and accountability under the Constitution.

The committee has, after all, been duly authorized by the House to conduct its investigation—an investigation which itself has a great deal to do with protecting our national security and the right of American citizens against abuses by our intelligence agencies.

WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC)
10 August 1975

SEE THE WORLD

Applications for employment at the Central Intelligence Agency tripled last January and have continued to increase steadily, a CIA spokesman confirms. The bleak job market is surely a reason, but the Agency partially attributes the increase to the unprecedented publicity the CIA has received since disclosures of some of its exploits. Seems some folks outside of Washington didn't even know the Langley giant existed.

The basic principle is that no man can be judge in his own cause, and no institution, either. The worst abuses of national security, in fact, arose out of the Executive Branch's arrogating to itself the sole right to define what national security is.

How is the committee supposed to function if it doesn't ask questions? Is it realistic to expect it to take only such information as those investigated choose to give it? Congress did not buy that principle during the impeachment of Richard Nixon, and it cannot be expected to buy it now.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

14 August 1975

Charles W. Yost

Time for the verdict on CIA

Washington

The Central Intelligence Agency has now been under intensive investigation for about a year — by the Rockefeller Commission, by a special Senate committee, most recently by a special House committee. How long is it necessary or desirable that this public washing of dirty laundry go on?

Certainly there has been plenty of dirty linen. The investigation has shown that clearly enough. Things were done by the CIA in the 1950s, the 1960s, even the 1970s, for which the American democracy finds it very distasteful to be reminded that it bears the responsibility.

Foreign officials, political parties, and newspapers were subventioned, or bribed if one wants to put it crudely, foreign government agencies were bugged, pilfered, or otherwise penetrated, coups d'etat were organized which overthrew governments or, more often, failed to do so, assassinations of foreign leaders were canvassed, though there is no evidence any were actually committed. Even counterespionage or countersubversion inside the United States was carried on occasionally, in violation of CIA's basic charter.

Many of these and other CIA activities cost huge sums of money which were spent with practically no surveillance by the Congress and certainly no public knowledge of what was going on. Only a very small number of officials in the White House and the State and Defense Departments were privy to all of this vast and dubious enterprise. Certainly the Soviet Government was far more cognizant of it than was the American public.

Of course the justification for these practices was that they were indulged in on an enormous scale by the Soviets, America's adversaries in a deadly cold war, that the U.S. had to fight fire with fire, that covert operations and intelligence must by definition be carried out in secret, else they will fail of their purpose.

The Washington Star

Thursday, August 7, 1975

535 watchdogs?

Secrecy, like power, tends to corrupt and absolute secrecy corrupts absolutely — except, of course, in the House Democratic caucus. On that Actonian principle, Rep. Otis Pike and the House select committee now investigating the CIA might have an unanswerable case for forcing that agency to make budget insiders of all 535 members of Congress.

But the principle doesn't apply: The secrecy of the CIA budget is *not* absolute. Thirty-eight members of Congress know, more or less, how much money the CIA spends and for what. Hence, if Mr. Pike's committee concludes that the chosen 38 have done a bum job of guarding the national interest and of steering the CIA away from idiotic misadventures, it might properly call for their discharge and the substitution of 38 others.

But it is absurd to suggest, as some of Mr. Pike's hearties are doing, that the CIA can have 535 budgetary watchdogs while conducting effective secret operations. Mr. Colby is right in fearing that their barking could alert the burglars. It is a fact that there are some members of Congress who don't want a secret intelligence agency in the first place, and some among them would unhesitatingly leak all the secrets out of

It is, moreover, almost certainly the case that, while many aspects of implementation were known only inside the CIA, all major operations of all kinds were authorized by high authority in the White House, the State Department, or the Defense Department. Indeed many of them were inspired and directed by those authorities.

These now widely known facts, however, do not answer our opening question — has the investigation now gone far enough?

No doubt the two congressional committees, if they should continue for another year or for five, could continue to unearth further sensational evidence of activities now held to be nefarious, even though at the time they were held by presidents and secretaries of state to be fully justified. Very probably the committees have only scratched the surface.

What, however, is the object of the investigation? Presumably it is not just for public titillation, though one must admit that the appetite of the American media and public for spy stories, for scandal in high places, even for self-flagellation, seems almost insatiable.

Presumably the investigations are not merely to provide publicity and platforms for members of Congress and their staffs seeking political exposure and popularity. What then is the object?

One would suppose one object to be to inform the American people, at long last, of the highly questionable activities in areas of covert operations and intelligence gathering which have for so many years been carried out by their agents in their name without their knowledge.

The purpose of their being informed, moreover, would be to enable them to decide, through the Congress, whether they wish to terminate all these activities, whether they wish to preserve some, if so which ones, and what machinery should be established to ensure, insofar as possible, that only those

activities of kinds sanctioned by Congress and people shall be carried out.

If these are indeed the objects of the investigation, it seems high time that the investigators resist the temptation to prolong the striptease in which they have become involved, and that they buckle down to the more serious and necessary task of drafting policies and machinery to govern these matters in the future.

It seems reasonable to presume that they will decide that the United States needs to maintain some sort of an intelligence apparatus abroad, even though they may well conclude that some of the methods used in the past were unwise or unnecessary and should, henceforth be banned. It is even conceivable they might decide that some capacity for covert operations should be retained, even though to be used very rarely and under severest safeguards.

If these presumptions are reasonable, it is not reasonable, nor in the public interest, so to blast the reputation of the CIA that no one abroad, even in friendly countries, will wish or dare to be associated with it. Intelligence apparatuses are delicate instruments. Once broken, they are very hard to repair. So indeed is the good name of the American Government, in its "intelligence" capacity as well as any other.

So I should strongly urge the prosecution that sufficient evidence is now in, that the jury — that is, the Congress — should be asked to render its verdict before the end of this year at latest, and that that verdict should not be punishment for the past but sound policy for the future.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

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What seems to be going on now, among the more zealous congressional assailants of the CIA, is a bad case of overcompensation. It is no doubt mortifying to reflect that until an enterprising New York Times reporter rubbed congressional noses in CIA folly Congress had slept blissfully on. Now that the pendulum has swung so sharply and the lights have come on there is a real danger that Congress could wreck the agency in the name of correcting abuses.

The CIA director, William Colby, shouldn't have to explain anything so elementary as the need for reasonable secrecy in intelligence work — if only because the lives of agents might be at risk. That he must not only explain the need for secrecy but actually defend that need in the face of the deliberate obtuseness of the Pike committee is remarkable.

There are hundreds of sensitive federal agencies, all more or less vital, whose budgets and functions are a complete mystery to most congressmen, perhaps even to Representative Dellums. That is why we have a system of delegated authority. If Congress has imprudently delegated that authority, let it be redelegated. But even if the fact disappoints Representatives Pike and Dellums, it is too late to go back to

WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1975

A Forum Defended

Your newspaper has carried a lengthy item from Bernard D. Nossiter in London, about the alleged involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in Forum World Features, a news service which I created and ran for 10 years. Not surprisingly, since the story is based on a highly inaccurate and tendentious article in Time Out, Mr. Nossiter's contribution is a curious mixture of fact, smear and fantasy. To say that Time Out is "a weekly that blends leftist political commentary with an entertainment guide" is one way of putting it: the euphemistic way. It would also be accurate to say that it is the favorite London vehicle for drop-outs, Marxist activists and the drug and hippie culture. In a recent issue, it carried an article in defense of paedophilia—better known as child molestation and a crime in all civilized countries.

I cannot comment on matters upon which Mr. Nossiter claims to have greater knowledge than I. I hope, however, that you will allow me space for one or two comments on points of detail. In fact, during the whole of my period at Forum World Features, we never once carried an article that could be described as "propaganda," except in the eyes of paranoids. If Mr. Nossiter can produce a single example, I shall be very surprised. I cannot answer for items that appeared in the Congress for Cultural Freedom's previous give-away service.

Mr. Nossiter describes me as "a well-known British writer of rightist views." Well, it depends on where you draw the center line, doesn't it? My late boss, Geoffrey Crowther, used to describe the politics of The Economist (on which I served for 10 years) as "extreme center." I wish I had coined that phrase, as it precisely reflects my own political position. But when one stands as far over to the trendy left as Bernard D. Nossiter, then I suppose the center does appear to be "rightist."

Mr. Nossiter says, correctly, that I hung up on him. The reason for this was that he had thought fit to adopt a hectoring and inquisitorial tone, which I found offensive and boring. I am a busy man.

He attempts to prove me a liar by quoting a Department of Trade entry showing me as the "person running the business" when Forum World Features discontinued its service. I cannot help it if dilatory solicitors or an incompetent public service did not duly note the change of management. In fact, I wrote my letter of resignation to Richard M. Scaife on 18 March 1974, and it became effective at the end of June 1974.

Finally, Mr. Nossiter says that the Institute for the Study of Conflict "puts out low-keyed reports on tactics to deal with 'subversives' at home and abroad." In fact, the ISC—an independent, non-profit making institute—provides realistic and factual guides on situations of conflict all over the world, and from the right as well as from the left, but has never yet published any practical guidance on combating the phenomena which we describe.

Brian Crozier,

London.

Sept. 1975

THE CIA'S SECRET WAR

FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS
THE CIA CONDUCTED
AN ILLEGAL WAR THAT
COST BILLIONS OF DOLLARS—
A WAR THAT WAS COVERED
UP BY THE LIES OF
FOUR AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

BY JOSEPH B. TREASTER

"I just want to say for the record that the CIA is an intelligence agency. I was in on the creation of it. It was not an agency to conduct war; it was an agency to gather intelligence."—Senator Stuart Symington, of Missouri, July 25, 1973.

The intentions of the CIA's founding fathers, notwithstanding, the agency plunged headlong into a full-scale war in the remote Southeast Asian country of Laos. It was a secret war—never declared, never announced, and often denied—that raged for more than ten years as attention focused on the fighting in neighboring Vietnam. Tens of thousands were killed, billions of dollars were spent, and much of Laos was destroyed in a desperate attempt to "save" it from the Communists.

Only the presidents who directed the CIA in Laos—first Eisenhower, then Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—knew the full story and they consistently lied and misled the American people, and pretended they were acting in the public interest.

Actually, nothing could have been more contrary to the public interest. For by transforming the CIA into a personal hit-squad, the presidents robbed the people of a voice in the affairs of their country, short-circuiting the very essence of democracy.

The secret war in Laos was a flagrant abuse of power by the Executive and the CIA, as were such illegal intrusions as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the support of mercenaries in the Congo, and the instigation of uprisings and coups elsewhere in the world.

What set the CIA operation in Laos apart, however, was its scope and size—it was one of the biggest and most expensive undertakings in the history of the agency. As the richest and most powerful single force in Laos, the CIA virtually charted the course for the entire country, inflaming a war that was more important to a handful of Washington officials than to many Laotian villagers, and fueling it long after the Laotians were exhausted and aching to quit.

It was a war that might well have been shortened had it been open to public scrutiny and had the CIA been under effective supervision and control by Congress, instead of being able to operate as an independent, almost private organization.

Until last December, however, when the New York Times reported large-scale domestic spying by the CIA, there had been little public sentiment for restraining the agency. Senator Stuart Symington, for example, exposed some of the CIA's deeds in Laos in Senate hearings in 1969 and 1972,

yet, incredibly, no one in Congress moved against the agency, and it continued bombing and sending young Laotian men into the meat-grinder of war.

Now, two years after a cease-fire ended the war in Laos, much of the CIA's activity there remains classified "Top Secret" as the agency continues to enjoy a position of unaccountability shared by no other segment of our government.

The CIA says that all but its usual intelligence-collecting apparatus has been pulled out of Laos. But given the agency's success at concealing its activities in Laos in the past, how can we know? How can we know for certain that the CIA is not at war at this very moment in some other far-off place? Few Americans have heard of, a war that most Americans want no part of, secret or otherwise?

At its peak, the secret war in Laos cost American taxpayers some \$500 million a year, as a few hundred CIA agents sent into combat an army of nearly 40,000 Meo and other hill tribesmen they had recruited and trained. The CIA's "irregulars" were superbly outfitted with American-style fatigue uniforms, M-16 rifles, grenades, mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and howitzers; and they were backed up by American bombers, which the agents directed in massive raids that scorched the verdant Laotian countryside, obliterating whole villages, slaughtering livestock, and devastating crops. Most of the bombing was done by

United States Air Force and Navy jets. But some of the early strikes were flown by CIA-hired pilots and throughout the secret war the CIA flew its own transports and helicopters to shuttle troops into battle and resupply them.

There were few spectacular battles against the Communist Laotian insurgents and the North Vietnamese regulars, but casualties mounted steadily. In desperation, as their units became depleted, the CIA's irregular commanders began forcing ten- and eleven-year-old boys into the army. Finally, when there were no more children to draft, the CIA went to Thailand and hired more than 21,000 "volunteers" to keep the war going.

By 1970 large groups of tribesmen, weary of the fighting, had begun deserting the CIA army. They wanted the war to stop. Prince Souvanna Phouma, the prime minister of Laos, also yearned for peace. But by then Laos had become an important adjunct of the war in Vietnam—North Vietnamese were pouring through the country to infiltrate South Vietnam and the Americans were attacking them with waves of bombers. The Americans believed that if there were a cease-fire, public opinion would compel them to stop bombing, but the infiltration could continue because it was so difficult to detect. So regardless of what the Laotians wanted, the Americans kept bombing.

In those days the United States was being torn apart by angry debates over the war in Vietnam, and President Nixon, in reaction, had started sending American troops home. But there was no outcry at all against the equally brutal acts of war being perpetrated in Laos because no one knew about them.

Presidential fascination with Laos was kindled in the cold war days of the late 1940's and early 50's. Because of its strategic location, sandwiched as it was between

China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. President Truman was convinced Laos was the place in Southeast Asia to draw the line against the dread "tide of Communist aggression." President Eisenhower saw Laos as the first in a chain of dominoes which, if lost to the Communists, would lead to the toppling of all the other "Free World" countries of Indochina.

American officials were caught in a dilemma, though. On the one hand they wanted to keep Laos out of the hands of the "Reds," but on the other, they didn't want to commit American troops to a land war in Asia (that mistake was later made in spades in Vietnam, of course) and they were deathly afraid of provoking China and the Soviet Union into a nuclear war.

The solution they hit upon was to set up an international con game: Washington would do everything in its power to see that, on paper, Laos was a neutral country. But with equal vigor, strongly relying on the CIA, Washington would see to it secretly that the brand of neutralism actually practiced was pro-American. It was a beautiful scheme: low-risk, relatively low-cost (it cost \$500 million a year while the Vietnam debacle grew into an \$83-million-a-day habit), and low-profile so there wouldn't be a lot of hassling with the folks at home, who never seemed to understand foreign policy the way the presidents did, anyway. All that was required to execute the game plan in Laos was a lot of lying and cheating, and that proved to be no obstacle for the CIA and a succession of presidents.

For openers, in order to get the Chinese and the Russians to agree to a neutral Laos, the U.S. had to pretend that a truly neutral Laos was precisely what it wanted.

"First we strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination. . . . If in the past there has been any possible ground for misunderstanding of our desire for a truly neutral Laos, there should be none now."

That was President Kennedy at a news conference in Washington on March 23, 1961, speaking with full knowledge that CIA agents and 400 Green Berets were recruiting and training Meo tribesmen expressly to insure that a "neutral" Laos would tilt toward the U.S. Some of the agents and Green Berets had been secretly working with the tribesmen since the late '50's.

Kennedy kept repeating the lie and in July 1962 in Geneva, fourteen nations, including the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, signed two documents guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos. The second of the two was a protocol detailing procedures for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Laos as well as "foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, and storing and utilization of war materials." In addition, in a clause which seemed to leave a lot of room for interpretation, the protocol forbade the introduction of arms and war materials except for "conventional armaments necessary for the national defense of Laos."

Shortly after the 1962 agreement was concluded, the United States withdrew more than two hundred advisers from Vientiane, the sleepy capital city of Laos, and

gave the appearance of sending home the 400 Green Berets who, under CIA direction, had been building the secret army in the back country. In fact, many of the Green Berets simply shucked off their fatigue uniforms, slipped into civvies, and went on about their business of turning the opium-growing hill people into riflemen. In the beginning they extended the charade by spending their nights in Thailand, so they could say they were not stationed in Laos. The story that eventually leaked out was that these men had retired from the military and had become contract employees of the CIA. But in any case, they were in violation of the 1962 agreement because, if they were not "foreign military personnel," they were certainly "foreign civilians," and both were banned.

In his news conference of March 23, 1961, President Kennedy recalled that the "clear premise" of the Geneva accords of 1954, which gave the states of Indochina their independence from France, had been that Laos would be neutral—"free from external domination by anyone." He added that the "efforts of a Communist-dominated group to destroy this neutrality [had] never ceased," calling special attention to a Soviet airlift of supplies then under way and a reported influx of North Vietnamese military advisers.

He failed to mention, of course, that the CIA had brought down at least two Laotian governments—in 1959 and 1960—which had seemed to be "too neutral" and seemed in danger of sliding toward the Communists. ("The United States has no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Laos," a State Department spokesman in Washington said, as the CIA was maneuvering to get a more pro-American government into power in late 1960.) Nor did the president mention that Brigadier General John A. Heintges and nearly two hundred other American soldiers, posing as civilians in sport shirts and slacks, had been functioning as a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) for several years through the 1950's and early 1960's, training Laotian regular army troops and equipping them with weapons in direct violation of the 1954 peace agreement. (General Heintges's name mysteriously disappeared from public army records in 1959, in an apparent effort to suggest that he had "retired." Years later he was back in uniform with more stars on his shoulders, serving as commander of the United States Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., and in several important posts in Vietnam, including deputy to General Westmoreland. He retired in 1971.)

Continuing to attack the perfidy of the Communists, Kennedy also remained silent about the four AT-6 World War II-era trainer planes the U.S. had fitted with rockets and bombs and given to the Laotians at the start of 1961 in another violation of the 1954 peace agreement.

The Russians, the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the Laotian insurgents, who called themselves the Pathet Lao (which means State of Laos), were not fooled by the official lies, for their side was feeling the cut of the bombs and bullets. As it evolved, however, the Russians and the Chinese decided rather quickly that Laos was hardly a piece of real estate worth risking blowing up the world for and they seemed rather grateful that the Americans had made it a noisy act, under the table

game. They were content to quietly furnish the chips of war to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese to keep the fighting in balance. So what resulted was a kind of warring neutrality in which only the Laotian people were hurt and only the American people were in the dark. There were occasional tirades against American violations of Laotian neutrality in Communist radio broadcasts, and they were frequently quite accurate. But what American would believe a Communist broadcast? (That's what we all said when the Communists broadcast the first reports of the My Lai massacre.)

Because Washington decided to proceed in Laos with a combination of force and stealth, the CIA got the military job. The agency, or "the company," as it is also called, had a well-earned reputation for both secrecy and illegal acts, and it was also believed that because it was smaller than the Pentagon, the CIA would be less bound up in red tape and more flexible in the field. The CIA was in the business of running agents and agent networks throughout the world with only a handful of Americans pulling the strings and it was felt that the same kind of operation could be used to run the war in Laos.

With Alice-in-Wonderland logic, American officials claimed later that secrecy was necessary in Laos to avoid giving the Communists a diplomatic advantage and to give the appearance of preserving the 1962 agreements for a time when all parties genuinely wanted peace. They never mentioned the ease with which one could move in secret—the usual second-guessers didn't have to be dealt with—nor did they mention the value of secrecy in Laos to presidents striving to look like men of peace.

The CIA's work in Laos was a delight to the "cost-effective," chart-and-graph-wielding policy managers in Washington. For at the peak of the war only about 400 CIA employees were engaged in Laos on the ground, compared to half a million Americans next door in Vietnam. Certainly Vietnam was a much bigger war, but there was no denying that the CIA was getting "more bang for the buck" in Laos.

The CIA was one of several agencies that constituted the American "Country Team" in Laos, with the ambassador as the chief. But the CIA was clearly the dominant force. It had the war, the action, just as MACV in Saigon had, and the other agencies slipped into a wedge of support behind it with money and men so that the CIA had many more resources than its budget seemed to suggest. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with more than 600 employees in Laos, was the largest of the agencies and it provided cover for a number of CIA agents, a service that the American embassy also rendered. But the distinction of which agency an American was assigned to lost significance, because in practice the whole "Country Team" was an anti-Communist team, working for the CIA's objectives. "Everybody was sort of paramilitary," said one USAID official whose job was dispatching airlifts of rice and ammunition to the tribesmen and their families. "There wasn't any way around it. That was the nature of the program."

Take, for example, Edgar "Pop" Buell, a folksy, grandfatherly, Indiana farmer who had gone to Laos to work for the Interna-

national Voluntary Services after his wife died, and later joined USAID. Buell had arranged the first contact between the Meo and the CIA. Then, walking, flying, and parachuting through northeastern Laos he set up a quiltwork of landing zones and drop sites that were used for delivering rice and arms. Buell was short and stubby and literally bounced with "can do" enthusiasm. He spoke English and Lao in jumbled sentences, but he communicated excellently, his eyes growing stern behind black-framed glasses and his brow furrowing deeply when he had a point to make. His uniform was khaki shirt, trousers, and sneakers. He never carried a gun, but everyone remembers the time he went out with the Meo and showed them how to blow up six bridges and twelve mountain passes along Route 7. There were countless tales of how he had braved rifle and mortar fire to lead hysterical villagers to safety during Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese attacks; and he was always there to cheer his side on in a good fight.

In July 1961, Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, a longtime CIA operative and expert on guerrilla warfare, reported in a top secret cable to Washington that 9,000 Meos had been equipped for guerrilla operations.

But he discovered that "as Meo villagers are overrun by Communist forces and as men leave food-raising duties to serve as guerrillas, a problem is growing over the care and feeding of noncombat Meos."

"CIA has given some rice and clothing to relieve this problem," he told his superiors in the cable published in the Pentagon Papers, but he added he felt that an organized relief program was needed.

Buell's efforts were aimed mainly at remedying the problem Lansdale had described, and refugee relief became one of USAID's biggest programs, along with a large medical program which, among other things, provided treatment for the Meo soldiers and their families.

In 1972 USAID officials said they were feeding 220,785 "refugees," about half of whom were irregular soldiers and their dependents. The others were pure civilians who had been uprooted by the war, to a large extent by the American bombing. There were hundreds of thousands of other displaced persons, but according to USAID they had found their own means of subsistence.

Senator Edward Kennedy caused trouble for the American operation in Laos with complaints that the supposedly humanitarian relief agency was being used to support a military operation.

Responding to questions about the senator's charges, Jack Williamson, who was known as the refugee affairs officer in 1972, explained that USAID functioned as "a central supply agency" as a matter of expediency.

"CAS needs rice for troops and dependents of troops—an army travels on its belly," Williamson said. "They're essentially pretty much in the same areas as our refugees and it makes sense to combine the delivery system." (American officials seemed uneasy about calling the CIA by its proper name. They often called it "CAS," a euphemism that meant "Controlled American Source.")

"We're trying to save the taxpayer some money," he went on. "We're not doing anyanky-panky. If they had to have their own

airplanes and supplies we would double the cost of the operation."

Williamson had it turned around, however. USAID didn't have the aircraft; the CIA did, under the cover of a company called Air America. The airline rented its services to USAID which then billed the Department of Defense for the numerous missions it flew in direct support of the CIA's war. Whether the Pentagon then paid the bill or forwarded it to CIA headquarters was not clear.

The CIA was such a pervasive force in Laos that it set the tone for life in the American community. Laos virtually became a CIA company town. Intrigue, elusiveness, and mystery became a part of everyone's role, and they loved it.

When I was there both in 1968 and in 1972 it was by far the spookiest country in Asia. I felt it the minute I walked into the bar of the Hotel Lane Xang in Vientiane. The handful of Americans in sport shirts and sunglasses lowered their voices and turned away. Anywhere else in Asia, they would have either kept on chatting or invited a stranger to join in. Making my rounds as a newspaperman to the offices of the ambassador and his staff I could feel everyone keeping a polite distance. No one suggested I drop by for a drink or, perhaps, dinner—which was rather standard elsewhere—and when I invited a couple of officials out to dinner one night their conversation was guarded and they hurried off early. Even those officials whose jobs were digging wells and building pigsties wanted to get in on the fun, so they slinked around pretending they knew something secret.

Men like Tony Poe, however, had no need to pretend. Their real lives were wild enough. Poe was the most infamous of the CIA operatives in Laos, a hard-drinking, fanatically anti-Communist former marine, tall and solidly built with the constitution of a tank and the disposition in combat of a wounded lion.

"The Laotians don't believe he can be killed," one American official told Fred Branfman, the co-director of the Indochina Research Center and a veteran of four years in Laos.

"The guy is an unbelievable piece of muscle," the American continued with Branfman. "The only thing I'd take him on with is a .45 Thompson and I'd want at least a fifty-yard lead before he got to me, that's how tough I think Tony Poe is. He's one of the most efficient killing machines in the business. He gets totally drunk every night, but yet he can wake up after four hours' sleep and run fifty miles. The guy has been shot to pieces; he's been surrounded and fought his way out of hilltop positions all over Laos for the last fifteen years."

Poe worked closely with the main body of the irregulars in the mountains of the northeast for several years. Then he struck off to the northwest where, among other things, he ran agents into China and organized local hill tribes into anti-Communist fighting units. One of his assignments for the CIA before Laos was reportedly training Tibetans in the mountains of the western United States to infiltrate back into their homeland and drive out the Chinese.

Branfman said that to encourage his troops Poe once offered a reward for enemy ears and hung a plastic bag on his front porch to collect the trophies. But he had to discontinue the practice when he discov-

ered that his men were getting too ambitious and were killing anyone they could find just to get the ears. Once, Branfman said, Poe asked a couple of pilots to take a present to his boss, Pat Landry, at a CIA office in Thailand. The pilots became curious about the horrendously foul odor coming from the package and ripped it open. Inside was a freshly decapitated head.

Tony Poe was not the only blood-and-guts swashbuckler in Laos. But most of the other CIA agents, as well as the U.S. government employees who functioned as CIA paramilitary personnel, were much more like your suburban neighbor. They liked the \$20,000 a year or so they were knocking down, they liked being part of a big team effort, they liked the special status they enjoyed in the backward country and many repeatedly extended their tours. Blaine Jensen, an Idaho farmer who spent ten years working alongside Pop Buell, put it simply. "A bunch of us came over and found it very interesting," he told me one day. "We felt we were doing the people some good. The people [the Meo] are a very likeable bunch of people. That's the only way I can explain it."

The CIA ran the war from a squat, two-story concrete building with towering antennas sprouting from its roof in an American compound in a residential section of Vientiane. The compound was enclosed by a high chain-link fence and was patrolled by units of the U.S. Embassy's 500-man, blue-uniformed private guard force. Nearby in the same compound were the offices of the 200 or so American military attachés who advised individual units and did the high-level planning for the Royal Laotian Army and Air Force. The regular army troops numbered more than 70,000 and primarily maintained defensive positions while the smaller irregular force led by the CIA bore the brunt of the fighting. The compound also held the offices of the USAID officials who saw to it that the irregulars and their dependents received food, ammunition, and medical attention. There was an American-style bar and grill where you could get a slice of apple pie and a cup of coffee, hamburgers, milk shakes, or perhaps a cold Bud and a side of fries. Next door was a movie house to escape with John Wayne or Paul Newman and munch buttered popcorn.

Every morning at nine o'clock, except for Sundays, the CIA station chief, the ambassador, the army and air force military attachés, the embassy "bombing officer," the head of USAID, the chief of transportation, and a few other key officials gathered in a small, bug-proof room on an upper floor of the American Embassy for a daily secret updating on the war. Seated around a rectangular conference table, the men would report the significant developments in their special areas. Unfolding his map and flicking a silver pointer over the mottled green terrain, the CIA station chief, the American commander of the irregulars, would tick off ambushes, attacks, and withdrawals; perhaps quickly outline an assault that was shaping up. The Air Force attaché, a colonel in civilian clothes, would plot the latest B-52 strikes or "Arclights," as they were more commonly called, and report on the number of fighter bomber raids that day. The head of USAID would probably give a rundown on how many tons of rice had been air-dropped, with possibly the notation that a

frequently used bridge had been blown up. And so it went.

In early 1972, the American ambassador was G. McMurtrie Godley III, Yale '39. He would quietly scratch at a note pad as officials spoke in the secret morning briefing, keeping a running account of "enemy" casualties. Then, when everyone had finished, he would announce the total, his spirits lifting visibly if it were a particularly high figure. Godley, who had served in the Congo in the mid-1960's when CIA mercenaries, with air support from Cuban-exile pilots, were fighting insurgents, was a huge, hearty man with a passion for the war and the role he played as supreme field commander. His favorite weapons were the bombers, especially the B-52's, and his gleeful discourses on them and the "ordinance" they delivered earned him the nickname "G. Arclight III."

Hugh Tovar, the CIA station chief at that time, was a slender, sophisticated and intelligent former OSS officer who had parachuted into Laos at the end of World War II and shared the ambassador's zeal for the secret war. As head of the "Country Team," the ambassador was nominally the superior, but as commander of the most prominent troops, the station chief gained extra stature, just as Westmoreland and Abrams had on the Vietnam Country Team, and in practice Godley and Tovar appeared to work on an almost equal footing.

Well before the daily briefings began, with the morning mist still clinging to the rice paddies, the pilots of the CIA's airline, Air America, in their gray trousers and white shirts, had tossed down ham and eggs and flapjacks at the airport cafeteria in Vientiane and were on their way "up country," in lumbering, unmarked C-47's carrying CIA field operatives, armed to the teeth with the latest automatic rifles and pistols and tons of food and combat supplies for the irregulars.

Until early 1972 a good many of the planes each day headed for the village of Long Tieng in a ruggedly beautiful valley eighty miles north of Vientiane. There for nearly ten years the CIA operated its main forward base for the secret war, training and equipping tribesmen, working out daily strategy, and sending them into battle. A mile-long paved runway sliced through the heart of the valley with stacks of bombs, forklifts for loading them, and a cluster of communications shacks at either end. The shacks were crammed with powerful, top-secret electronic equipment for eavesdropping on the Pathet Lao and directing irregular troops over great distances. Just back from the airstrip were bunches of tin-roofed huts for some 30,000 civilians and the several thousand irregulars who had garrisoned the base. There was also a 150-bed hospital maintained by USAID. The airstrip was not long enough for jets and was used mainly by the little, single-engine T-28 bombers of the Royal Laotian Air Force, Air America transports, and big-winged helicopter couriers that often landed and took off in a few hundred feet on the side of steep mountains. But frequently Jolly Green Giant rescue helicopters of the American Air Force idled there on standby for a "May Day" call from an American bomber pilot in trouble. Alfred W. McCoy, in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, said the tribesmen, whose main cash crop had always been opium, also operated a heroin factory at

Long Tieng at a time when Laos was the major supplier for the GI drug market in Vietnam. McCoy said, too, that Air America planes were sometimes used to transport the Meo opium. Foreigners—that is, non-official Americans such as newsmen—could visit Long Tieng, which was officially described as a base of the Royal Laotian Army, only by obtaining permission from the American Embassy in Vientiane, and permission was rarely granted.

When I arrived in Laos in March 1972, Long Tieng had been under heavy artillery fire for several weeks and the CIA, the irregulars, and their families had retreated south to a place that was marked Ban Xon on the maps but which most of the Americans called Site 272. Site 272 was a dreary flat spot amid the strikingly beautiful limestone peaks and spires of northern Laos. It was dominated by a steel-mat runway. The CIA had taken over the western side of the field, thrown up rough-lumber shacks to shelter its super-secret electronic gear, and posted "restricted" signs. Across the metal strip was a handful of shacks where USAID field men coordinated airdrops of rice, canned meat, and cooking oil. The USAID hospital that had been at Long Tieng was there, too, not far from a steamy shack where Air America pilots were wolfing down hamburgers between flights. The field was frenetic. Planes seemed to be fighting to land and to take off. No sooner did an aircraft screech down than cargo handlers were filling it with rice and ammunition and waving it off again. Knots of hill tribe women, mainly Meos with their baggy black slacks and blouses, colorful sashes, and heavy silver jewelry, waited stoically to board aircraft that would take them to their distant villages.

Site 272, on the southern edge of the mountains, not far from the flat Vientiane Plain, was the end of the line for the tribesmen, the bottom rung on the ladder of retreat, where they found themselves panting when the cease-fire came. For them and the CIA the war had been a series of costly delaying actions, their few advances followed by greater setbacks. Some of the tribesmen had fled from provinces high up on the map of Laos edging on North Vietnam and China. Others had come from the Plain of Jars. But all of them had given up a home somewhere in the highlands under pressure from the Communists. They loved the mountains, felt heartsick in the flats, and even became physically ill there. That was why they had originally joined forces with the CIA, many tribesmen told me. The Communists would come into the villages, they said, organize the people into work parties to dig trenches or carry ammunition and supplies and, in the evenings, lecture them on Marxism. The tribesmen I met didn't like being bossed around and they didn't care much for the lectures. So at the first opportunity they ran away. When the CIA offered them guns they gladly accepted, figuring they could take back their homes from the intruders.

There was no "arm-twisting" to get the Meo to fight, one of the highest ranking Americans in Laos told me, annoyed at the suggestion that the CIA had made cannon fodder of the tribesmen.

"If it had not been for Uncle Sam's support," the American official continued, "the Meo would have been destroyed years ago.

and chased them out." He seemed to forget as he spoke in 1972 that even with "Uncle Sam's" help, the tribesmen had been mauled and displaced.

One theory expressed guardedly in Vientiane was that the initial fighting among the Meo had been a matter of clan disputes. Some took up with the North Vietnamese and some turned to Vientiane and the Americans. The strong feeling was that without the CIA's arms and encouragement, the fighting would never have reached such a high level and that very likely accommodations could have been made which would have averted the slaughter of the Meo.

Early on, the clans allied with the CIA developed a draft system by which village elders forced young men into the army. Whether the elders were acting out of community spirit or because they were being paid a "head price" by the CIA I couldn't personally determine. But McCoy wrote in his book on the narcotics traffic that when Ger Su Yang, the leader in the village of Long Pot, refused to send young men to the irregular army in early 1971, the Americans stopped dropping rice to his people.

In a hospital bed at Site 272, thirty-seven-year-old Lieutenant Bounhoun Keodara, whose left leg had just been amputated below the knee, talked about how he had been "recruited" thirteen years earlier. "You must be a soldier if you are a man because the leader tells you you must," he said. "If you don't want to go you are put in prison. Or you pay someone else to go for you."

Nearby in another bed, a fourteen-year-old soldier with a broken leg said his two older brothers had been taken into the army before him. Then one of them was killed, he said, "so I had to take his position."

"I don't like army life," the boy said. "If there were not so many enemy I would like to be a soldier. I'm afraid."

Senh Sai, fifteen, said he wanted to become a soldier because of the money, but he added, "the big people asked us to be soldiers. They ordered us."

At a tiny outpost cut into the side of a mountain top, a ten-year-old boy with American-made hand grenades clipped to his belt and an American-made M-16 rifle in his hands was asked if he enjoyed being a soldier. "I don't enjoy it," he said with a shy smile. "I want to study. . . . But pressure pushed me into being a soldier. . . . I want to be a teacher more than I want to fight."

It was total war in the mountains of Laos, with no safe exit for anyone. Recounting the losses in one battle, a young, angular-faced irregular soldier in camouflaged fatigues said that 300 Meo had been killed, mostly civilians.

"We use civilians to carry ammunition," he explained. "We don't have any other way to support our soldiers."

Those who somehow managed not to fight for either the CIA-backed side or the Communists sometimes found the shifting war suddenly in their own village, with machine-gun bullets whining overhead and mortars and bombs flattening homes. There was no choice but to run. It was always hard going, and exhaustion and disease took their toll. Those who stayed alive were often confused and disoriented and many became beggars of sorts, dependent upon American rice drops.

It was a tragedy that kept repeating itself endlessly grinding the people down. One man of twenty-seven told me his family had

been uprooted seven times in twelve years. A middle-aged woman, whose husband and only son had been killed in the fighting, said she had taken flight five times. Lt. Tsion Leng said his village had pulled up stakes in a panic every year for eleven years. "We lost everything," he said without emotion. "We lost some of our family members. The enemy captured more than 200 of the 22 people in the village. Thirty-seven died of disease, fever, malaria and seven by spirits. We really don't like moving, but we have to."

As these "assets," as the CIA referred to the hill people, withered, the agency increasingly looked to Thailand for manpower, despite a legislative ban against U.S. support for forces of a third country in Laos. (Senator Symington charged that the use of the Thais in Laos violated the legislative restriction "in letter as well as in spirit," but the CIA continued unchecked with its illegal recruiting.) What attracted the Thais was money. A private who signed up with the CIA to go to Laos, for example, was paid nearly three times the salary of a private in the regular Thai army. The so-called Thai "volunteers" were given Lao names and Lao identity cards by the CIA. They were sent to Laos in Thai units and stayed in the units rather than mixing with hill tribe companies and battalions. After fulfilling a one-year contract they were free to go home. About 30 percent, however, tired quickly of the hard living and deserted.

One of the things that kept the hill people going so long was their leader, Vang Pao, an ambitious, French-trained soldier who attracted the attention of the first Americans who ventured into the mountains of Laos. As the CIA funneled money and arms through Vang Pao, his stature and power spiraled, pushing him ahead of the traditional Meo leaders. He was made a major general in the Royal Laotian Army with responsibility for an entire military region, the highest position a hill tribesman had ever attained, and he became the singular leader of his people. I found tribesmen who loved him, others who despised him, but no one ready to cross him. When he said, "Move out," the troops moved out. Partly to solidify his position in the polygamous society, the story of Vang Pao's rise to power was the story of the Meo people.

Once accused of pocketing CIA money intended for his troops, of shooting men with whom he had differences, and of torturing prisoners, his brutality was never denied, but most Americans claimed the general was less corrupt than other Laotian officers with whom they dealt.

There were times during the long war when even Vang Pao wanted to quit. But Pop, Buell kept him going, according to Don A. Schanche, who wrote a book about Buell's life with the Meo called *Mr. Pop*.

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Schanche recalled one evening after a major defeat when Buell found Vang Pao alone in his French colonial villa at Long Tieng, disheveled and in tears.

According to Schanche, Buell listened briefly, then shouted at Vang Pao, "Get hold of yourself! You lost a battle. You ain't lost the war. And you ain't lost your people either. Sure, their morale's all shot to hell right now, but they'll get over it."

Then, Schanche went on, Vang Pao straightened and looked ruefully at Pop. "I know you speak harshly to me for my own good, my father," he said. "Maybe it is not as dark as I have been telling myself since I retreated from Pha Thi. But it is bad. You saw my soldiers when you were there. I took you with me to inspect the new recruits. Did you not see them? A third of them were only twelve years old. Their rifles are longer than they are. They should be in school, not fighting. When you looked at them, couldn't you see?" Again he began to stream tears. "The good ones are all dead, my father. Dead. These are all I have left. It is late. We have fought for nine years. There is no way we can win."

"But you can hold. General, you can hold," Buell replied.

"Hold what?" Vang Pao continued in the same dispirited vein.

"It ain't all lost, General. You know that," Buell said. "We can figure somethin' out."

Talking with a correspondent from Canada Television once, Buell said he considered himself and Vang Pao as partners in an anti-Communist crusade. They both felt bad that young boys were being used as soldiers, he said. But when he was asked if he would like to see a ten-year-old grandson of his carrying a hand grenade made by a foreign power, Buell replied, "I sure as hell would, if he was holding off an enemy such as the North Vietnamese. My own grandson. Even at five years old, if he could do it."

Buell always expressed his love for the hill people and when he retired from USAID after suffering a heart attack, he settled in Vientiane, working at a school for blind children from the hill tribes.

By 1972, the war the CIA had entered as a counter-guerrilla campaign had become, from the American side, largely an air war. Even with the Thai reinforcements, the many smaller bombers.

Laos had been shaken by twice as much bombing as North Vietnam. Sections of the once-populous Plain of Jars had been turned into cratered moonscapes, and survivors told of living for weeks in caves and trenches, venturing out only after dark.

But during most of the bombing—from May 1964 until March 1970—Presidents Johnson and Nixon baldly denied that the air raids were taking place. Even as villagers fleeing the bombing streamed into Vientiane

telling of skies filled with attacking American planes, American officials insisted that U.S. aircraft were only carrying out "armed aerial reconnaissance," that is, surveying the land and striking only in self-defense.

Finally, though, on March 6, 1970, amid what he called "intense public speculation" over growing American involvement in Laos, President Nixon went on national television to put "the subject into perspective." The president's statement was broadly misleading and littered with lies and omissions, but it did put on record for the first time the fact that American planes had, indeed, been secretly bombing Laos for six years.

Nixon asserted that the bombing had been initiated at the request of the Royal Laotian Government and that subsequent strikes had been flown "only when requested by the Royal Laotian Government."

On the contrary, however, Joseph C. Goulden, in his book *Truth is the First Casualty*, reported that not only had Prince Souvanna Phouma not requested the start of the bombing in 1964, but that he had not even been informed that it was beginning, and when he discovered the air raids, he threatened to resign unless they were halted. In two days, however, Goulden said, the American ambassador in Laos then, Leonard Unger, managed to calm the prince and turn his protest into an "invitation." Furthermore, diplomats in Vientiane told me in 1972 that Souvanna Phouma felt the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was of no value to Laos and wanted it stopped so he could proceed with attempts to make peace with the Communists. But the diplomats said Souvanna Phouma had no hopes of a bombing halt because of American concern with Vietnam.

While forcefully condemning the Communist violations of Laotian neutrality, Nixon continued, like his predecessors, to deny that the U.S. had breached the agreements. He made no mention whatsoever of the CIA and referred to a part of the general armed forces for which the Laotian government had "requested" assistance from the U.S.

The president stated flatly that "no American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations," but within two days the *Los Angeles Times* found the family

was being run by a coalition similar to the government the Laotians had started with shortly after independence in 1954. The difference, however, was that after some eighteen years of political and military intervention by the CIA, the Communists controlled much more of the population and land and held a stronger position in the coalition. The CIA's single largest military effort had been a dismal failure.

In the end, the CIA was denied even the gratitude of the hill people it had armed for

UNION, San Diego
6 August 1975

CIA Target Of Overkill

having kept them out of the hands of the Communists. Chatting in the cool, dark lobby of the Constellation Hotel one morning in Vientiane, Touby Lyfoung, one of the most influential political leaders of the Lao, told me his people would surely have gone with the Communists had the CIA not intervened. And that, he said, would have been better. "Even if the Communist regime had not been paradise," he said, "our people would not have died. There would have been no war." **OT-2**

(This is the fifth article in a series on America's intelligence community.)

NEW YORK TIMES
19 August 1975

POWER TO SPY HELD A TOOL FOR TYRANNY

WASHINGTON, Aug. 17 (UPI)—Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho said Sunday that the spy technology of the Government is so massive that Americans would have "no way to fight back" if a dictator took control.

Mr. Church, chairman of the Senate committee investigating the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence gathering agencies, said his panel is looking into the security index of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, emergency offices of the Mount Weather computer system and the military's contingency plan for martial law. Mr. Church warned that the nation's "very extensive capability of intercepting messages," which he said was essential in keeping track of foreign enemies, "at any time could be turned around on the American people."

He said that if the country should come under tyranny, "the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the Government, no matter how privately it was done, is in the reach of the Government to know, such is the capability of this technology. We must see to it," he said, that the Central Intelligence Agency "and all agencies that possess this technology, operate within the law and under proper supervision so that we never cross that abyss."

LOS ANGELES TIMES
8 August 1975

CIA Malady

Ernest Conine's (July 18), "Why the Big Flap Over CIA Contact Men?" spotlights the paranoia that has seized so many of our political leaders and opinion formers.

The CIA malady is not only virulent, it is so contagious that the normal good judgment of ordinary voting citizens is being paralyzed.

After these many weeks of increasing hysteria, during which even the CIA executives have been badgered into apologies for just and proper actions, how can we return to sanity before irreparable damage is done?

Sen. Frank Church, the chairman of one of the congressional committees investigating the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency recently compared that organization to a "rogue elephant charging out of control."

More recently many responsible citizens have begun to compare the investigation into the activities of the CIA with the witchhunts of the McCarthy era in the 1950s.

Both evaluations have validity, each in its own context, each in its own time period.

In some respects CIA has behaved like a rogue elephant, although not of recent date. In its heyday the Agency violated its charter by spying on Americans within the United States of America. It succumbed to pressure from the White House to take part in improper activities. It undoubtedly had a hand in more than a few revolutions here and there. And there were probably times when it even discussed the possible assassination of foreign leaders.

However, that is all in the past and, even at the worst, its irresponsibilities and transgressions were accompanied by skillful intelligence activity of incalculable value to the nation. Today the CIA is prostrate. Its morale is sapped, its ability to recruit agents is damaged and, as Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said over the weekend, the sources of information available to the CIA are drying up.

In this context the continuing harassment of the Agency — particularly in the limelight of congressional hearings, where immediate drama has more weight with the public than a voluminous report a year from now that few will bother to read — is reminiscent of the McCarthy era.

What we are seeing is investigative overkill at its worst. The question now is not whether the CIA can be

bridled and controlled by Congress, but whether it can rise from the ashes. And that brings the discussion to the central point of whether we need a CIA at all. We can't recall that even the severest critic of the agency has said that we do not.

Whatever its failings, the functions of the CIA are vital to our national security. An agency of that sort is essential to provide the President and the defense establishment the information they need both to conduct intelligent foreign policy and to provide for the security of the citizens of the United States of America.

Mr. Schlesinger, himself the head of the CIA recently, reminded us that there is no other way to obtain the intelligence we need. Satellites are inadequate because photographs do not think and, as Schlesinger noted, they do not reveal intentions.

The message that he left with the CIA investigators merits the consideration of every American who believes that he has been wronged by the CIA, or that American institutions have been subverted by CIA activities.

We tend to forget, Mr. Schlesinger said, "that the most valuable of social welfare services that a society can provide for its citizens is to keep them alive and free."

Put another way, we can and should insist that the CIA not have the willy-nilly right to open our mail—but we should also do nothing that sacrifices our right to have private mail in the first place.

We should also remember that while we must set the rules by which the CIA operates, we will lose the game every time if we insist upon using padded gloves while our opponents are using brass knuckles.

I wish it were possible to impose a month of silence. We could then hope for a rational action by Congress to correct the few defects in authorizing legislation and oversight procedures. During the silence those who have been hysterical would then be ready to praise the CIA for its ac-

complishments and urge its continued operations as an essential tool of our administrative process.

Simmer down, America! Think quietly for 30 days; then act calmly.

PHIL WILCOX
Laguna Niguel

This Week in Washington

Colby Gets Some Praise in Congress

By Mark R. Arnold

For much of the 27 months that he has headed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), William E. Colby has suffered the fate of one of those mechanical targets you see at amusement parks—the kind that gets shot down whenever it raises its head.

Traditionally, directors of U.S. intelligence have been able to keep their heads low and their agency's activities beyond the searchlight of public scrutiny. But that has not been Colby's lot.

Revelations about CIA involvement in burglaries, buggings, drug tests, assassination plots and its keeping of files on U.S. citizens have taken their toll on agency morale and threatened to wear out Director Colby's welcome at the White House.

"They're taking a microscope to activities formerly viewed only through

scanning." He also argued that the practice is illegal under Supreme Court rulings limiting warrantless wiretaps to national-security cases involving foreign agents. The committee later took its inquiry behind closed doors after the White House warned it was treading in an "extremely sensitive" area.

The House investigation and a companion inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Idaho Democrat Frank Church, are running on separate but complementary tracks. The Church group is exploring CIA operations, beginning with involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders. It has yet to hold an open session, though the panel has been taking testimony since the spring.

The Pike committee, seeking to avoid duplication of the Senate group's work, is zeroing in on the size and shape of the intelligence establishment, its budget practices, and the degree of oversight from the White House and Congress.

Members of both panels are known to believe that intelligence operations should be subject to tighter congressional supervision. In addition, there is some sentiment in Congress for elimination of the CIA's responsibilities for covert operations, which would leave the agency as a purely intelligence-gathering organization. Such a step would be

bitterly resisted by the White House and powerful congressional friends of the agency.

'Thanks, Not Abuse'

In his congressional appearances, Colby conducts himself as a calm, sophisticated professional, seeking to be co-operative while championing in a low-key way the present prerogatives of his agency. Occasionally, he becomes defensive, as when he said last week that CIA personnel "deserve the country's thanks rather than the abuse they are receiving today."

For the most part, though, he patiently fields inquiries about the mechanics of agency operations while requesting that questions about sensitive agency policies be handled behind closed doors. Pressed as to why the CIA should have greater flexibility in its transfer of funds than other agencies, Colby replied last week, "If we are offered a document of tremendous intelligence value, we can not tell the seller to return next year when we have had an opportunity to budget for it."

His basic message is that though there have been abuses in the past, the agency must be preserved. "The world has changed, the country has changed, the intelligence business has changed," he told the Pike committee. Replied freshman Rep. Philip H. Hayes of Indiana, "Congress has changed too."

News Analysis

a telescope, if at all," says one student of the agency, referring to the recent spate of investigations—journalistic, Presidential, and congressional.

But Colby, to judge from recent appearances, is accommodating himself well to the demands for greater disclosure in post-Watergate Washington, and is earning himself some tentative praise on Capitol Hill for his co-operation.

Difficult to Judge

Last week, he made two appearances before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, his 40th and 41st appearances before Government investigators this year. He began by saying, "It would be disingenuous to say that I welcome this process, but we will work constructively with you to show both the good and the bad."

How much of both, good and bad Colby in fact disclosed is hard to judge because much of his testimony took place behind closed doors. In one executive session, he satisfied a key demand of the 13-member House panel by outlining the secret budget for U.S. foreign intelligence. This information the agency has previously shared with only a handful of lawmakers on the Senate and House Appropriations committees. Chairman Otis G. Pike of New York said Colby's presentation had been "remarkably candid."

But in sticking his head up before the Pike panel, Colby got knocked down once again. Rep. Les Aspin of Wisconsin drew from the intelligence chief the admission that the National Security Agency (NSA), which monitors foreign communications, sometimes picks up conversations of U.S. citizens while eavesdropping on overseas telephone calls.

Colby replied that intercepts involving citizens are "incidental" to agency monitoring of foreign communications. Aspin insisted, however, that the activity is not incidental but "random

PRESS-HERALD, Portland, Me.
4 August 1975

Orgy Of Attacks

It is healthy that the Central Intelligence Agency's illegal activities should be exposed but the excesses of congressional and press-probing have damaged the agency and the country.

The CIA's mission of providing authentic information about foreign affairs to our government is vitally essential. A sound foreign policy is impossible without this service. Judgments in the best interest of the United States by the Executive branch on overseas matters depend upon reliable intelligence and analysis.

But there is reason to believe that the orgy of attacks on the agency by some politicians and part of the press has reduced the CIA's effectiveness. Certainly our allies are wary about an intimate relationship with the agency. Its own people, their morale shaken, are running scared and such timidity is bound to be reflected in the conduct of covert missions, in the recommendations and actions which the record will show have often helped to avert crises abroad.

Worse, some of the revelations here at home have actually lifted the lid from CIA operations, enabling other nations to take steps to thwart our information gathering. The New York Times, for example, with disgraceful irresponsibility, actually disclosed that our specially-equipped submarines were monitoring Soviet missile activities for 15 years and often doing it inside Russian territorial waters. The Times can be proud that it led the Russians to take countermeasures, including devices around targets to nullify our electronic spying gear and underwater mines.

Such international spying, as unpleasant as it may be, is routine necessity with all nations and the CIA in keeping an eye on Soviet missile activities was doing its job, a job in the interest of the American people. Because it went astray in its domestic activities does not justify reckless exposure of its legitimate performance on behalf of national security.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1975

Mind-Drug Tests a Federal Project for Almost 25 Years

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

American military and intelligence officials watched men with glazed eyes pouring out rambling confessions at the Communist purge trials in Eastern Europe after World War II, and for the first time they began to worry about the threat of mind-bending drugs as weapons.

Then, a few years later, came the reports of American G.I.s being brainwashed in Korean prison camps.

"Here were people who had stood up against the Nazis, suddenly standing up and confessing everything to the Communists," one employee of the Central Intelligence Agency recalled the other day. "For the first time, our prisoners of war were denouncing their own country. What in the world was going on?"

No one in the United States knew for certain. So, as the story is now told, the C.I.A. began investigating a wide variety of then little-known, mind-altering drugs, including LSD, which is lysergic acid diethylamide, and trying them out on human beings. So did the Army, the Navy and, eventually, the Air Force.

In the two months since the Rockefeller Commission first disclosed the C.I.A.'s experiments with LSD, there have been many fragmentary reports on drug testing in the military-intelligence community.

From these reports, and new information turned up in interviews and other research, there emerges the story of a vast government program ranging over nearly a quarter of a century, a program that, primarily in the name of national security, subjected more than 4,000 persons to such psychochemical drugs as LSD, marijuana and a number of other chemical compounds that could produce hallucinations, euphoria and hysteria.

Government in Vanguard

The story is one of a Federal Government that played the role of foremost pioneer in research on a family of drugs that in the nineteen-sixties found their way into the streets of America as the seeds of a new counterculture.

It is a story, also, that makes clear that the intent of the drug experiments went beyond the Government's contention that they were merely defensive in nature, aimed at learning how or when an enemy was using the compounds and how to protect against them. In fact, there is ample evidence that military and intelligence planners hoped to add these drugs to the United States' arsenal of offensive weapons.

The Rockefeller Commission reported, for example, that the C.I.A. considered several "operational uses outside the United States."

And in the late 'fifties there were a number of references in military publications to psychochemicals as "incapacitat-

ing agents" that could be used to knock out an enemy for a few hours or a few days without doing permanent damage, a concept that one retired general the other day called, "winning without killing."

Included in the commission's disclosure of the C.I.A.'s drug experiments earlier this summer was an account of the death of a man who had jumped from a New York City hotel window after having been surreptitiously given LSD.

As the identity of the victim, Frank R. Olson, became known, and as other details of the incident emerged, servicemen and civilian researchers who had participated in military drug experiments began telephoning newspapers and television stations.

Several Projects Confirmed

At first the armed forces refused to comment, but eventually spokesmen confirmed several drug projects. In the smallest, and apparently the only effort not directly related to military activity, the Navy said it conducted a single study with 20 persons between 1950 and 1951 to evaluate the therapeutic value of LSD in treating severe depression.

The C.I.A. and the Army, which was the principal researcher for the Department of Defense, say they discontinued their LSD experiments on humans in 1967, but the Army says it went on with other drugs that could cause hallucinations until about two weeks ago. In addition, the Air Force says it continued to sponsor university research in LSD through 1972.

Civilian scientists and medical researchers generally agree that there probably was good reason to test these drugs on humans—given the perceived threat and the fact that there existed no alternative means of determining the impact of the psychochemicals on men. But they have been extremely critical of the procedures followed by the C.I.A. and the Army.

In most of the C.I.A.'s experiments with LSD, the Rockefeller Commission report said, the subjects were unaware that they were being administered the drug—a practice that Dr. Judd Marmor, president of the American Psychiatric Association, says he considers unethical and dangerous.

The standard ethical procedure in human experimentation in the United States is to obtain prior informed consent from subjects. There is a danger, especially with such a potent psychochemical as LSD, that an unsuspecting subject will suddenly feel he is losing his mind and, in despair, attempt suicide, many researchers believe.

Despite the death of Frank Olson, which occurred in the fall of 1953, apparently not long after the C.I.A. began experimenting on humans with LSD, the agency continued to administer the drug to unsuspecting subjects for 10 more

years, the Rockefeller Commission reported.

The agency's Inspector General learned of the practice, questioned the propriety of it, and called a halt, the commission said, but the C.I.A. did not finally abandon its test with these drugs for four more years. During that time, the subjects were allegedly informed volunteers at various correctional institutions.

The wife and three adult children of Mr. Olson, who for 22 years had been in the dark about the apparent motivating factors in his death, have taken the first steps toward suing the C.I.A. for what they call the "wrongful death" of the head of their family.

David Kairys, one of the lawyers for the Olsons, says his firm, Kairys & Rudovsky of Philadelphia, has also taken on the case of the survivors of a marine colonel who fatally shot himself nine years ago after a C.I.A. job interview in which he later said he believed he had been drugged.

The Army says it administered experimental drugs only to persons who had volunteered "without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion." The volunteers, however, were rewarded with three-day passes every weekend and given an extra \$45 a month in temporary duty pay.

The volunteers were told, the Army says, that they were being given a "chemical compound which might influence their behavior," but they were not told before or after the test the specific name of the drug, such as LSD, or that it might cause them to hallucinate or to feel panic or discomfort.

Follow-up studies were done on only a handful of the military men tested, an inquiry over the last three weeks shows, and there was no indication that the C.I.A. had conducted a followup on any of its subjects.

Concerned Over Validity

Dr. Marmor, the head of psychiatric association, said: "One might argue as to whether [the Army] had obtained informed consent, but if you tell the subject everything you might well invalidate the experiment."

Dr. Van M. Sim, who was director of the Army's program of testing drugs on humans for 22 years, and is now being investigated for alleged misuse of the pain-killing drug Demerol before he came to the military, used the same rationale in explaining his methods in a recent news conference, saying that to provide more information to subjects might prejudice the experiments.

Dr. Marmor said that in the Army tests there apparently had been "some consent and there was some prior knowl-

edge. And that kind of preparation gives an individual some kind of protection. What I'm concerned about is an individual quite unsuspectingly given a drug."

Representative Thomas J. Downey, a Long Island Democrat who has called for a Congressional inquiry into the issue, says he finds it "inexcusable" that the Army did not tell its subjects what drug they had received after the experiments so that, in the event of aftereffects, they might have some sense of what was happening.

He is disturbed, too, that there has been no substantive follow-up of the Government test subjects.

Dr. Sim said in an interview at his home in Bel Air, Md., near the Edgewood arsenal, that on its own initiative the Army had done a follow-up in 1971 on two men who had received LSD, and 38 who had received other drugs, and had not been able to distinguish between those subjects and a control group that had received no drugs.

He said he had felt the sample was too small, and that he was not entirely confident about the follow-up techniques employed, but he said he didn't have at his disposal enough money or medical officers to expand and continue the follow-up "and nobody seemed particularly interested in this."

Dr. Sim said he and his staff had themselves taken all of the drugs being tested, and he said since neither he nor the others had experienced any troublesome aftereffects, "we didn't expect the other men to feel anything either."

In 1972, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, William R. Jordan, who said he had been stricken with epilepsy a year after participating in an experiment with psychochemicals, asked that the Army do a follow-up on his test group of 34 men.

The Army initially turned the colonel down but later reversed itself after Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida wrote a letter in his behalf.

In the ensuing followup the Army said it was able to find only 27 of the 34 men. One had been killed in Vietnam, seven reportedly said they were not interested, and 19 were examined for two to five days each and finally given a clean bill of health.

The Army now says it will attempt to follow up on all of the servicemen it has given the drug, a total of 585 of the more than 3,000 men who participated in the over-all drug program.

Most of the others had received drugs that can cause hallucinations, but the Army said it had no plans to follow up on these men. Even in dealing with only about 600 men, Dr. Sim said he thought the

effort would take years, and some Army doctors expressed skepticism that any meaningful results would be achieved.

The Army said it had no intention of attempting to get in touch with the approximately 900 civilians who were given LSD in Army-sponsored experiments at the University of Maryland, the University of Washington and the New York Psychiatric Institute.

The Air Force said it likewise was not planning to review the health of the 102 civilians who took LSD in studies it paid for at New York University, Duke University, the University of Minnesota, the Missouri Institute of Psychiatry at the University of Missouri in St. Louis, and the Baylor University College of Medicine at the Texas Medical Center in Houston.

In addition to those given LSD by the military and intelligence organizations, the National Institute of Mental Health said that it had conducted tests on more than 3,000 volunteers—prisoners, mental patients and other civilians—for 15 years ending in 1968 in an effort to determine the drug's medical value, particularly in treating psychiatric disorders and chronic alcoholism.

The Food and Drug Administration said its records showed that 170 research projects with LSD had been approved over the last 10 years, but that only six were currently under way at five institutions, including the Veterans Administration Hospital in Topeka, Kan.

The V.A. program, according to officials of the agency, involves an average of two carefully selected mental patients a year. The Associated Press reported yesterday. The patients have been hospitalized for long periods and have not responded to other treatment, the V.A. said.

Other Tests Listed

The other research, a spokesman said, is being done at the Vista Hill Psychiatric Foundation in San Francisco, the Medical College of Birmingham in Birmingham, Ala., the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute in San Francisco and the Maryland Psychiatric Institute in Baltimore, which has two projects.

Dr. Sim said he knew of no cases in which participants in the program he directed at the Edgewood Arsenal in northeast Maryland had suffered serious consequences, nor had he heard of any adverse reports concerning the subjects in the experiments carried out for the military at universities and research centers.

However, the Rockefeller Commission said that in a number of instances, subjects in the C.I.A. experiments became ill for hours or days after being given the drug and that one person had been hospitalized.

The commission said the details of the hospitalization and many other aspects of the C.I.A.'s drug testing could not be learned because all of the records concerning the program—a total of 152 separate files—had been ordered destroyed

in 1973.

Commission sources say that the chief of the C.I.A. drug testing program, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, a 57-year-old biochemist who was personally involved in the fatal experiment in 1953, ordered the destruction of the records in an apparent effort to conceal the details of possibly illegal action. Dr. Gottlieb is reportedly in India.

Psychochemicals Defended

Arguing in favor of using psychochemicals as offensive weapons in 1959, Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs, the then chief chemical officer of the Army, wrote in the October issue of *The Army Navy Air Force Journal*:

"We know the concept is feasible because we have run tests using a psychochemical on squad-sized units of soldier volunteers. They became confused, irresponsible, and were unable to carry out their missions. However, these were only temporary effects with complete recovery in all cases."

The Army says it never prepared large quantities of LSD for offensive use and that it discontinued experiments with the drug in 1967 because "all necessary work to define the chemical warfare threat from this compound" had been completed. Several other military sources, however, said the Army stopped work with the drug because its effects were regarded as too unpredictable.

A few years earlier, the Army adopted a psychochemical that it calls BZ as its standard incapacitant, and a department spokesman said that bombs filled with the agent are now stockpiled at the Pine Bluff arsenal in Arkansas. So far, the Army says, BZ, whose chemical name is 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate, has been used only in experiments. Like LSD, BZ is a derivative of lysergic acid.

An Army training manual lists the symptoms caused by BZ as dry, flushed skin, urinary retention, constipation, headache, giddiness, hallucination, drowsiness and, sometimes, manic behavior. Also, researchers say loss of balance and inability to stand or walk are common.

Dr. Sim said that most of the military drug testing took place at the Edgewood Arsenal in laboratory conditions, after the subjects—mostly soldiers, but also some airmen—had gone through a week of medical, psychological and psychiatric examinations.

But he said that he and staff members had also done field testing with military volunteers at several installations in the United States.

In the United States last week to attend a scientific meeting, Dr. Albert Hofmann, the Swiss chemist who accidentally discovered the hallucinogenic effects of LSD in 1943, said he had begun working with lysergic acid, in hopes of developing a stimulant for circulation. He was unhappy, he said, that LSD had ever been considered as a tool of war.

"I had intended to prepare a medicine," Dr. Hoffman said, "not a weapon."

Disclosures of Colonel Michael Goleniewski

Colonel Michael Goleniewski, a former director of the Communist Polish Army counterintelligence, who worked in close liaison with high level KGB officials and Soviet satellite intelligence officers while being in secret contact with western intelligence, has now dramatically illustrated the warning issued by Sir Martin of MI-5. As a result of his defection to the West, arranged primarily by the CIA, Colonel Goleniewski has become the single most important foe of Soviet KGB espionage operations against the Free World.

Colonel Goleniewski brought to America numerous Communist intelligence documents, including data on 240 intelligence agents working for the KGB in western Europe and America. His disclosures have led to the arrest of many leading KGB agents and none of his information has turned out to be untrue or inaccurate. Consequently, what has turned out to be the most sensitive revelation by Goleniewski may have been a key spark for the purge of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff and the frenzied left wing attacks to discredit and neutralize that vital agency, seriously weakened and penetrated as it is.

Intelligence Digest Weekly Review statement

Colonel Goleniewski has established personal contact with your *Intelligence Digest* correspondent and his information caused the following statement which appeared in the 21 May 1975 *Intelligence Digest Weekly Review*, "Brief intelligence items:"

"There is yet another factor involved in the attacks on the CIA, especially its Counterintelligence Staff, which concerns allegations that a very prominent US official operating at the highest echelon of government was formerly connected with a Soviet-directed espionage network. It is reliably reported that the lack of response to these allegations resulted in some resignations from the CIA Counterintelligence Staff. All information on this factor has been 'blacked-out' by the left wing American press."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

19 August 1975

'Ford and Olsons'

Your editorial on "Ford and Olsons" is saccharine and shortsighted. It tells only a small part of the story, and fuzzes over the major problem of CIA.

It is fine that President Ford apologized to the widow and family of Frank Olson for Olson's death a score of years ago after CIA gave him LSD without his knowledge. The action by CIA was treacherous and tragic.

But the same President Ford believes that counterespionage and subversion in foreign countries is the natural order of things. The same Gerald Ford has played sleepy-dog on the charges that the CIA plotted the deaths of Diem, Lumumba, and Allende, that it tried many times to kill Castro. The same President played sleepy-dog concerning the infiltration of the American peace movement and the American liberal movement by CIA and other intelligence agencies.

The serious problem of global CIA activity cannot be brushed aside with smiles, cosmetics, or image building. The real issue is subversion and killing in many parts of the world—plus subversion at home by the intelligence community.

South Dartmouth, Mass.

T. Noel Stern

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
New Left Independent Weekly
20 August 1975

CIA brewing Chile-style coup

in Portugal

The following "open letter to the Portuguese people" was written by Philip Agee, a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency and author of the book, "CIA Diary: Inside the Company." Agee, who has recently visited Portugal, worked for the CIA for 12 years, engaging in counter-revolutionary activity in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico. His experiences, he says, led him to become a "revolutionary socialist" and his subsequent expose of the CIA, naming hundreds of undercover agents and operations, has seriously hurt the agency. The "letter" was distributed by Fifth Estate, an anti-CIA group.

By PHILIP AGEE

The revolutionary process in Portugal is being attacked by the guardians of capitalist countries' interests, of which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is the most notorious and powerful. I see the signs daily. These counterrevolutionary activities are similar to what I did in the CIA for more than 10 years during the 1950s and 1960s. I send this letter as part of a continuing effort by many Americans to end imperialist intervention and support to repression by the U.S. government.

In the Azores as well as in mainland Portugal, in the Catholic Church, in political parties and even within the armed forces, the CIA and its allies are working to create enough chaos to justify an attempt by the so-called moderates to take over the revolutionary government.

Since the fall of fascism in Portugal, I have tried to follow developments and have twice visited your country. While my study of the visible signs of CIA intervention is still incomplete, there is good reason to alert you to what I have seen. Last week a U.S. senator announced that the Communist Party of Portugal is receiving \$10 million per month from the Soviet Union, a figure he attributed to the CIA. Two days later Deputy CIA Director Gen. Vernon Walters (who visited Lisbon to survey the political situation in August 1974) confirmed the senator's claim. Secretary of State Kissinger, for his part, publicly warned the Soviet Union recently that assistance by them to the Portuguese revolutionary process was endangering detente. These statements suggest that the American people are being prepared for another secret foreign adventure by the CIA.

I will describe below what I believe are CIA operations, along with a list of names and residences in Portugal of as many of the CIA functionaries I can identify.

The size of the overall U.S. government mission in Portugal is shocking, especially its heavy dominance by military personnel. The mission totals 280 persons of whom about 160 are Americans, with the rest being Portuguese employees. Of the Americans, 105 are military personnel assigned mainly to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, the office of the Defense Attache, and the COMIVERLANT command of NATO.

HIDDEN AGENTS

Of the approximately 50 American civilians in the mission, about 10, I believe, are employees of the CIA. No less than 10 additional CIA functionaries are probably working in Lisbon and other cities, having been assigned ostensibly for temporary duties so that their presence is not included on embassy personnel lists, nor reported to the Portuguese foreign ministry.

One must also assume that additional CIA operations officers have been placed under cover in American military units in Portugal, where their experience in political operations—far superior to that of their military colleagues—will be most effective. While efforts to divert the revolution through Gen. Spínola have failed, new efforts are being made daily in the struggle to stop the revolution.

Without doubt, the CIA officers in other U.S. embassies, most likely in Madrid, Paris and London, have personnel assigned to Portuguese operations that are undertaken in those countries rather than in Portugal proper. The most sensitive operations of the CIA probably are occurring in other European cities rather than in Lisbon.

Who specifically are responsible for operations against Portugal? The CIA is only one of the various U.S. agencies working against the revolution, under the guidance of Ambassador Carlucci. Although Carlucci is not a CIA agent, he must carefully direct and coordinate all U.S. counterrevolutionary operations, including those of the military services. His top-level team includes: Herbert Okun, his minister/counselor and deputy chief of mission; John Morgan, the chief of the CIA; Adm. Frank Corley, chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group; Col. Peter Blackley, chief of the Defense Attache Office; Charles Thomas, counselor for political affairs; and Navy Capt. James Lacey, senior U.S. military representative on the COMIVERLANT NATO Command. Each of the U.S. military units, along with CIA and State Department personnel, are responsible for one or more of the specific counterrevolutionary programs.

In order to preserve imperialist interests in Portugal, the revolution must be diverted from its current directions and the U.S. government is not alone in its efforts. I strongly suspect that Kissinger many months ago urged the leaders of Western European governments to intervene themselves directly to reverse the Portuguese revolutionary process, arguing that the problem is essentially European and that the CIA has been limited in its capabilities by recent revelations. In 1948, when the Communist Party of Italy was about to win the elections, the U.S. government alone threatened to halt aid for reconstruction and even to launch a military invasion. In recent days, the EEC presidents themselves have threatened to withhold financial assistance from Portugal unless their style of democracy is established. Other similarities between postfascist Portugal and post-World War 2 Europe are striking. In Greece, France and Italy, the U.S. government established governments submissive to American economic interests while simultaneously providing alternatives to left-wing governments led by the same political forces that provided the backbone of the resistance in World War 2.

The chosen solution in that era was predominantly Christian Democracy or Social Democracy and the trade union movements corresponding to each. The promotion of these same forces in Portugal since April 1974 suggests to me that the CIA, probably in coordination with other Western European intelligence services, is attempting the same solutions that were successful in other countries following World War 2.

What specifically is the CIA doing in Portugal? The first priority is to penetrate the Armed Forces Movement in order to collect information on its plans, its weaknesses and its internal struggles; to identify the so-called moderates and others who would be favorable to Western strategic interests. The CIA would use information collected from within the AFM for propaganda inside and outside Portugal designed to divide and weaken the AFM. Other CIA tasks include: false documents and rumor campaigns, fomenting of strife, encouraging conflict and jealousy. Moderates are being assisted where possible in their efforts to restrain the pace of revolutionary

development toward socialism. The final goal is for the so-called moderates to take control of the AFM and all Portuguese military institutions.

The U.S. military schools have trained over 3000 Portuguese military personnel since 1950. Detailed files have been accumulated on every one of them—their personalities, politics, likes and dislikes, strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Many of these will have already been selected as contacts to be developed within the Portuguese military establishment, with emphasis on developing close relations with as many AFM members as possible.

Significant efforts have already been made—and these, too, have failed to date—to strengthen Social Democratic and Christian Democratic political parties. The CIA's normal procedure is to maintain friendly relations (and often to give financial support) with leaders of "moderate" opposition political parties who are forced to live in exile. The purpose is to reap large benefits when such politicians return home. Often paid agents are infiltrated into these exile groups in order to obtain additional information. The CIA may have intervened in the recent electoral campaign to assure that the results would "prove" that the majority of Portuguese favor a more "moderate" pace for the revolution. James Lawler, the CIA deputy chief of station in Lisbon, engaged in just such operations in Brazil (in 1962) and in Chile (in 1964) where many millions of dollars were spent by the CIA to promote the election of U.S.-approved "moderates."

In trade unions, the CIA has also been unsuccessful so far, but obvious efforts continue. As in Italy and France after World War 2, the CIA is trying to split the trade union movement by establishing an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and by promoting ties between Portuguese industrial unions and the International Trade Secretariats. Michael Boggs and Irving Brown, both officials of the AFL-CIO with notorious ties to the CIA, visited Portugal last year. Although the capitalist-controlled trade union institutions failed to establish footholds when the trade union law was approved in January, the ICFTU is still trying, through its representative in Portugal, Manuel Simon.

The CIA is also using the Roman Catholic Church for its ends. Recently a reliable source in Washington told me that large amounts of money are going from the United States to the Catholic church for combating the revolution in Portugal. The church's opposition to the worker's control of Radio Renascença should alert us to the identity of interests between the church and American economic concerns.

Propaganda campaigns are central for all important CIA political operations. These campaigns prepare public opinion by creating fear, uncertainty, resentment, hostility, division and weakness. Newspapers, radio, television, wall painting, posterage, fly sheets and falsified documents of all kinds—the CIA uses many different techniques. In Portugal, these have had little success so far, mainly because workers have taken control of the public information media. But the CIA must continue to aid—in every possible way—the efforts of "moderate" political forces to establish and maintain media outlets that the CIA can use for placing its materials.

Outside Portugal the campaign to discredit the revolution is having success. In Europe and America we see the themes clearly: "The AFM has failed to follow the will of most Portuguese as reflected in the April elections. . . . The Portuguese people have sadly 'lost' their freedom with the diminishing importance of the elected assembly. . . . The press has 'lost' its freedom. . . . Portugal needs 'stability' to solve its social and economic problems. . . . The revolutionary leadership is inept and unable to stop the economic downturn. . . . These propaganda themes are preparing the U.S. and Western public opinion for acceptance of intervention and a strong right-wing military government. These themes present the usual false dilemma: Portugal will have either capitalist democracy or cruel, heartless communist dictatorship, with attendant

dull, austere living conditions. There has, of course, been little comparison of Portugal today with the cruelty and hardships of capitalist economics under the former fascist political system.

ECONOMIC WARFARE

As in the campaign against Chile, economic warfare is the key for cutting away public support from the revolutionary leadership. By withholding credits and other assistance from bilateral and multilateral commercial lending institutions, great hardships will befall the middle and working classes. Private investment credits can be frozen, trading contracts delayed and cancelled and unemployment increased, while imperialist propaganda will place the blame on workers' demands and the government's weakness rather than on lending institutions and their deliberate policies of credit retention. The effects of these programs in Chile during the Allende administration are known to all.

Propaganda exploitation of economic hardship will thus prepare at least a limited public acceptance of a strong military government that suddenly appears to "restore national dignity, discipline, and purpose." If there is a Portuguese Pinochet, he ought to be identified now.

In coming months we will probably see intensification of the CIA's operations to create fear, uncertainty, economic disruption, political division and the appearances of chaos. Political assassinations must be expected, along with bombings that can be "attributed" to the revolutionary left. Morgan, the head of the CIA in Lisbon, learned these kinds of operations when he served in Brazil (1966-1969) and in Uruguay (1970-1973). The "death squads" that were established in those countries during the last decade must be anticipated and stopped before they flourish in Portugal.

Greater militancy by reactionary elements in the Catholic church must also be expected in their effort to undermine the revolution. As "moderate" electoral solutions become more and more remote, the CIA and its sister services will increasingly promote Chile-style "stability" as the only remaining way to "save" Portugal. The separatist movement in the Azores, already gaining momentum among U.S. residents of Azores origin, may be promoted by the CIA as a last resort for preserving U.S. military bases there. In Angola, the CIA is not standing idly by, where exceptional natural resources must be kept in capitalist hands. The FNLA is likely being supported by the CIA through Zaire in order to divide the country and prevent MPLA hegemony.

What can be done to defeat this intervention? Clearly the revolutionary process itself and the people's support and participation through organs of popular power is the strongest defense. Nevertheless, imperialist agents ought to be identified and exposed by using many of the CIA's own methods against them. Careful control must be maintained of all entries and exits of Portugal by U.S. citizens, both through immigration control and through the issuance of visas for diplomatic and official passports by Portuguese embassies and consulates.

In the CIA, I worked to install in Uruguay a system whereby all visitors' visas from socialist countries would require approval of the Uruguayan director of immigration, with whom I worked closely, giving recommendations on each visa request. Background investigations of the employment histories of U.S. government officials usually reveal which ones are CIA officers posing as diplomats. Moreover, all "private" U.S. citizens must be monitored for possible CIA connections: businesspeople, tourists, professors, students and retired people. Once these people have been exposed, the Portuguese people themselves must be prepared to take the action needed to force the CIA people out of Portugal. The slogan "CIA Out" must become a reality.

The shocking U.S. military presence in Portugal could well be ended altogether. The only "advice" and "assistance" that a U.S. military group can now give in Portugal is how to make a counterrevolution.

AIM REPORT VOL. IV
JULY 1975

INTELLIGENCE IN A GOLDFISH BOWL

Lt. General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA, says that the United States may be able to succeed in carrying out intelligence operations in a goldfish bowl. But he adds that if we do it will be like going to the moon. We will be the only ones ever to have done it.

General Walters made this remark at the American Security Council luncheon in Washington on July 23, 1975. News media treatment of his candid remarks on the CIA and the dangers facing America today is symbolic of what is wrong with the approach of important elements of the news media's coverage of the CIA investigation.

The Washington Star on the day following General Walters' talk carried three stories on the CIA, occupying 70 column inches of the paper (over half a page). The stories were headed: (1) "Did CIA Cause Colonel's Death?" (2) "CIA Panel Will Call Kissinger" (3) "Nixon Tied to CIA Effort in Chile." Not one word was said about General Walters' talk, even though *The Star* had a reporter present. *The New York Times* also ignored the story. *The Washington Post* devoted six inches to General Walters, burying the report in a story headed: "Clifford Urges Limit to CIA Activities." We were informed that both the AP and UPI carried stories on the Walters' talk on their wires, but no paper we examined used their stories.

The only respectable report we found was in the conservative weekly, *Human Events*, which led its August 2 "Inside Washington" report with a 375-word story on the Walters talk.

The reporter who covered the talk for *The Washington Star*, Norman Kempster, told AIM that he did not do a story on it because Walters had not said anything new. It would appear that in the minds of some journalists the only thing that is newsworthy is material that is critical of the CIA. Statements that put our intelligence activities in proper perspective, defending what has been done, are simply not deemed to be worth reporting.

On February 3, 1975, a top reporter for *The New York Times*, Peter Arnett, stated in a talk at the Air War College, "It seems to me that this is going to be the year that the 'spooks' (CIA) get theirs, or they have to start answering questions. . . Many reporters that I know are starting to go to Washington and are trying to find all the security people, all the discontented CIA officers and others who could feed the grist for the mill to find the story of what went on. I think there are going to be some embarrassing stories about this in the next few months and the next year."

At that time, Reed J. Irvine, Chairman of the Board of AIM, made this rejoinder to Mr. Arnett: "I am afraid that the big story is one that the press is missing entirely. It may be that this is the year when we are going to destroy our internal security establishment, when we are going to destroy or greatly weaken our defense establishment, and when, indeed, we are laying the groundwork for the demise of democracy, or the citadel of democracy, the United States, because of the intent of the press to bring about an immediate end without thinking of the ultimate consequences."

In his American Security Council talk, General Walters voiced a similar warning. Solzhenitsyn has, of course, advised us that we are faced with a very dangerous situation in the world, but this is not the message that usually comes from high government officials in these days of detente. Despite what Norman Kempster of *The Washington Star*

says, it should be news when the No. 2 man at the CIA gives a Solzhenitsyn-like warning.

General Walters told his audience that the country was in "a tougher power situation than it has been since Valley Forge." The reason for this, he said, was that for the first time a foreign country has the "power to destroy or seriously cripple the United States."

General Walters pointed out that despite detente, the Soviets were deploying four new, different types of intercontinental missiles, with signs of a fifth on the horizon. They are building larger and more powerful submarines and increasing the number and improving the quality of their tanks. He said: "We see in all areas a tremendous military effort being made to modernize and improve the Soviet forces beyond what seems to me to be necessary for either deterrence or defense."

The General noted that the Doolittle Report on the CIA twenty years ago had concluded that the U. S. was faced with a ruthless and implacable enemy who was determined to destroy us by any means in their power. Asked whether we faced that kind of enemy today, General Walters said: "I think we are facing a very tough situation. I think the tactics may have changed, but I don't think the long-term goal has changed very much."

General Walters said that our position was especially dangerous because the people of the United States and most of the Western World failed to perceive the great threat posed by the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, giving it the superiority that might enable it to force its will on the rest of the world.

Asked if the CIA had failed to convey its perception of the danger to higher officials on the National Security Council, General Walters said: "We have simply conveyed the information. They must draw their conclusions from it."

The Attack on the Intelligence Community

While welcoming a responsible, constructive investigation, General Walters suggested that the current assault on the CIA is, in part, unfair and is also being promoted, in part, by people with ulterior motives. He emphasized the point that activities that were accepted twenty years ago are being condemned today. Standards would continue to change, and he feared that 15 or 20 years from now the CIA might be condemned for having failed to do things that it could not do given current attitudes.

General Walters noted that many people now expect the intelligence services to operate with a degree of purity that will not be reciprocated by our enemies. He said you were going to have a rough time if you fought by the Marquis of Queensbury rules when your opponent was using brass knuckles. The Doolittle Report had said that we would have to match the dedication and ruthlessness of our implacable foe. That is not a popular idea today, but General Walters pointed out that even our revered Founding Fathers recognized the need for covert operations. He said George Washington mounted three kidnap attempts on Benedict Arnold, and from 1772 to 1775, Benjamin Franklin used his position as assistant postmaster to run a mail intercept on the British. Personally he did not think it was a "dirty trick" to help democratic forces survive in a hostile environ-

ment.

Walters stressed that there was a need for secrecy. Harry Truman had said that he did not believe the best interests of the country were served by going on the principle that everyone had a right to know everything. Truman had also said that it did not matter to the United States whether its secrets became known through publication in the media or through the activity of spies. The results were the same.

General Walters said the CIA had been hurt and its ability to carry out its mission had been impaired by the attacks upon it. He said: "People who used to give us whole reports are giving us summaries, and people who used to give us summaries are shaking hands with us. People who used to help us voluntarily are saying don't come near me. This must be a delight to the America-is-wrongers. For the people who believe that the U. S. represents the best hope of mankind for freedom in the world, it is not an encouraging factor."

The Big Story

What is the big story today? Is it that a dozen years ago high officials, perhaps the President, plotted unsuccessfully to assassinate a foreign dictator? Is it that a decade ago the CIA accumulated information about Americans who were

leaders in the effort to frustrate our very costly efforts to keep Southeast Asia from falling into the control of the communists? Is it that the CIA conducted 32 wiretaps in 27 years?

General Walters said: "We have spent an enormous amount of time rummaging through the garbage pails of history, looking at the '50s and '60s, but the question of whether we are going to continue as a free and democratic nation is going to be decided in the late '70s and '80s, and I hope we will spend an appropriate amount of time on that period, which is going to determine how we and our children live in the future."

The news media are so absorbed in reporting the titillating gossip, the tales of those disaffected employees that Peter Arnett said his friends were hunting down, that they have no time or space to consider what they are doing to institutions that are vital to our survival. The Washington Post, which buried General Walters' talk, devoted 24 column inches of text and 17 column inches of photos on July 12 to an unsubstantiated charge that Alexander Butterfield was a CIA "contact" in the White House. This was part of the lead front page story of the day. Three days later *The Post* published Butterfield's categorical denial of the allegation in a 12 column-inch story on page A-3.

It reminds one of a sheep dog chasing after hares while the coyotes devour the lambs.

THE WASHINGTON STAR
18 AUGUST 1975

Letters to the editor

Don't take secret papers home?

For some months I have shared the concern of many others about the reported lack of internal security among some of our congressional committees. While quite in sympathy with the need for the legislative side of our government to have more knowledge of the workings of such important agencies as the FBI and CIA, it is with great apprehension that I view disclosures which have to be made by the agencies, supposedly in secrecy, but apparently subject to public disclosure.

Having worked under a variety of security conditions, necessitating various clearances, I have been presumably investigated frequently and in depth. It is my understanding that no congressman or senator is

required to have such clearance investigations to allow him access to classified material. The reason for this is understandable — up to a point. But it gives no assurance that they understand even the rudiments of security practices.

The recent situation brought about through the ransacking of Sen. Howard H. Baker's home exemplifies the situation. Judging from the reports from his staff, as well as himself, it would appear that from time to time he would take classified documents home with him to work on, even though it was contended that no such documents were in the house at the time of the break-in. Whether there were

such documents or not is scarcely the point. The very fact of taking classified documents home is regarded as one of the prime and cardinal sins by security officials.

I am certain that if, as a government employee, I had been found to have taken classified papers to my home, I would not only have been severely chastised, but probably fired. And I certainly would have lost my security clearance.

What line of reasoning makes a senator without background investigation less of a security risk than any of the hundreds of other people who work for the government, or government contractors, and who are investigated to high heaven before being allowed to handle classified papers?

The scary thing about the Howard Baker affair is that it discloses the practice of congressmen and senators presumably to take classified papers to their homes or elsewhere for convenience. With this knowledge in the open, all of their homes should be regarded as fair and profitable game for agents to break through our security.

Lauriston S. Taylor,
President,
National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements
Washington, D.C.

WASHINGTON POST
16 August 1975

CIA Gets Drug Case Extension

The Central Intelligence Agency has asked for and received an extension of the 15-day deadline for delivering secret documents to a House Government Operations Subcommittee investigating the dropping of drug charges against a former CIA agent. A staff member of the Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee said yesterday the CIA appeared to be "cooperating" and the threat of a subpoena to CIA Director William E. Colby would not be used unless it became evident the documents would not be produced. The CIA was given an extension until early next week to hand over documents concerning the CIA activities of Puttaporn Khrankhuan, 31, a former CIA operative in Thai-

land, indicted in 1973 for smuggling about 60 pounds of raw opium into Chicago.

The Justice Department later dropped the charges when the CIA refused to turn over documents which he said would aid his defense. The presiding judge had told federal prosecutors he would dismiss the case unless the documents were produced, the prosecutors said.

ESQUIRE
SEPTEMBER 1975

Washington

TIMOTHY CROUSE

The last secret

On a tropical summer's night, with the dogwood wilting outside and the gnats dropping like flies, a number of us are basking in the chill of a centrally air-conditioned neo-Federal house, guests at a quintessential intimate Georgetown dinner party. The lineup is not half bad. The host advised two Presidents. The guest of honor is the nation's hottest young movie director. Assembled for his edification are: one Senator; one former Senator who tried for the White House and missed; and one of the two reporters who retired Richard Nixon. Yet the star of the evening turns out to be a merely successful Washington attorney who advised only one President.

Just as the rent-a-butler is clearing away the spinach soufflé, the attorney is called to the telephone. By the time he returns, the rest of the guests are well into the boeuf Bourguignon. Pale, sweating, his collar loosened to facilitate breathing, the lawyer explains that a reporter had called that afternoon with a story suggesting that several of the lawyer's former White House colleagues were in on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The reporter had asked if such a thing could be true. "I don't know," the lawyer had replied.

Now one of the former White House colleagues had got wind of the lawyer's "I don't know" and had tracked him down to the dinner party. The colleague seemed to feel that the lawyer had damned him with faint comment. He was, one gathered, hysterical, going so far as to suggest that the lawyer had ruined his life.

These days, the lawyer says, he is no longer very sure of anything. Maybe these guys tried to assassinate Castro and maybe they didn't. He really doesn't know. "Ninety percent of us went along playing it straight," says the lawyer, "but God only knows what the other ten percent were doing. I'm beginning to suspect that there may have been a second, underground government under Kennedy and Johnson."

Something is happening and you don't know what it is, do you, Mr. Jones? Out of a clear blue sky, Nemesis has descended on Washington and is having a field day. The last three years have yielded more casualties than the three decades that preceded them. The Best and the Brightest may be next on the list. Or maybe the whole damn C.I.A.

The Washington secrets market is clearly out of control. In a town

where people believe hardly anything that anybody says, there is only one test for truth which is widely accepted as foolproof: whatever is secret must be true. To possess secrets is to know what is really going on. To have secret information on *someone* is to be in the catbird seat. Once you become known as an owner of secrets, you are well on your way to becoming powerful. (This is why the Pentagon, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and certain congressional committees classify everything in sight—*instant secrets*.)

Any secret-holder with the slightest amount of brains or ambition goes out and puts his secrets to work in the market. There are three ways of doing this:

1. You can hold on to your secret and collect modest dividends in the form of favors from people who have heart attacks every time you remind them of what you have on them.

2. You can trade your secrets for other secrets.

3. You can risk cashing in your secret in return for a spectacular gain. That is, you can leak your secret to the press, thereby precipitating a scandal that will topple your enemies.

For years, the Washington secrets market was a pitiful thing. Most politicians fancied themselves to be gentlemen, a conceit which is fatal to active trading. The prime example was Harry Truman, who could have made an easy killing in the market with one quick phone call to Drew Pearson. "Say, Drew, do you have any idea what was going on in the back seat of Ike's jeep? . . . Well, maybe you ought to look into it. . . . Sure, I'll have my secretary send out the file this afternoon." Harry could have spared us the Eisenhower era, but instead he sat on his secret for twenty-five years and ended up actually giving it away to Merle Miller, who turned it into a small fortune. But then Harry was the kind of hopeless straight arrow who called a son of a bitch a son of a bitch and kept his secrets secret.

What could you expect of a town where the main outlet for secrets was called Washington Merry-Go-Round? Pissant stuff, that's what. The casualties could be counted on the fingers of a lobster. Sherman Adams, Bobby Baker, Tom Dodd. The only bright spot was Joe McCarthy, an inspired gambler who cashed in everything he had and went for a real ride. McCarthy might have cleaned up in the secrets market, except that he was twenty years ahead of his time.

Probably the most successful secret-trader in town was Lyndon Johnson. He was no gentleman and he had an excellent nose for garbage, two attributes that stood him well in

the little secrets crap game that some of the boys were running up on Capitol Hill. Lyndon didn't get to be majority leader without having the goods on at least half the members of the U.S. Senate, but his techniques in those days were instinctive and crude. It wasn't until he reached the White House that he acquired the sophisticated apparatus of which he had always dreamed: F.B.I. files and Pentagon briefings for source material, and national TV for exposure. Unfortunately, this windfall went to Johnson's head, and he ended up floating a mammoth issue of phony stock, which is to say that he assured the American people that he was in possession of secrets that justified waging a war in Southeast Asia. When his secrets turned out to be nothing more than a bundle of worthless, trumped-up statistics, Johnson took the bath he deserved.

Johnson's demise gave the secrets market a much-needed lift, because it started off a large-scale erosion of the credibility of politicians everywhere, thus making them more vulnerable to secrets. Even a few members of the traditionally reverential national press corps began to see that they could publish secrets without getting hanged for treason. But it took Watergate to turn the secrets market into the crazy, go-go extravaganza that it is today. The big panic that began on June 17, 1972, brought into the secrets market a lot of people who wouldn't have been there otherwise—people like John Dean and James McCord, who could hardly wait to dump their secrets into the maws of the Ervin committee, *The Washington Post*, and anyone else who put in a decent bid. Most of these people had no choice in the matter, but that is often the case with pioneers. The important thing is that they established the trend of going for broke in the secrets market and made it possible for every American to blow the whistle on his fellow citizens without fear of being branded a stool pigeon or fink.

The first genius of this exciting, revitalized market—its Bernie Cornfeld, in fact—is Seymour Hersh of *The New York Times*. Nobody knows how much Hersh is worth, and he is too crafty to let on. One moment he talks as if he has at least two hundred thousand major secrets locked up in his desk drawer, and the next moment he has you thinking that he couldn't find the Washington Monument. When Hersh is talking his best game, you can almost believe that he has enough secrets to explain every sinister turn in American history over the last ten years. If he wanted to, Hersh could put all his secrets together and drop them with

one great thud. But he is too smart to blow all of his capital at once. Instead, he drops them slowly, one by one, and watches as ripples of panic spread all over Washington. Then he sits back and waits for terror-stricken secret-holders to come running to his door, begging to sell him what they have for practically nothing.

With the market as volatile as it seems to be right now, the danger is that Hersh may precipitate a crash. The scenario, as I imagine it, goes like this:

After a lengthy investigation, the Church committee issues a report which rashly claims to expose "every last secret of the C.I.A." Forced to defend his honor, Hersh unloads the Big One on the C.I.A.—a billion-dollar secret!

he has been saving for just such a rainy day. Stirred up by Hersh's twenty-thousand-word tale of murder, rape and plunder, public protest reaches such a strident pitch that Gerald Ford announces his decision to shut down the C.I.A. and turn the Agency's Langley headquarters into a cancer research center. In retaliation,

high officials of the C.I.A. leak their Ford dossier, which includes, among other bombs, photocopies of the President's high-school I.Q. tests. Public outrage over the Ford revelations leaves the House of Representatives no choice but to vote a unanimous bill of impeachment. When that happens, Ford, who was not for nothing the minority leader, lets out every secret he ever collected on his old buddies in the House. Then he puts in a phone call to San Clemente. "Dick, old pal, remember the pardon? . . . Hell, you don't have to thank me again, just give me a little dirt on Rocky—there must be something on the tapes." Ford hangs up and immediately persuades the Vice-President to invest three and a half million dollars in buying off the Senate, thereby insuring a verdict of not guilty in the impeachment trial. House members, quick to notice the sudden increase of Bentleys in the Senate parking lot, launch a full-scale investigation. In the course of it, various congressmen unload all the secrets they have compiled on their Senate colleagues, against whom they were one day planning to

run. Finally, Warren Burger steps in, declares both the executive and legislative branches unconstitutional, and sets up the Court as a "nine-man judiciary junta—until new elections can be held."

All of this happens with the speed of a Rube Goldberg contraption being sprung, and it makes the Reign of Terror look like a Boy Scout jamboree. Within weeks, the federal government is totally decimated, and reports of tarrings and featherings are so widespread that not a single Washington official dares to show his face in the continental United States. Those unable to sign on as *attachés* in the Singapore embassy retreat and have their features altered by plastic surgery, like Abbie Hoffman.

The crash has burned out the secrets market to such a total extent that there is not even one *icemonger* left in all of Washington. At the foot of the Washington Monument, huddled in a ragged overcoat, Seymour Hersh sits with a sign that reads: "Used Secrets Five Cents." There are no buyers. #

GAZETTE, Beaufort, S.C.

6 August 1975

The CIA Under Fire

There are signs that investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency could create an atmosphere in Washington similar to that which prevailed during the Watergate affair. While there is a world of difference between the Watergate scandal and the problems of monitoring intelligence activities, the CIA affair is heading down the Watergate path of reckless rumor and speculation.

The facts about Watergate eventually came out—facts shocking enough virtually to bring an administration to a halt and to force the resignation of a president. The CIA investigation is no threat to the present administration, but an orgy of suspicion and innuendo about CIA activities in the past could have as unsettling an effect on our foreign relations as did the long agony of Watergate.

The facts about the CIA overstepping its bounds in surveillance of American citizens have been laid out by the Rockefeller Commission, putting most of the speculation on that subject to rest. It is the commission's inconclusive report on alleged CIA in-

volvement in foreign assassination plots that has opened the door for the now-familiar process of leaks of confidential information about investigations in progress.

To begin with there is a limit to the facts that can be obtained about discussions that took place among government officials a decade or more ago. Vice President Rockefeller was perhaps too candid in his remarks before a television audience about the inconclusive nature of information on the chain of responsibility for CIA activities during the Kennedy years. As he has learned, to say that a story cannot be proved false is interpreted as saying it might be true.

When President Ford turned over material on alleged assassination plots to congressional committees and the Justice Department, he urged that it be handled with "utmost prudence" in view of its extraordinary sensitivity. It is not surprising that he is already dismayed with the leaks and speculation that have ensued. While a House committee acted properly in denying access to CIA material

to a congressman who leaked secret testimony once before, there are still many holes in the congressional sieve.

It would be most regrettable if responsible congressional leaders and Justice Department attorneys who, by their oath of office are obliged to exhibit sensitive prudence in handling information, are accused of a "cover-up"—another term familiar from Watergate days. The fact is that there are aspects of CIA operations that need to remain secret—not by any means to protect any individual but to protect the United States of America.

Members of the news media need to balance that consideration with their dedication to the public's right to know, and there is the additional point that the CIA investigation may involve people who are not alive to defend themselves. Above all, neither national security nor the reputation of people living or dead should be subject to speculative charges by politicians looking for a cause celebre to make names for themselves.

GENERALTHE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
2 August 1975**Before the ink is dry**

For thirty years the peoples of Europe have lived in peace because of two unused words, one Russian and the other American. The balance of nuclear fear has kept the continent peaceful. The Helsinki agreement now offers Europe the opportunity to make cooperation instead of terror the basic reason for not getting killed by your neighbour. The chief merit of Helsinki's 300,000 words is that they set standards of international behaviour and of behaviour towards individuals which are higher than those which much of Europe has so far experienced. Frontiers are not to be changed except by agreement; and high time too as the Greek Cypriots are no doubt saying to themselves this morning. No state shall interfere with the government of another; and high time too as the Hungarians (1956) and the Czechs (1968) must also reflect today.

Does all this mean what it says? Yes, said Mr Brezhnev on Thursday, though will they believe him in Prague? Yes, said Mr Ford yesterday, though will they believe him in Chile? It remains to be seen. And what is seen will depend more on the governments of the super-Powers than on the other 33 Helsinki participants put together. For Helsinki has not abolished the iron curtain—which is the super-Powers' basic territorial bargain—or changed its location. Thirty years ago yesterday Truman, Stalin, and Attlee agreed at Potsdam that "a line running from the Baltic to the Adriatic" would divide a Soviet sphere of influence from a Western one. Helsinki did not alter this line (the only man who beat it was Tito in 1948) and the states on one side of it still have different forms of government to those on the other. For all its fine words the Helsinki agreement does not say that these forms of government are open to change. A western-style democracy in Czechoslovakia would be no more acceptable to the Soviet Union now than it was before, or than a Communist dictatorship in Italy would be to the United States.

To change these attitudes would have been

impossible. The merit of Helsinki is that it covers as much common ground as could be found and that much of it may be fruitful. For example, there ought to be no real obstacle now to progress towards a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction in Europe. The MBFR conference in Vienna has been wasting its time since the spring when the Soviet delegation, presumably with the possible cancellation of Helsinki in mind, began to drag its feet. MBFR is a worthy cause and ought to be the object of the next big European diplomatic effort. Fewer men-at-arms mean more money for other, more benevolent things, and if both sides reduce their forces fairly security is not endangered.

Another piece of business which Helsinki did not—and could not—finish is the dispute over Cyprus. This is a clear case of one country (Turkey) altering a frontier, or establishing a new one, by force at the expense of another country. Which makes nonsense of the hallowed Helsinki principle that frontiers are unchangeable except by agreement—a principle to which Turkey yesterday ceremoniously subscribed. Archbishop Makarios was justified in wondering aloud about the sincerity of the Helsinki proceedings as a whole.

Helsinki coincides with one other development which is out of tune with the fine words pronounced in Finland. If it is true that the Soviet Communist Party is subsidising the Portuguese one then this marks a quite serious departure from established postwar Soviet policy. Ever since the Second World War the Soviets have refrained from fostering revolutionary communism in countries west of the iron curtain to which they agreed at Potsdam. They have maintained correct diplomatic relations with established and elected governments. West of the iron curtain (though not to the east of it) they have refrained from encouraging Communists to overthrow those governments, in France, Italy, Denmark or anywhere else except, apparently, in Portugal. If this is what they are doing now they are flouting the spirit of Helsinki; and doing so before the ink is dry.

WASHINGTON POST
17 August 1975*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak***Moynihan's Undelivered Speech**

The State Department bureaucracy last week killed a blunt speech drafted by ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan and aimed at Third World members of the United Nations, showing that the reality of U.S. isolation in the U.N. is not yet accepted at Foggy Bottom.

Even Dr. Moynihan's veto of U.N. membership for Communist North and South Vietnam was a surprisingly close call. Despite some opposition within the State Department, he got

the green light to veto the two Vietnams in response to the U.N. Security Council's refusal to even consider membership for South Korea.

Moynihan had planned to accompany the Vietnam vetoes with tough talk relating them to the Korean exclusion. He drafted a speech noting that votes over the years on South Korea's membership in the U.N. had been supported by countries with multi-party systems and opposed by countries with one-party systems.

Moynihan's draft speech then deliv-

ered this message to the Communist and Third World one-party nations: You cannot turn the U.N. into a one-party system by excluding the South Koreans and including the Vietnams.

Such realism is not objected to by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But with Kissinger in Montreal for a speech on veto day, Aug. 11, the State Department bureaucracy succeeded in ash-canning the speech. Instead, Moynihan made a brief statement barely suggesting the outlines of the full speech.

The State Department's attitude reflects its congenital insistence on maintaining warm bilateral relations with individual countries no matter how roughly they treat this country in multilateral organizations. Moreover, in handling Third World countries with kid gloves, Foggy Bottom seems to be living in a past world when U.S. strategy at the U.N. was aimed at maintaining majority support on key

votes.

The harsh inevitability that the United States will be badly outnumbered on future U.N. votes means Moynihan may well resurrect his one-party speech. Beyond speeches, however, the United States may have to start pressuring individual nations to convince them that consistent anti-American votes could be costly for them.

Probable Israeli-Egyptian agreement in the Sinai will prevent a showdown of Third-World efforts to expel Israel from the U.N. But Ambassador Moynihan and the United States will face a tough test when the regular general assembly session next month votes on a Communist-Third World resolution calling for removal of U.S. troops from Korea.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
6 August 1975

POLAND SELLS BODIES

MR WILSON, summing up the Helsinki conference in Parliament yesterday, spoke of "a new spirit of co-operation" which should "provide the basis for more fruitful relationships." He dwelt particularly on the articles relating to freedom of movement and the rights of individuals. A sobering, indeed sickening, example of the chasm between such expectations and the hard realities of dealing with the Iron Curtain countries is provided by an agreement between West Germany and Poland actually concluded at Helsinki. Under it 125,000 people of German origin in the former German territories awarded to Poland in 1945 will be allowed by the Polish Government to go to Germany. In return Bonn will grant Poland a credit of £180 million which in effect amounts to a gift, plus a lump sum of £236 million on other accounts.

Poland has already bilked Germany on this issue. The Bonn-Warsaw treaty of 1970 provided for the release of the Germans, but only a relatively small number have been allowed to go. This may be why the present cash

WASHINGTON POST
14 August 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Kissinger, Schlesinger and SALT

Although the Pentagon now has been brought into the heart of policy-making on Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), there is widespread suspicion that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger will abandon the military's position if necessary to avoid stalemate with the Soviets.

The fact that Kissinger finessed the Defense Department out of a seat at recent SALT conversations in Helsinki, while not inherently important, demonstrates he is not fully sharing the stage. There is, moreover, informed opinion high in the government that Kissinger will not endanger a SALT agreement by sticking to the Pentagon position on critical questions affecting long-range security of the United States and short-range political success for Gerald R. Ford.

If Kissinger seeks new compromises, the final decision will be President Ford's. He maintains total confidence in Kissinger, and some high-ranking officials cannot imagine him breaking with his Secretary of State if that would prevent 1975 agreement with the Soviets. Other officials, however, believe the President's interests are not identical to Dr. Kissinger's and that he must be prepared to support the harder-line Pentagon position.

Actually, preparations for U.S.-Soviet SALT sessions at Helsinki were far less of a one-man show than in the past. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Kissinger's arch-rival inside the administration, attended two top-level planning sessions. Schles-

inger and Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with the President at a third meeting, which did not include Kissinger.

The result: a unified U.S. position at Helsinki, including Kissinger's acceptance of the Pentagon's tough standard for counting Soviet MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles). That turned into a vindication of Schlesinger's arguments for hard bargaining when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev agreed in Helsinki to MIRV verification.

But picayune maneuverings over whether the Pentagon would have its own man in Helsinki undercut this unity. As we reported earlier, Schlesinger requested that a high level Pentagon representative attend the Helsinki bilateral negotiations about SALT. Acting on Kissinger's recommendation, Mr. Ford replied the Soviets wanted only four persons per side—definitely excluding the military of both nations.

Schlesinger, therefore, sent nobody. But at Helsinki, the cozy four-man game suddenly doubled, with eight Americans and eight Russians sitting in—including, unexpectedly, Gen. Mikhail Kozlov, deputy chief of the Soviet general staff.

Pentagon officials concluded Henry had tricked them again. Elsewhere in the bureaucracy, the interpretation was that Kissinger was determined not to let his Kremlin counterparts think he was being outflanked by Schlesinger. Nothing occurred at Hel-

prices are below current rates. East Germany has sold West Germany thousands of "political prisoners" much dearer. These auctions have become a major source of income for the East German Government, which can always round up a batch when the balance of payments needs a fillip. In addition, as part of the 1970 agreement under which the East Germans reduced their interference with West Berlin traffic and allowed more visitors in, Bonn has paid hundreds of millions of pounds under various headings such as road repairs. Further "easements" have been offered for £545 millions.

This obnoxious trade in human beings, in its various aspects, is the basis of the Helsinki bargain. The West has paid a huge price in irrevocable diplomatic concessions. In return the Communist Governments give vague and suspect undertakings to allow a few of their own people, and also to a tiny number of foreigners, isolated glimpses of those freedoms of movement and action to which they already have multiple international and constitutional commitments. At least the West should have insisted on something tangible as an earnest of a change of spots—the dismantling of the illegal Berlin Wall for instance. Why had Mr Wilson nothing to say about that?

sinki to alarm the Pentagon. But Kissinger's maneuverings raised doubt about how long he—and the President—will stick to these hard bargaining points:

The Soviet Backfire bomber: The Kremlin contends it is only a local weapon and is not to be counted among strategic weapons according to the SALT agreement reached in Vladivostok last November. But the Backfire can easily reach the continental United States on a one-way flight and, by refueling in Cuba, could make a round trip. Therefore, the U.S. insists the Backfire must be counted among strategic weapons.

Cruise missiles: The Soviets claim the Vladivostok agreement counts as strategic weapons subsonic cruise missiles, fired from bombers, with a range over 600 kilometers. But the U.S. military contends that this conveniently discriminates against U.S. cruise missiles which could reach the Russian heartland.

Missile size: The Pentagon, backed by U.S. disarmament director Fred Ikle, considers it vital to negotiate reductions in the huge Soviet advantage of larger missiles and believes Brezhnev is now ready to negotiate.

The question of U.S. survival may depend more on missile size than on any other issue. But in the short run, the Backfire bomber is most politically combustible. Should the U.S. permit this menace to the U.S. heartland to be omitted from strategic weapons, Mr. Ford would be open for intense

political assault.

When Kissinger first returned from Helsinki, colleagues found him pessimistic about prospects for a SALT agreement this year and wedded to a tough bargaining position. But more recently, the officials describe him as reverting to his old theme of this

being the last chance for agreement that would avoid additional multi-billion-dollar defense requirements. If he follows that through by recommending key concessions, Mr. Ford will face the most difficult and most fateful choice of his presidency.

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NEW YORK TIMES 11 August 1975 COMMANDOS TRAIN FOR EMBASSY DUTY

Navy Force Would Protect U.S. Lives and Help Curb Terrorism Abroad

By EVERETT R. HOLLES

Special to The New York Times

SAN DIEGO, Aug. 10—Navy Seal commandos have received special training for possible assignment to American embassies in countries plagued by guerrilla terrorism, according to Navy sources here.

The Seals—the name is derived from sea-air-land, denoting the scope of their operations—would monitor guerrilla and revolutionary activity and give counsel to the foreign governments on counterinsurgency tactics, while at the same time reinforcing security for the lives and property of Americans.

Assignment of these specialists—trained in such counterinsurgency tactics as hit-and-run abductions of enemy military and political leaders—to embassies in perhaps a dozen countries was said by a Navy informant to have been under consideration at the Pentagon and State Department for some time.

Discussion of the proposal has been accelerated, he said, by the recent deterioration of the American military position in the Mediterranean, rising

anti-Americanism in some African countries and anxiety over events in Korea, the Philippines and other Asian areas.

Seizure by Japanese terrorists last week of a part of the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, along with a number of hostages, was believed likely to spur the discussions.

Navy sources stressed that the Seals, some 2,500 of whom have been trained here and at Little Creek, Va., over the last 13 years, would be assigned only to embassies in "friendly countries."

Most Are Vietnam Veterans

The countries under consideration were not identified here, but one informed source said they included capitals in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the western Pacific and, possibly, South America.

Selected groups of the Navy commandos, totaling 75 or 80 men out of a current force of about 300, were said to have been given the special training to equip them for possible embassy duty, including language and political courses. They would be accredited as embassy naval attachés and assistants. Almost all are veterans of Vietnam combat.

Seal units of two to six men each are already stationed at American military bases overseas, in both the Pacific and Atlantic, and others are attached to military assistance missions in countries that have defense alliances with the United States.

An officer of the specialized warfare command in charge of Seal training at the Navy's Coronado amphibious base here said that if the commandos were attached to embassy staffs, their role would be largely ad-

visory. But he added that "actual field operations using the skills they employed so successfully in Vietnam could not be ruled out, should emergencies arise."

A former officer of the Coronado specialized warfare command said it was "reasonable to assume" that any Seal units assigned to American embassies would work closely with agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, who are listed by many embassies as cultural and commercial attachés.

Used in Phnom Penh

A Navy spokesman in Washington acknowledged that in one instance, Navy Seals had been assigned to embassy duty. After the withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia and until shortly before the Communist takeover of the country, he said, Seals were assigned to the American embassy in Phnom Penh as Navy attachés and assistant attachés. Five Seal officers served there between 1973 and 1975.

"At the present time no Seals are assigned to American embassies overseas," the spokesman said. "Except for the Khmer Republic [Cambodia] there have been no Seal assignments to other United States embassies."

Military sources acquainted with the Seal program here said that preparations for ultimately sending the counterinsurgency specialists to American embassies began in January, 1972. That was a month after the last Seal units were withdrawn from Vietnam, leaving behind a few advisers to the Vietnamese Navy's Seal-type force they had trained, the Lieu Doi Ngui Ngay, or "underwater soldiers."

Comdr. Daniel Hendrickson, commander of Seal Team 1 for

18 months until March, 1972, when he moved up to the Coronado training base's operational command, said that after Vietnam, the Seal training was shifted "from unconventional warfare techniques, largely in jungle environments to a worldwide capability on a stand-by basis."

Commander Hendrickson said the Navy foresaw a need for "a Seal force that could handle a variety of unconventional warfare missions in other countries, helping foreign governments detect potential guerrilla activities without upsetting sensitive diplomatic balances."

Describing the shift in training, Commander Hendrickson said it was anticipated that the Seals would ultimately be serving abroad on embassy attaché duty or with military advisory groups.

"Then we will be in a better position to provide expert counsel to our Government, to pick danger spots and prevent conflicts wherever possible," he said. "We can advise the host country and, if necessary, provide assistance before it is too late and help the armed forces of those countries to counter guerrilla efforts."

Although the Seal teams were set up in 1962—on order from President Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis—it was not until late in 1966 that the Navy acknowledged their existence. Their exploits in Vietnam were not disclosed officially until Seal Team 1 from Coronado received a Presidential citation in November, 1968, for "extraordinary heroism in action" between July, 1966, and August 1967.

Seal Team 1 here and Seal Team 2 at Little Creek are each reported to have about 120 men on a stand-by basis at present.

NEW YORK TIMES 10 August 1975 U.S. ARMS SALES HIT NEW RECORD

72 Nations Bought \$9-Billion Worth in Fiscal '75

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 9—Foreign military sales by the United States in the fiscal year ending June 30 reached a record \$9-billion, with nearly half going to three Persian Gulf states.

Defense Department figures show sales to 72 countries, the bulk in Europe and the Persian Gulf.

The total was not expected, the Defense Department says. After a new high of \$7-billion was reached in fiscal 1974, largely because of substantial orders from Iran and Israel, the Pentagon had foreseen sales leveling off or even decreasing.

The situation changed with a decision last spring by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway to purchase the F-16 fighter developed for the Air Force by General Dynamics. The cost will exceed \$2-billion.

Congressional Criticism

While no firm orders for the F-16's have been placed the Defense Department decided to include agreements on them in its sales total for the 1975 fiscal year.

At the same time the department, in the face of Congressional criticism that it was indiscriminately pushing sales abroad, provided a breakdown designed to show that not all involved arms and ammunition.

Of the firm orders placed, the breakdown showed, 44.4 per cent were for weapons and ammunition. Spare parts, largely for weapons, accounted for 23.2 per cent, while 12.4 per cent was for such support equipment as cargo aircraft, barges, trucks and communications equipment and 20 per cent was for such support services as construction, supply and technical training.

The breakdown is part of a new case being advanced by Defense Department officials in support of military

sales. Their contention is that while all are ostensibly for military purposes some can have an indirect economic benefit by promoting development.

The Largest Orders

Large orders were placed by Iran, with \$2.5-billion; Saudi Arabia, \$1.4-billion, and Kuwait, \$366-million, all of the Persian Gulf. Other big buyers were Australia, with \$157-million, Canada, \$101-million; Taiwan, \$104-million; West Germany, \$283-million; Greece, \$195-million; Israel, \$838-million, and South Korea, \$235-million.

All the rest were considerably lower than \$100-million.

The breakdown showed that of the \$1.4-billion in sales to Saudi Arabia, \$318-million was

for weapons and ammunition, \$212-million for spare parts, \$63-million for support equipment and \$596-million for support services. For Iran the figures were \$1.5-billion, \$353-million, \$170-million and \$259-million. Miscellaneous items made up the balance in both cases.

With the easing of Congressional restrictions on the sale of sophisticated weapons to Latin-American countries, the United States has been returning to its role as the major supplier. The Defense Department listed \$137-million in sales to 18 Latin-American countries in the last fiscal year.

WASHINGTON POST
15 August 1975

Clayton Fritchey

The Voice of the Pentagon

James Schlesinger is usually referred to as the Secretary of Defense, but in practice his principal role seems to be director of public relations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their principal propagandist and lobbyist.

He's one of the best front men the Pentagon has ever had. What Secretary of State Henry Kissinger used to do so masterfully for Richard Nixon—articulate and sell his master's policy—Schlesinger does almost equally well for the chiefs.

In the process, he is also being useful, in a special political way, to the commander-in-chief, Gerald Ford, for Schlesinger's tough talk and increasingly belligerent stands give the President some protection from the right wing of his own party.

The defense secretary's recent gratuitous references to "first strikes," resort to nuclear weapons, armed intervention in Korea and other provocative statements have prompted Moscow to charge him with playing "dangerous games," but this response has only enhanced Schlesinger's standing with the President's cold warrior critics.

While differences between Schlesinger and Mr. Ford, as well as between Schlesinger and Kissinger, are attributed more to nuance and style than substance, there is no denying that the Pentagon spokesman sounds far more belligerent, and intentionally so.

Since Schlesinger has not been contradicted, reprimanded or told, directly or indirectly, to pipe down, it is obvious that the course he is pursuing has the passive, if not active, approval of the White House. And it is

not hard to see why.

Mr. Ford inherited a detente with Russia. It is the centerpiece of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy. Without it, there is no recognizable policy. At this point, Mr. Ford has little choice but to sink or swim with it, but more and more it is playing into the hands of his conservative critics, a distressing development for a President soon to face election.

In the last few weeks, Mr. Ford has been under heavy attack for various efforts he has made in behalf of detente, such as going to Helsinki for the signing of the new European Security Pact, allowing the sale of millions of tons of U.S. wheat to Russia and refusing to see Moscow's implacable critic, Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

So it is not strange that Mr. Ford would permit, even welcome, the offsetting hard line of his defense secretary, which is such music to the enemies of detente. As the presidential election year approaches, Schlesinger may be allowed, indeed encouraged, to go further, for there are signs that Mr. Ford may himself be getting a little skittish about detente, or at least its political value in an election year.

It is difficult to see how, at this late date, the President could dump detente and its architect, Dr. Kissinger, but in the coming months it would not be surprising if the Secretary of Defense began to rival the Secretary of State as the key adviser on national security affairs.

Everything that Schlesinger has said and done lately has helped the President with the critics he fears

most — the Reagan-Goldwater-Thurmond-Helms Republicans—while it is just the opposite with Kissinger. It was Kissinger who advised Mr. Ford not to see Solzhenitsyn, and it was Kissinger who paved the way for the President's controversial trip to Helsinki.

Around the White House they agree that Kissinger for the time being is indispensable, but it is also recognized that there is a more natural bond between Mr. Ford and Schlesinger. The President has always instinctively been a hawk, a cold warrior and an unlimited military spender.

In his two years at the Pentagon, Schlesinger, with the enthusiastic approval of the President, has increased the military budget by \$20 billion annually, and he frankly projects adding on another \$40 billion to \$50 billion in a few years.

While Kissinger's has lately been counseling patience in dealing with Portugal's left-wing military government, the President and Schlesinger continue to talk as if a Marxist takeover would be intolerable for the United States. The defense secretary's argument is that our Mediterranean Sixth Fleet would be seriously endangered.

George McGhee, former U.S. Under Secretary of State and former ambassador to Germany, notes, however, that "despite the fact that our aircraft carriers, submarines, cruisers and destroyers have steamed up and down the Mediterranean shores since 1946, we lost our dominant influence in the Middle East even before the introduction of the Soviet fleet."

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NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 11, 1975

Soviet Warship Design Emphasizes First-Strike Role

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10—A Navy study has concluded that superiority of Soviet warships in firepower has been achieved by sacrificing the endurance, electronic sophistication and crew comforts emphasized in American ships.

The study by the Naval Ship Engineering Center in Hyattsville, Md., helps provide an answer to a question that has been troubling officers and members of Congress as they have watched the Soviet fleet expand with new classes of heavily armed warships.

Increasingly over the last few years, the question has been raised as to why the Soviet Union is able to build war-

ships that appear to be smaller, faster and more heavily armed than those in the United States Navy. The question, in turn, has been used in reverse by such officials as Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf to emphasize a threat posed by the Soviet Navy.

Priorities of Fleets Differ

The answer supplied by the study was that the Soviet Union has not achieved any breakthrough or significant advance in naval ship design. Rather, it finds that the Soviet Union is building large numbers of relatively small, fast warships with impressive firepower "to satisfy mission requirements and design priorities different from those" of the United States Navy.

The study is summarized in

an article in the August issue of the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute by Capt. James W. Kehoe, who is assigned to the Naval Ship Engineering Center.

In effect, the study finds the United States Navy could build warships like those of the Soviet Union if it wanted to change its priorities and missions for the fleet.

The characteristics of the Soviet warships, according to the study, are dictated by the mission for the Soviet fleet of "sea denial"—or denying other nations, in particular the United States, certain uses of the sea.

The sea-denial mission, it points out, requires a design emphasis on heavy firepower, a first-strike capability against

enemy shipping and high speed and good sea-keeping capability rather than endurance.

In contrast, the mission emphasis in the United States Navy has been upon sustained control over the sea lanes and projection of striking power by means of aircraft carriers. Such missions have established ship design requirements in the United States Navy for endurance so the ships can operate or extended deployments without dependence on land bases and for electronic sophistication so escort ships can provide anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection for the carriers.

The contrasting missions, the study finds, have led to different priorities in design of warships.

The design priorities, in descending order, in Soviet warships, have been on weapons, propulsion, electronics, endurance and crew comfort. In contrast, the study finds that the priority order in the United States Navy is electronics, crew, comfort, endurance, weapons and propulsion.

Less Space for Weapons

The emphasis on electronics and crew comfort means less space for weapons and ammunition. This helps explain, the study finds, why Soviet ships in general carry about twice as many weapons as American ships.

At the same time, the study points out that the Soviet ships, in their emphasis upon higher firepower, have little or no

capability for reloading their major missile and torpedo weapons systems mounted on the decks.

"This design philosophy," it observes, "suggests that these ships are being configured for a pre-emptive first strike in a short, intense conflict."

A question being raised in Defense Department circles is whether the Navy, caught in a

budget squeeze by the high cost of its nuclear-powered warships and envious and disturbed by the firepower of Soviet warships, will not be driven toward the same design philosophy if it wants to expand the present fleet of 500 ships.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1975

The Ford Trip Risked Little And Accomplished Little

By LESLIE H. GELB

WASHINGTON—Some scenes of recent weeks go right to one of the questions that is beginning to consume Presidential election-minded Washington: How much détente is enough, or, put another way, how much détente is good politics?

• There is Aleksandr Solzhenitzyn, the Russian Nobel laureate, regaling a Washington audience on the perils of détente, a process, so he says, of aiding Soviet leaders in cementing their control over Russian society and Eastern Europe. Listening and applauding in seats of honor are none other than President George Meany, of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Senator Henry M. Jackson. About the only thing this group has in common is its lack of admiration for Secretary of State Kissinger, who has just advised President Ford not to see Mr. Solzhenitzyn.

• There are the millions of tons of grain destined for Russia piling up on the docks while the longshoremen wonder whether loading the ships will drive up the price of bread to the American consumer. Meanwhile, the farmers and traders are getting ready to sell more grain to Moscow.

• Then, there is Mr. Ford in Helsinki (Mr. Kissinger standing obligingly in the background) signing the European security agreement so desired by Moscow, followed by head-to-head talks with the Soviet Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, on another strategic nuclear arms deal.

• Finally, to counteract the charge that the document Mr. Ford just signed in Helsinki forever doomed the nations of Eastern Europe to Soviet bondage, Mr. Ford flies off to demonstrations with the leaders of Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

Détente is obviously a very tricky business. To be sure, each United States President wants to do those things he sees as right, that is, to insure that Washington is getting as much peace as it is giving to Moscow. But it is difficult to "do what is right" or, indeed, to do anything or nothing, without landing in a political minefield.

Every United States President who has gone to a meeting with his opposite Soviet number learned, quite quickly, that the American people like détente and want peaceful relations with Moscow. But each had to puzzle a great deal about public support for particular agreements with the Russians.

Nuclear arms control agreements go over well with the political center and with some liberals, only to be attacked by other liberals and most conservatives. Grain sales are applauded by grain farmers and damned by consumer groups. Sales of manufactured goods are hailed by big business and condemned by labor. Human rights issues such as tying nondiscriminatory trade status for Moscow to the freer emigration of Soviet Jews, causes schizophrenia all over the political landscape.

Mr. Ford is tip-toeing through this in the traditional manner. He is flying to foreign countries which, ipso facto, makes him a world leader. Administration officials acknowl-

edge that Mr. Ford's trip to Europe would have meant something only if it had not occurred. In foreign policy terms, nothing much was either risked or gained. He is trying to occupy the political center: signing the European security agreement and saying it doesn't mean much, approving a big grain sale for Russia but warning that he'll watch the next one carefully.

But try as he might, the one, big new Soviet-American deal that Mr. Ford will not be able to side-step is on strategic nuclear arms. By most accounts, this agreement will be signed this fall or it probably will not be signed at all. And by the lay of the politics, there is practically no accord that he can cut with Moscow that will not be cut up by the conservatives in his own party and by Mr. Jackson.

A Case of Oversell

Strategic nuclear arms have a symbolic importance in world politics and United States politics that often transcends their military significance and far surpasses public understanding. There is no doubting that each side has the capability to destroy the other under any circumstances. And yet the very unspeakability of nuclear war fires the imagination in a way that has led leaders and public opinion in most countries to gauge relative Soviet and American strengths by the nuclear forces that each possesses and the mutual agreements that they reach in this area. Thus, by the fall at the latest, Mr. Ford will have to choose between the pluses of another nuclear pact with Moscow and the minuses of losing conservative support.

Mr. Ford will probably have the support of most liberals whatever agreement on nuclear arms he reaches with Moscow. This is not because liberals believe he is negotiating the best or the most comprehensive nuclear arms deal (in fact, many think it is too little, too late), but because they feel trapped. In their eyes, to oppose the deal and join forces with the conservatives to defeat it, would be to destroy détente—and that they do not want to do.

State Department officials express unusual concern about the political fate of their détente policy. They know that their boss, along with former President Nixon, oversold the benefits of détente, in part to sell it in the first place and in part for political reasons. Along with Mr. Kissinger now, they have been moving to readjust public expectation about détente, but they realize as well that the damage has already been done. Some speculate that a hardened public attitude might cause the Russians to make some additional concessions to save détente. But most seem to feel that if Moscow and Washington are to reach any new significant accords, they had better be consummated soon, before election year.

Election year is already rushing in on sun-baked Washington. The surest sign is the increasing number of conversations where only high principle is attributed to oneself and only base cynicism to one's opponents. In the process, the question of how much détente is good for peace is being submerged by the question of how much détente is good politics.

Leslie H. Gelb is a New York Times Washington diplomatic correspondent.

Eastern Europe

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
7 August 1975

HUNGRY RUSSIA

RUSSIA CANNOT FEED HERSELF. Before the 1917 revolution she was one of the world's major grain exporters. The family-run farms produced enough for the population and a hefty surplus. The Communists "collectivised" agriculture, since when the country has been in permanent food deficit. STALIN let the peasants starve. KHRUSHCHEV began buying grain abroad. BREZHNEV, with increased resources to hand from higher prices for Russian-exported raw materials like oil and gold, has greatly extended Russian buying of foreign grain.

Quite regularly, the anyway inadequate Russian harvest "fails," due to climatic conditions. Nature comes in to reinforce the endemic inefficiency of the collective farm system. When this happens, as it did in 1972, Russian purchases abroad can have a disruptive and distorting effect on the world economy. In that year, Russia

bought just under 20 million tons of grain from America alone. By clever, super-capitalist-style operations on the market, Russian buyers organised what is now referred to in America as "the great grain robbery." To the subsequent embarrassment and anger of Washington, a good part of their purchases was actually subsidised by the American Government under the then existing rules.

Now there are well-founded reports that this year's harvest in Russia will again be bad, necessitating the purchase abroad of up to perhaps 30 million tons. Purchases already made in America amount to about 10 million tons. Mr Butz, the Agriculture Secretary, has placed a "hold" on further sales until the next American crop report, due on Monday. As well as the economic effects of Russian purchases (highly inflationary for food prices in 1972), there is a strong political background to this whole question. Should the West continue to bail Russia out yearly as part of a sham "détente"?

SUNDAY TIMES, London
3 August 1975

THE "Khrushchev Spring" was a reversal of the 30-year despotism of Stalin. It was both a defensive reaction against the monstrous power of the security organs which had been nurtured by the ruling elite and also a reaction to the impossibility of economic development in a closed society which retained strong elements of slavery and feudalism in an age of scientific and technological revolution.

When the Stalinist myth was exposed from the pulpit of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party—the spiritual and worldly overlord of the country—social thought began gradually to "unfreeze" and values to be reappraised. Soon the elite noticed first timid and then increasingly assured manifestations of a resurrection of the intelligentsia, the truly independent thinkers who vanished shortly after the Revolution. And neither the end of the Khrushchev Spring nor the large-scale repressions practised by his successors could put a stop to the process.

On the other hand the rapid erosion in people's minds of the quasi-religious status of Marxism-Leninism, and a certain improvement in living standards, gave rise to a Soviet version of the consumer society in which the old fanaticism of the masses was replaced by a spiritual vacuum, filled with alcohol.

Having lost its ideological basis the regime became entangled in the snares of insoluble contradictions arising from the incompatibility between the problems posed by the new epoch and the primitive, bureaucratic structure of the regime. The only way for it to fend off the inevitable fiasco was to emerge from economic and scientific isolation and expand its contacts with the West. Yet at the same time unanimity of

OPINION

SOVIET DILEMMA Detente plus extermination

VICTOR FAINBERG

thought had to be preserved as the basis of society—"granite unity of party and people." Dissent must be exterminated.

Dissent is that part of the newly reborn intelligentsia which not only is not afraid to think, but does not hide its opinions. The dissidents demand that the authorities take the window-dressing of the Soviet political myth seriously.

In his final plea at his trial, playwright and essayist Andrei Amalrik said: "We demand that you act in conformity with your own constitution, your own laws, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. But we know that you cannot act in conformity with these laws (ie grant freedom of speech, of the Press, of assembly, etc) because if you don't jail ten men who come out and demonstrate there will be hundreds the next time, and then thousands." This paradoxical situation in which the man who defends the constitution of his

country is considered a dissident, is resolved by means of concentration camps, prisons and lunatic asylums.

One has to give the Soviet authorities their due: they know the worth of words. For a five-minute demonstration of protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia my friends Larisa Bogoraz and Pavel Litvinov were each given five years' exile, and myself five years' imprisonment. For his appeal to Western psychiatrists about the misuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, camps, and exile. Ukrainian historian Valentin Moroz got 14 years for writing a book on the political camps. For publishing an underground literary-political journal, Ukrainian poet Zinoviy Krasivsky got 12 years.

But the dry figures of these sentences are no true reflection



Victor Fainberg, who spent five years in Soviet mental hospitals and prisons, was allowed to emigrate last year. He now campaigns from London for Soviet human rights.

of their real significance. People like Bukovsky cannot be silenced even in the camps. And they are killing them. Not with bullets, as they did under Stalin, but by starvation, cold, the damp of prison cells and the lack of medical treatment. To this end they have carefully devised a system of punishments: strict regime, special regime, isolation cell, and so on.

When I read speeches or articles on the subject of détente I feel like asking: what sort of détente have you in mind? It is unrealistic to seek rapprochement with a great nation which is thoroughly fenced off from you by a wall of ideological and political isolation. The so-called rapprochement can only be the Soviet leaders—for whom this isolation, which they maintain by such shameful means, is a *sine qua non* of their political being. Do you not think that détente in such a form with one side flouting all the standards set by international law and its own is tantamount to letting a Trojan horse into a commonwealth of nations?

The paragraph in the Helsinki agreement concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries which are its signatories has aroused a great deal of argument. A broader interpretation of this paragraph suggests that it excludes even petitions and other diplomatic measures which have always been used to alleviate the fate of the innocent who have been convicted. I believe that measures of this kind are first and foremost acts of humanity, not politics.

Outsiders should not refrain from protest on the grounds that such actions are "political." The Soviet system makes this unavoidable, it is maintained by the destruction of dissidents.

BALTIMORE SUN
8 August 1975

George F. Will

U.S. Bread and No Freedom in Soviet Union

Washington.

Speaking with rare concision and customary inaccuracy, Vladimir I. Lenin declared that the 1917 revolution would produce "bread and freedom."

Freedom has not arrived, because the Soviet Union has not yet passed through the "glorious transition period" between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the withering away of the state. But bread will be along any day now—when U.S. grain sales compensate for the Soviet Union's reactionary weather.

For about the 58th time since 1917, an unusually dry winter or wet summer, or vice versa, or both, has prevented the Soviet Union's collectivized agriculture from fulfilling the promise of scientific socialism.

So the Kremlin has earmarked some money (perhaps diverted from the fund for the subversion of Portugal) for the purchase of huge amounts of the United States grain that are produced in such inexplicably large quantities in spite of the internal contradictions and imminent collapse of American capitalism.

Actually, if the collapse comes in the next few months, the Russians will be peeved. They have contracted for approximately 10 million metric tons of our grain, and probably will want at least 5 million more tons.

The Soviet Union has ignored its formal promise, made at the 1973 summit conference, to provide projections of their agricultural needs (just as they will ignore all significant promises made at Helsinki, including the

promise to publish adequate "economic and commercial information"). So we are unsure about the exact size of the Soviet appetite for our grain.

We will know that size only when it is too late to do anything about it—after Soviet purchases have driven U.S. grain prices far above the prices they paid when they entered the market. But American policy holds that detente is a bargain at any price.

Anyway, it would violate the "spirit of Helsinki" to wonder aloud if more grain might spring from the Eurasian earth if that earth were hoed vigorously by the Soviet soldiers who are tied down at the task of nailing governments in place with bayonets in Prague and elsewhere. Besides, if we don't sell the Soviet Union at least 15 million tons of grain—an amount approaching the 19 million tons of the memorable 1972 grain sale—the Kremlin will face the sort of internal unpleasantness that one detente part-

ner should spare the other.

The Kremlin needs grain primarily for livestock feed. Soviet leaders rashly promised to increase their subjects' protein consumption. For that purpose the leaders will spend money not required for repairing the Berlin Wall or for cheating on the 1972 strategic arms agreement.

World grain markets cannot supply the 40 million tons of grain the Soviet Union probably will need to make up its shortfall. Even if they buy 15 million tons of U.S. grain, the Soviet people will have to slaughter a lot of livestock prematurely.

But without that U.S. grain, the Kremlin would be severely embarrassed, and there might even be social unrest in the workers' paradise. Of course, there may be some unrest in the U.S. when the prices of our beef, bread and other foods begin to reflect the price of what is left of our grain.

There is a first time for ev-

erything, so conceivably the U.S. Department of Agriculture is correct in saying that we are not in for a repeat of the 1972 "great grain robbery." According to a government study, that transaction earned \$700 million, but cost consumers \$1 billion in higher food costs.

Unfortunately, we could have more confidence in USDA assurances if the department were not guessing about the size of Soviet demand and U.S. supply.

Fortunately, U.S. supply may be even better than expected if there is a lot of rain, soon, in the Midwest. So to cope with the myriad problems caused by Soviet purchases, a former USDA official recently suggested a possible policy: "We can only hope the rains fall."

Even a policy of dynamic hoping has shortcomings. It does nothing to get grain to some of the hundreds of millions of people who need it even more than do the Soviet people.

WASHINGTON POST
13 August 1975

U.S. Denies Soviet 'Deal' on Solzhenitsyn

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

VAIL, Colo., Aug. 12—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger tonight denied a report that he had made a "deal" with the Soviet Union which led to President Ford's initial refusal to meet with Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

However, Kissinger said in a telephone interview with a reporter here that he had urged the Soviet government to permit the Nobel-prize-winning author to emigrate about a month before he was allowed to do so in February, 1974. Mr. Ford became President in August, 1974.

The new development in the Ford-Solzhenitsyn meeting controversy came after the Associated Press, in a dispatch from Scottsdale, Ariz.,

quoted Warren Rustand, appointments secretary to the President, as saying the President's refusal to see the famous author was the result of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time Solzhenitsyn went into exile.

The AP report produced a frenzy of activity here, with White House press secretary Ron Nessen telephoning Rustand and Kissinger to try to find out what had happened.

Nessen told reporters that Rustand denied saying what the AP quoted him as saying. Rather, said Nessen, Rustand insisted he reported he had heard "rumors" about the arrangement in Washington.

Nessen then quoted Kissinger as saying that the initial

decision by the President not to meet with Solzhenitsyn when he was in Washington "was not based on any arrangement made with the Soviets at the time Solzhenitsyn left the Soviet Union."

Nevertheless, Nessen conceded that Kissinger "had some informal conversations with the Soviet government at the time of Solzhenitsyn's departure" from the Soviet Union.

That comment led reporters to the conclusion that Kissinger at least had entered into an informal agreement that the United States government would not use the Solzhenitsyn case to embarrass the Soviet Union.

When Nessen said he had no information to support that conclusion reporters asked him to telephone Kissinger again to clarify the matter. When he refused, a reporter asked to use Nessen's telephone to reach Kissinger.

The Secretary of State took the call immediately and denied "absolutely" that there was any agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. with respect to the writer. Kissinger said he had urged the Kremlin to let Solzhenitsyn leave the country.

"There was no deal of any

kind as to how Solzhenitsyn was to be treated in the West," Kissinger said.

Expressing annoyance at the questioning, the secretary said, "this thing has become an absurdity" and flatly denied that there was any connection between his earlier conversations and Mr. Ford's initial refusal to receive Solzhenitsyn when he was in Washington this summer.

Kissinger would not say

what Soviet officials he talked with about release of the well-known author and critic of communism.

Following criticism of the President for not seeing the writer, Mr. Ford issued an invitation and Nessen said tonight that Solzhenitsyn continues to have an "open invitation" to visit the White House and meet with the President.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 August 1975

Another Soviet grain drain?

Are American consumers about to be bamboozled again because of U.S. grain sales to the Russians?

So far the Soviet Union has purchased just under 10 million tons of grain and the administration insists the impact on American food prices will be marginal. It is not yet clear, however, how much the Russians will buy this year. If their faltering grain crop turns out even worse than expected, additional purchases could be heavy.

If Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve is right and domestic prices shoot up as a result, President Ford will confront an irate public. Americans remember only too well the 1972 Soviet grain deal, which caused food prices to soar for the next two years.

The picture is different today. There are no more price supports to grain exporters which enable the Russians to pay a low price. Moreover, the purchases are smaller and the U.S. harvest is larger.

The administration is in fact happy about these sales. Food has long been an important component of American exports that earn money to pay for imports of oil and other commodities. Proponents of free trade argue that export controls, while they may keep prices down for some goods, simply increase the cost to Americans of other items imported from abroad.

Furthermore, it is argued that American farmers have to be able to export their grain if they are to keep expanded acreage in production. Now that soil-bank subsidies are lifted, the farmers are out on a limb. If they cannot sell the grain, they will not plant it in the future. That would be self-defeating at a time when the world demand for food grows.

Yet consumers are understandably suspicious that they are always the victim of manipulation and end up paying the price for Soviet inefficiencies in farming. Part of the problem arises from the secrecy that attends so much of the grain dealing, which is carried on by private American companies in Moscow and does not become known until it is over.

The Russians, for their part, are equally secretive. Under an agreement with the United States they are supposed to provide periodic reports on crop production, consumption, foreign trade, and so on. But they withhold crucial data, such as forecasts of their import requirements.

Somehow a means ought to be found of bringing Soviet-American grain negotiations into the public domain — and of making the Russians rather than the Americans pay the price of Soviet failures in agriculture. The administration should be alert to the political liabilities it faces if the American consumer finds the price of bread and flour climbing (as it already is) and concludes that he has been had.

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NEW YORK TIMES
12 August 1975

'Normalized' Prague?

Of all the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia undoubtedly imposes the most repressive conditions on its people. The secret police keep the populace under intensive scrutiny. The worst blows are aimed at Czechoslovakia's foremost writers, some of whom have even seen their children denied the right to enter high school because they will not conform slavishly to Prague's demands.

Czechoslovak press and radio routinely turn out the most heavy-handed anti-American propaganda in Europe. They portray the United States as a partner of Nazi Germany at the end of World War II, with General Eisenhower a collaborator of Hitler. The role of the American Army in helping liberate Czechoslovakia in 1945—a liberation in which 1,500 Americans died—is never mentioned, while there is unceasing and nauseating tribute to the Soviet Army as the sole instrument of Czech liberation from the Nazis.

The present rulers of Czechoslovakia, led by the Soviet gauleiter, Gustav Husak, are propped up by the bayonets and tanks of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers who continue to occupy Czechoslovakia and make it for all practical purposes the sixteenth constituent "republic" of the Soviet Union. None of this is likely to be changed by the ritualistic Husak-Brezhnev pledge last weekend to observe the Helsinki declaration.

Under the Ford Administration's flabby interpretation of détente, all the many unsavory aspects of Czechoslovakia must be ignored in the interest of full normalization of relations with Prague. The sole barrier to an immediate move by Washington to give Prague eighteen tons of Czechoslovak gold held since World War II, along with access to American credits and the like, is the refusal of some American businessmen to accept as part of the projected deal only a fraction of the value of assets which were confiscated in that country a generation ago.

All this, we would suggest, is a gross misreading of the requirements of détente and a memory lapse about the need for détente to be a two-way street. There is no need to hurry about full normalization while "Hate America" propaganda is routine in Czechoslovakia and a Stalinist-type tyranny oppresses Czechs and Slovaks alike. When there are serious signs of real normalization in Czechoslovakia, then Washington can give serious thought to normalized relations.

The economic issues involved here are insignificant from the national point of view. The central questions are of decency and morality, and the lack of need, to say the least, for unseemly haste in fully accepting the most repulsive regime among the Soviet satellites.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
19 August 1975

United States Foreign Policy And the West European Left

By Robert J. Lieber

DAVIS, Calif.—In the aftermath of America's Indochina debacle, it has become fashionable to view the future with concern and trepidation or to find that "we are close to a national nervous breakdown," as Secretary of State Kissinger has said. As applied specifically to Western Europe, such fears and their concomitant mood of Spenglerian gloom are clearly exaggerated.

In Europe, there has been a resurgence of left-wing strength within some of the principal Socialist parties, but both left and right within these parties remain strongly wedded to democratic values.

This commitment profoundly divides them from the Communists and is evident, for example, in the character of François Mitterrand and the French Socialist party.

Mr. Mitterrand's electoral and programmatic alliance with the Communists has been a striking success for the Socialists.

By creating an attractive rejuvenated party, not least by his willingness to propose substantial and occasionally radical measures of domestic reform, Mr. Mitterrand has succeeded in making the Socialists the senior partner.

Clearly, it is Mr. Mitterrand who has exploited the Communists, thereby contradicting the conventional wisdom—borrowed from the Eastern European context of 1944-47—that if you sit down to dine with the Communists it is they who will devour you rather than vice versa.

As for Britain, the United States press and television commentators have—in a tone of prophecy—told us of the smell of "Weimar" or of "Argentina" in the air.

Britain's troubles are significant, but the assessment of these has been myopic and, at times, hysterical. Consider Britain's past economic and political disarray: major labor strife and the specter of civil war over Ireland on the eve of World War I, grievous losses in the 1914-1918 war, the General Strike of 1926, economic crisis in 1931, 22 per cent unemployment in 1932, economic and political mismanagement throughout the 1920's and 1930's, appeasement, Dunkirk and the costly victory in World War II, economic crisis in the late 1940's, "stop-and-go" economics in the 1950's and 1960's, and the frequent perils of

sterling.

In this perspective, the present crisis recedes in both gravity and uniqueness. What is more, fundamental political questions go begging. Britain's high inflation and wage settlements involve a definite pattern of income redistribution and class-based politics.

The Heath Government of 1970-74 enacted whopping tax advantages for business and for upper- and upper-middle-income families.

More recently, the Labor Government and the trade unions have exacted an even more marked redistribution of income in favor of their own constituencies.

In any case, the Labor Government has begun to deal with hyperinflation; the Common Market referendum has—predictably—provided a resounding endorsement of Britain's continued membership; oil has begun flowing from the North Sea, and—above all—Britain remains a rational, viable and civilized society and polity.

To the extent that the Western European democratic left successfully addresses itself to pressing social and economic problems it strengthens the fabric of the societies and makes them less susceptible to the kind of turmoil that fosters the growth of Communist movements.

Indeed, I would juxtapose to Secretary Kissinger's penchant for quoting Spengler the view that in order to preserve it is necessary to change. In this sense, the domestic difficulties faced by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may prove more intractable than those in Western Europe.

As for the question of a viable balance of power in Europe, the situation is less grim than it has been painted. There is no valid presumption that governing parties of the democratic left will neglect security factors.

Note that Sweden (Social Democratic) spends the same proportion of her gross national product on defense as does France (Conservative-Gaullist), that Britain and West Germany under Labor and Social Democratic party Governments respectively, maintain adequate defense establishments and close Atlantic ties, and that a French Socialist Government would be likely to continue Gaullist policies involving a strong national (and nuclear)

defense.

The future alignment of Western Europe will also be shaped by American policies whose ingredient of *realpolitik* has often—and ironically—proved evanescent. Before 1973, by treating the Greek and Portuguese authoritarian regimes as favored allies we over-identified ourselves with these ill-fated and unpopular Governments.

In the case of Greece, this policy (as well as Secretary Kissinger's inept actions involving Cyprus) has led the present moderate Government of Greece to call into question the American military presence there. In Portugal, United States policy may have played into the hands of Communist elements in the Armed Forces Movement.

Similarly, President Ford's recent visit to Spain can be seen as an endorsement of the tottering dictatorship of Adolph Hitler's erstwhile and aging ally, Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

In Spain, as recently in Greece and Portugal, change will come, but when it does the legacy of United States policies is likely to have earned the enmity of moderate and democratic elements.

The societies of Western Europe are complex and pluralistic. Visions of a Communist coup like that of Prague, 1948, or of Finlandization—enforced neutralization—do not correspond to existing realities.

Except for Portugal these countries are not in imminent danger of capture or even major influence by Communists or pro-Soviet elements. Even in Italy the Communist party is in no position to assume political domination for the foreseeable future.

To the extent that dangers might arise they are likely to owe as much to American mistakes as to indigenous factors.

Without the albatross of Indochina around our necks, perhaps we will now be able to address the area with a sense of proportion and sophistication, and without becoming frozen into position by nostalgia for old patterns and relationships.

Robert J. Lieber, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, is author of "British Politics and European Unity" and "Theory and World Politics."

LONDON TIMES
6 August 1975

Will détente force Italy behind the Iron Curtain?

Clare Boothe Luce,
who was American ambassador
to Italy from
1953 to 1957, contributes
this week's column
in our International Women's
Year series.

As the accepted leader of the free world, the United States creates, to a large extent, the political climate in it. The effect of US political and cultural détente with Soviet Russia has been to create a world climate in which communism has become politically and culturally respectable.

Détente has strengthened communist parties—and weakened democratic parties in the western democracies. Because of détente, many democratic parties have begun to suffer defections both from the left and the right. Opportunists on the left hasten to join forces with the upcoming Marxist socialists. Those on the right, who refuse to accept political détente with their domestic communists, have no choice but to join hands with the hard-core anti-communist elements, whose programmes are all too often "neo-fascist" or "militaristic".

In the new climate of détente, which tends to make the anti-communist right almost as disreputable as it was in the fascist era, the weakened centre is forced to weaken itself even more by joining the communists in attacking its right-wing defectors. Thus, there is a gradual erosion of the centre towards the left. Sooner or later the point is reached where the centre can no longer govern, because it can no longer form a parliamentary majority. And in order to avoid civil strife, and maintain the façade of democracy, it must bring the communists into government.

The great gains scored by the Communist Party in the recent Italian elections are among the first—but not the last—sour fruits of détente.

American liberals, whose passionate belief in economic determinism might astound Marx himself, have attributed the communist gains in Italy entirely to the adverse economic conditions prevailing there, and have failed to see their connexion with political and cultural détente.

It is true that there is considerable economic discontent in Italy. Like all the democracies, Italy is plagued by

inflation and unemployment, and has been hard hit by the rising costs of fuel. But even when the Italian recession is taken into account, the fact remains that the majority of the people are better off today than they have been in their entire history.

Moreover, "economic discontent" is par for any democratic course. As Tacitus once observed about the human appetite for the goods of this world, "There is no such thing as enough". And the desire of a democratic electorate for more—and more—is increased, rather than satisfied by the progress it has previously made. In the past 25 years, no country in Europe has made relatively more progress than Italy, and no electorate is demanding more of its government.

All political scientists seem agreed that the hour when a democracy begins to collapse is when the people's demands exceed the country's resources, and refusing to face this fact, they begin to raid their own Treasury.

The resources of Italy today are simply not adequate to meet the excessive demands that the people are making of their Government. This situation is dangerous, precisely because détente has now made the communist alternative to democratic government much more acceptable than it was in the Cold War era. Italians no longer fear that the US would not recognize a communist Italy, extend aid, or refuse to trade with it. The US wheat deal with Russia, and the extension of credits are ample proof that a communist Italy would not be cut off from US commerce, support and friendship.

Despite the efforts of the communists to hasten the collapse of the Christian Democratic government by endlessly agitating the most unreasonable economic demands of the electorate, if it were not for détente, there would be no reason to fear the entrance of the communists into the government. But détente has maximized not only the gains of communist political penetration of Italy, but also the gains of communist cultural penetration.

In their struggle to create a communist world, the men of Moscow are long-range totalitarian planners and campaigners. They have neglected no field of human thought or endeavour. For three decades now, seemingly apolitical communists have been carefully woven into the fabric of Italian culture. Twenty-five years ago, the American Embassy was aware of a communist directive instructing every Italian communist to concentrate on converting the youngest male member of non-communist families. Today,

these cultural converts, now matured, are present in large numbers, not only in the party, but also in the Italian educational system, the arts, the professions, the media, the military, and even in the church.

In the Cold War days, this process of cultural penetration was called "subversion", and was stoutly resisted, especially by the church. In the climate of "peaceful coexistence", resistance—even by the Vatican—is viewed as "religious intolerance", or an undemocratic, even "fascist" attitude.

The political and cultural *coup de grace* to anti-communism was recently delivered by President Ford himself when he refused to receive Nobel Prize winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the White House. When the world's most famous anti-communist, and political exile, who has won his credentials as a "freedom-fighter" in Russian labour camps, is *persona non grata* to the leader of the free world—how can anyone in Italy, or anywhere else, fail to get the message that communism is "in" and anti-communism is "out"? The President later changed his mind, but by then it was too late and Mr Solzhenitsyn declined the invitation.

So long as the United States fails to realize that the struggle against Soviet world expansionism is being lost in the cultural and political field, it will be impossible for democratic governments to devise effective strategies, no less find convincing arguments for keeping their domestic communist parties from increasing participation in government. It is predictable that once the communists enter the Italian government, the pattern, with variations dictated by local considerations, will eventually follow that of Czechoslovakia.

The Mediterranean, once the *Mare Nostrum* of the Romans, is still a western sea. But if Italy slips behind the Iron Curtain, nothing short of the Third World War will keep it from becoming a Russian lake. When this happens, the US defence of Europe will become impossible. And the USA will be isolated.

Altogether a pretty heavy price to pay, when one comes to think of it, for a détente that has produced nothing for the West but a very slight increase in trade, and a series of nuclear disarmament deals that have, on balance, favoured the Russians.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

21 August 1975

Joseph C. Harsch

Communist loss in Portugal

It was a very good thing indeed, and something which should be more widely noted than it has, that communism in Portugal is being pushed back by the Portuguese people themselves without any appreciable outside help and certainly without the intervention of the American Central Intelligence Agency — or by any other form of American intervention.

There has been encouragement to the socialists in Portugal from outside. It has been mostly in the form of advice and encouragement, supplemented with some funds, from socialist parties on the outside — primarily from the socialist parties of France and West Germany. But the American role (largely for accidental or mistaken reasons) has been nonexistent. The Communist failure in Portugal (which it already is) can never be pinned on American intervention no matter what the Communists themselves may claim in their propaganda.

American nonintervention has been due in part to the immobilization of the operations side of the CIA. Current investigations and disclosures of past CIA mistakes and the generally bad reaction to the last CIA intervention in a similar situation (Chile) have for the time being taken the CIA out of play. Its intelligence appraisal work goes on unchecked and undamaged, but its clandestine side is simply not operational under present circum-

stances.

Add that pessimism prevailed at the top levels in Washington when the Communists in Portugal opened up their bid for control. The tendency was to assume that since the CIA was immobilized all was lost and Portugal would be the next victim to communism. There was a defeatist attitude based on the fallacy that communism wins wherever American resistance is absent.

Happily the pessimism was unjustified. The Portuguese people themselves have exhibited a vigorous reluctance to hand over their country to a minority capable of gaining only some 12 percent of the vote in a free election.

It is healthy indeed for everyone, perhaps especially for Americans, to learn that anti-communism exists all by itself in a sturdy and vigorous native form. Americans are not the only people who know that Stalinist-style communism is a tyrannical condition unsuitable for free men. Americans have no monopoly on awareness of the dangers or of willingness to take firm action to resist it in its aggressive forms.

There is also a reminder in recent events in Portugal that Communists are neither all-powerful nor all-wise. They have generated almost no real power in Portugal. And they have done some exceedingly stupid things.

They have probably set their cause back by another decade.

For example, the Communist parties of both France and Italy have long been cultivating a "law-abiding" profile. They have claimed that they seek power only through the ballot box. They have purported to have become domesticated and law-abiding. And this new image was helping them greatly throughout Western Europe — particularly in Italy.

The Portuguese experience has exploded the theory of a benign form of communism in Western Europe. The Portuguese Communists refused to accept the verdict of the ballot box. They reached for decisive power after being defeated overwhelmingly. They announced they were not impressed or influenced by such expressions of popular preference.

The arrogance and the baldness of their behavior in Portugal can now be added to the list of events which cause men to resist them wherever they can. The suppression of popular will in Hungary and Czechoslovakia took care of a lot of earlier illusions.

The CIA intervened in Chile on the assumption that otherwise Chile would be captured by the Communists. Would it? We can never know. There was a counterrevolution — and a brutal one at that. If Portugal comes out of its ordeal by its own efforts — everyone will be better off. And we will know the answers.

NEW YORK TIMES

17 August 1975

Support for Portugal...

After long assuming that a Communist takeover was almost inevitable in Portugal, Secretary of State Kissinger has finally set United States policy—in its public expressions, at least—onto a more constructive tack. His Birmingham speech offered just the kind of psychological support that Portugal's embattled democratic forces have been needing as they press their resistance to Communist-backed Premier Goncalves and the radical left-wing minorities of the Armed Forces Movement.

Much of the credit for this belated show of encouragement must go to the energetic United States Ambassador in Lisbon, Frank Carlucci, who made a flying trip to Washington last weekend for urgent consultations. Dispatched to Lisbon just seven months ago, Ambassador Carlucci from the start sent back reports and recommendations that shook up Washington's fatalistic, predetermined notions.

Last April's election, in which the non-Communist

parties scored such a resounding triumph, added weight to his cautiously sanguine assessments; the past week or so of popular resistance to Communist authoritarianism confirmed that forces of democracy and moderation need not be written off in Portugal.

This resistance is all the more impressive for having so clearly lacked the same sort of tangible support from abroad that the Soviet Union is providing the local Communists—and which, in an earlier era, the Central Intelligence Agency might have been tempted to contribute through a variety of covert actions.

There is a world of difference between undercover manipulation of another country's political affairs and open expressions of sympathy from an allied government for the majority will against a ruthless minority's power play. The United States and the allies of Western Europe are now approaching a common position toward the Portuguese struggle; both are holding out the promise of economic aid and support—without which Portugal cannot begin to restore its threatened social fabric—once it is clear that the country's political development can proceed along democratic lines.

East Asia

BALTIMORE SUN
28 July 1975

Where the Powers Converge

Korea: the Enduring Test of U.S. Asian Policy

By R. H. SHACKFORD

Washington.

Many problems face the United States as its thirty years of hegemony over what we used to call "free Asia" are ending. But the severest tests could come in Korea where Americans already have fought one war and there is concern lest it stumble into another great tragedy.

After all, it was the Korean War in 1950, as Yale University's diplomatic historian, Gaddis Smith, recalled in a recent *New York Times Magazine* article, that "inaugurated a generation of American warfare in Asia, froze relations with China in a hostile mold for two decades and led to the debacle in Vietnam." Another Korean war would be infinitely more dangerous and disastrous than Vietnam because Northeast Asia is the geographical meeting point of China, Russia and Japan. And the United States meets all of them there by virtue of its military presence in South Korea.

Unfortunately, a lot of thoughtless, hard-line talk prevails which only intensifies a complex, tense situation. In South Korea, the harsh, repressive regime of our ally, President Park Chung Hee, almost daily justifies its totalitarian policies at home by predicting an imminent new attack by North Korea. It demands that the United States "demonstrate by deeds its firm determination not to commit the same failure on the Korean peninsula as it did on the Indochinese peninsula." This is a form of diplomatic blackmail, challenging the United States to "prove," in the wake of Vietnam, that it is not a "pitiful, helpless giant."

In Washington, the Ford administration tries to bolster U.S. "prestige" by proclaiming—also almost daily—its determination to stand by its treaty commitments. It even encourages hints that if there is another Korean war the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons against North Korea

cannot be ruled out. That is supposed to keep North Korea guessing, even though we would call it nuclear blackmail if another country were doing it to us.

Meanwhile, North Korea keeps repeating what it has claimed for 25 years—that unification of Korea is essential and inevitable, while it maneuvers diplomatically for victory at this fall's United Nations Assembly to remove the U.N. flag—merely a symbol—from South Korea and to get majority support for American troop withdrawal.

All this, and more, coincided with the 25th anniversary of the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. But another, equally important anniversary, although ignored, occurred last Saturday—the 22d anniversary of the armistice which ended three years of terrible fighting in Korea. That armistice still prevails. But no genuine effort by either side has been made since then to take the normal next step—to negotiate a peace settlement.

The question of reunification of Korea, an enduring notion, is unrealistic today short of a total military victory by one side or the other.

But that does not mean that there is no opportunity for diplomacy on the Korean problem today. It is essential. If detente has any fundamental meaning at all, it is to prevent controversies in small countries leading to conflict between large ones.

There are six countries with direct and vital interests in what happens in Korea. Most immediate, of course, are the two Koreas which, a couple of years ago, had talks for a short time on ways to resume contacts and live-and-let-live. There are the three major countries who are Korea's neighbors—Japan, not much farther away (125 miles) from Korea, across the Korea Strait, then Cuba is from Florida; Russia, whose

major Pacific city and naval base, Vladivostok, is only 75 miles from the Korean border; China, which shares a border of more than 400 miles with North Korea. Then there is the United States which converted South Korea after the Korean War for all practical purposes into a colony, even though in 1947 it had been ready to get out of that country "with the minimum of bad effects."

The stakes and the rivalries in the area are tremendous, and some of them date back long before Marxism, Leninism or Maoism became household words. But it should not be beyond the ability of rational men in these six countries to find a formula for preventing a war that no one wants. The formula appears to be so obvious as to be too simple.

Reunification of Korea, long ago relegated to the propagandists, must be abandoned as a feasible objective for the foreseeable future. It must be left to time, and more importantly, to the Koreans themselves eventually to decide.

The status quo—two Koreas—is the basic formula for avoiding another war. And the surest way to avoid such a war would be agreement among the large powers—the U.S., Russia, China and Japan—to persuade the two Koreas that the status quo is in their vital interests, too. Even that idea is Korean. It has been suggested by the leading critic of South Korea's dictator Park, Kim Young Sam, who leads the New Democratic Party. He proposed that the six nations primarily involved meet to find a way to guarantee peace in the Korean peninsula. There is no longer any chance in South Korea for such dissent from the regime's policies—virtually all dissent having been banned in May by President Park.

Unhappily, most of the talk about Korea, even in Washington, is about another war. At a recent

Ford press conference there was talk (in response to questions) about whether the President would use nuclear weapons if North Korea attacks South Korea. The President wouldn't say yes, but he didn't say no—only that nuclear weapons would "be used in our national interest as they should be." There were no questions—and, therefore no answers—about any diplomatic initiatives.

In his recent speech to the Japan Society, trying to woo Japan into a new partnership after years of ignoring that country, Secretary of State Kissinger vowed "to maintain the peace and security of the Korean peninsula . . . We will assist South Korea . . . But we shall also seek all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confrontations." He made no specific suggestions.

What more honorable way is there—not forgetting the skepticism that greets any claim about "peace with honor"—than an effort to get the six nations most crucially involved to seek an agreement to maintain the status quo in Korea and to stop talk about "going north" or "going south" or using nuclear weapons?

What more honorable way is there—not forgetting the skepticism that greets any claim about "peace with honor"—than an effort to get the six nations most crucially involved to seek an agreement to maintain the status quo in Korea and to stop talk about "going north" or "going south" or using nuclear weapons? Winston Churchill used to say, "better to jaw, jaw, than to war, war." Now that we have "celebrated" the 25th anniversary of the start of the Korean War with talk about another war, what more honorable way to "celebrate" the 22d anniversary of the end of that war by trying a little "jaw, jaw" to prevent another.

The Washington Star

Monday, August 11, 1975

18 Mos. to Prepare

New Red Push Expected in Asia

By Fred S. Hoffman

Associated Press

U.S. intelligence analysts believe Thailand and Malaysia have about 18 months to prepare for major Communist insurgencies.

Reports indicate that infiltration into Thailand already has increased since the Communists won in neighboring Indochina this spring.

Malaysia is less vulnerable than Thailand to large-scale overland infiltration because it does not border on any Communist-run country.

But intelligence sources say Malaysian insurgents have become more aggressive in recent months and have sent emissaries to try and obtain U.S. small arms captured by Communist forces in Indochina.

INFORMATION collected by U.S. intelligence in Southeast Asia indicates that massive infiltration into northeast Thailand is likely to begin in early 1977 with the objective of "liberating" 16 provinces, sources say.

By that time, intelligence specialists believe, the Communists will have cemented their control throughout Vietnam and Laos and will be ready for a major effort to promote insurgency in neighboring Southeast Asia countries.

Worried Thai leaders already are embarked on diplomacy aimed at achieving a live-and-let-live arrangement with the Communist Vietnamese, considered the principal threat. The Thais also have been courting support from Communist China in hopes of countering the Vietnamese.

MALAYSIAN officials are said to anticipate one or two years of grace before facing serious insurgency troubles. To get ready, they are reported expanding their army, police and village guard forces.

Last week, Thai Defense Minister Pramarn Adireksarn said in Bangkok that "thousands of insurgents" have been receiving war equipment from foreign nations which he did not

BALTIMORE SUN

13 August 1975

Air Force confirms drugging of 13 Vietnamese refugees

Washington (AP)—The Air Force confirmed yesterday that it drugged 13 Vietnamese refugees and put them on the last plane from Thailand to Guam while they demanded to be returned to Vietnam.

The Air Force issued a statement after Representative Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.), chairman of the House immigration subcommittee, said he had talked to 12 of the refugees and was told they had been drugged, beaten and taken to Guam against their will.

The Air Force, however, had no comment on the alleged beatings and on Mr. Eilberg's statement that the Vietnamese had told him they were threatened with jail and then death if they refused to go to Guam.

"Near hysteria, they [the refugees] demanded to be returned to Vietnam and threatened suicide if they were not returned immediately," the Air Force said.

It said the Vietnamese were sedated with sodium pentathol and also given the tranquilizer thiorazine.

The Vietnamese had been flown from Vietnam to Thailand, and Thai officials adamantly refused to let them stay, so a decision was made by U.S. and Thai officials "to sedate the Vietnamese and take them to Guam," the Air Force said.

The 13 Vietnamese said that when they boarded the plane in

Vietnam, they had been told it was flying to the delta region, not out of the country, the Air Force said.

"Hours of discussion failed to persuade them that there were no means to take them back," the Air Force said. "The Thai officials were adamant that they leave Thailand immediately."

The Air Force said the Vietnamese were sedated with medicines regularly given in evacuation situations "for the patients' comfort or where because of mental or emotional disturbance they may pose a threat to themselves or others."

An Air Force nurse accompanied the 13 Vietnamese on the flight and "no ill effects were noted," the Air Force said.

"Although they were helped aboard the aircraft, all 13 were ambulatory during the flight," the Air Force said. "And all except one, who insisted on being carried off, left the aircraft at Guam without assistance."

The decision to sedate the Vietnamese and take them to Guam with other refugees, the Air Force said, was made with the hope that they could be repatriated expeditiously.

The Air Force said the incident occurred May 1 after South Vietnam had fallen and the drugs were administered by U.S. medical personnel at Uta-pao Air Force Base in Thailand.

Mr. Eilberg had said he

would conduct a formal subcommittee inquiry into the incident if the Air Force did not give him a full explanation.

Mr. Eilberg, who is at Guam with subcommittee members on an inspection trip, said through his Washington office that he did not know why the refugees were beaten and drugged.

He said the 13 Vietnamese were among 65 people who had fled to Thailand at the time of the fall of Saigon but changed their minds and asked to return to Vietnam.

"After being threatened by Air Force officers, 52 of the Vietnamese agreed to go to Guam. The 13 who did not were then threatened first with jail and then death if they did not go to Guam," Mr. Eilberg's announcement said.

Mr. Eilberg said he was told during the interviews "that the 13 were then beaten and then each person was carried by four Americans into a room where they were given two injections in their arms and two in their legs."

The Vietnamese said they reported the incident to an "American doctor captain" who told them he believed their story, Mr. Eilberg said.

The chairman said he does not know the identity of the Air Force officers allegedly responsible for the drugging or the Army captain who examined the Vietnamese.

name.

About the same time Gen. Kriengsak Chamanand, chief of the Thai joint military staff, spoke of "preparing our defense strategy and reviewing the military situation daily" in light of increasing internal insurgency and uncertain relations with Thailand's Communist neighbors.

But U.S. officials long have been critical of Thailand's armed forces. Those forces have received more than \$600 million in U.S.

equipment but were unable to suppress even a relatively low-level insurgency while the North Vietnamese were concentrating on gaining Communist victory in Indochina.

AMERICAN officials also have been unhappy over what they consider Thai failure to act effectively in recent years to improve economic and other conditions in Thailand's impoverished northeast provinces.

Although the Thai northeast seems the prime objective, U.S. intelligence specialists say the Vietnamese Communists plan to expand subversion in other areas of Thailand as well.

The Communists are reported to have agents in 42 of Thailand's 71 provinces. They are said to have a goal of training in North Vietnam some 500 Thai Communists and 500 Vietnamese living in northeast

NEW YORK TIMES
18 August 1975

Indochina in Flux

The Communist bloc's own power struggle for pre-eminence in Indochina shows signs of intensifying, just three months after the United States abandoned the region in defeat. A complex tangle of ideological and historical rivalries is provoking friction, not only between China and the Soviet Union but between Vietnamese and Cambodians, and among differing factions in their revolutionary regimes.

Long-standing strains between Hanoi and Peking showed up openly in the correct but low-key treatment accorded a North Vietnamese delegation visiting Peking last week. Their rivalry is also evident in the maneuvering of both sides' partisans in the shadowy leadership of Cambodia. When Phnom Penh recently announced the appointment as new Deputy Premiers of two politicians linked to Hanoi's Vietminh movement, Peking radio hastened to reveal that a top-level Cambodian delegation was about to visit the Chinese capital—the first foreign trip by any of the Cambodian leadership since the Khmer Rouge took control last April. On arrival in Peking, the Cambodians were received with warmth and fanfare.

Especially baffling is the status of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Cambodian head of state who lived in exile in Peking for five years. Though the rebel forces who nominally recognized his leadership have assumed

WASHINGTON STAR
30 July 1975

Thailand Seeking Nations to Take 50,000 Refugees

By Denis D. Gray
Associated Press

BANGKOK — The fate of tens of thousands of Indochinese refugees still in Thailand hangs in the balance: the United States is not prepared to take the bulk of them; the Thai government says it cannot keep them, and the United Nations is only starting to tackle the problem.

Thai and American officials estimate there are 40,000 to 50,000 Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese in Thailand. And while the influx of Vietnamese has stopped, Cambodians and Laotians continue to come in.

Cambodia fell to the Communist-dominated Khmer Rouge in mid-April. South Vietnam fell on April 30 and Laos since has come gradually under the dominant influence of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao.

Judging from the latest instructions from Washington, U.S. officials say, at best one-third of the estimated 7,000 Cambodians in Thailand might be allowed into the United States.

BUT NO MENTION is made of the largest refugee group, the Meo hill tribes people of Laos, who were considered among the best and most loyal fighters the U.S. government supported in Indochina.

The United States has to date taken in about 80 percent of the Indochinese refugees that have already been resettled outside of Thailand, according to United Nations and U.S. Embassy statistics.

Thailand has been saddled with the problem of caring for the refugees mostly because of 1,700 miles of border with Laos and Cambodia and proximity to Vietnam.

It faces the refugee problem with considerable po-

power, the Prince made no apparent effort to return to his capital; indeed, he even left Peking for a long sojourn in North Korea.

The United States is hardly in position to influence these obscure maneuvers, even if it had an interest in doing so. But increased flexibility in Washington's approach to the new Communist regimes could help them maintain their independence of both Moscow and Peking.

There is no visible logic, for example, in the Ford Administration's attitude toward private economic initiatives that could lessen Vietnamese dependence on Communist aid. A prominent American banker is permitted to visit Hanoi on an exploratory mission, yet American voluntary organizations are explicitly barred from sending economic and development aid to affiliated institutions in Vietnam—aid that they were permitted to supply even while the war was raging!

President Ford himself imposed this ban, reportedly against the recommendation of Secretary of State Kissinger. At least one affected organization, the American Friends Service Committee, intends to keep fighting the decision.

Fishnets and tractors donated by private Americans are not going to change the course of Indochina's Communist politics. But they are symbolic of the change in official American attitudes which will have to occur if the United States ever expects to play a more constructive role in Vietnam's peace than it did in Vietnam's war.

litical embarrassment since the Thai government is anxious for peaceful coexistence with its new Communist-dominated neighbors.

"Our standing policy toward the refugees is to send all of them back to their homelands while helping them the best we can for humanitarian reasons," Premier Kukrit Pramoj told newsmen recently. "We don't want the refugees to create misunderstandings with our Indochinese neighbors."

MOST WESTERN observers, however, do not foresee the Thais actually forcing refugees back across the frontiers and predict that some at least may quietly be allowed to settle in the country. But largely, Thai policy has been one of "wait and see," hoping the United States and other countries will take the refugees off their hands.

Several reliable U.S. diplomatic sources and American refugee relief workers here say high-ranking Thai officials have told them privately that the lives of the refugees are not being made too comfortable so as to dampen any desires for staying in Thailand permanently.

U.S. Embassy officials in the refugee program say many of the remaining 2,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand meet the two criteria for admittance to the United States — employment by the U.S. government at the time of the American evacuation of South Vietnam or having a relative in the United States.

VERY FEW OF the Cambodians meet such requirements for entry and almost all the 2,400 "spaces" set aside by Washington for Cambodians coming from Thailand have now been filled and the refugees flown out of the country, the officials say. These "spaces" were not subject to the normal criteria.

A State Department cable earlier this month, said Cambodian and Laotian "leaders" and "high-risk personnel" — those whose lives might be in serious danger if they returned to their homelands — would be granted entry, the officials said. It is difficult to estimate how many refugees could fit into these two categories, but a diplomat charged with the Cambodian refugee problem said between 2,000 and 3,000 might qualify.

The estimated 4,000 ethnic Lao and 34,000 Meo tribesmen have not been designated as "refugees" by

the American government and consequently none has to date been admitted to the United States, the officials say.

U.T. KADRY, the regional director of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, said in an interview that his agency has not yet provided aid to the camps but has helped several hundred "legal entrants" from Indo-Chinese nations, including payment for their air fares out of Thailand.

"Legal entrants" are people with proper exit documents and identification papers and they form a minor fraction of the total refugee population in Thailand.

Kadry said he hoped a recent meeting between Thai Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and U.N. officials in Geneva would produce some concrete steps toward "a permanent solution" to the refugee problem.

The foreign minister told newsmen that the International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commission would send representatives to see what could be done to help the Thai government in dealing with the refugee problem. Chatichai said Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, the head of the commission, told him his agency would try to allocate some funds for the refugees.

THOUSANDS of the refugees live under conditions which a U.S. diplomat charged with the Cambodians described as "generally poor." He said that during his recent visit to one of the largest refugee camps, about 1,000 Cambodians had no meat, vegetables or fruit to eat and that only a small bag of rice and some dried fish were provided daily to each family. He added that

BALTIMORE SUN

13 August 1975

Mary McGrory

Reprisal Guides U.S. and Vietnam

Washington. As usual, the reflex for reprisal is guiding our relations with Vietnam.

Upon the Security Council's rejection of South Korea for membership in the United Nations, the United States promptly threatened to veto the applications of North and South Vietnam.

The principle evoked was resistance to what the State Department terms "a selective program of universality."

Said a representative of the American Friends Service Committee, whose application for licenses to ship machinery to Vietnam was turned down recently by the State Department, "It seems as though some people in this government are still fighting the war."

The reason given, by the way, was that while private agencies like the Quakers can send food and medicine to the war-ravaged country, "developmental items" cannot be licensed. The machinery was destined for a small workshop for the handicapped.

The UN action is explained by Philip M. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, as meaning that "the other side can't decide who is eligible."

"We don't want to exclude anyone," he says, "but how can anyone argue that South Vietnam belongs, when nobody even knows who their government is, and then

around and say South Korea doesn't belong?"

The UN explanation is that it is customary when only one half of a divided country applies to turn it down. North Korea has evinced no interest.

What the episode illustrates, beyond what some call "sandbox diplomacy," is that it may be a long time before the Ford administration can bring itself to acknowledge that the Viet Cong won the war and to sit down as equals with Madame Binh of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

The secretary of state keeps saying we have to see how the South Vietnam government "behaves," as if it were a newly released felon.

Mr. Habib concedes that there is "no evidence of a major bloodbath," but tells of reports of "massive repressive and brutal re-education."

If and when the Saigon government changes from military to civilian—a move promised vaguely for later this month—the pressure for recognition from U.S. businessmen, private voluntary agencies, Americans with relatives in Vietnam and those people in Congress who regard the present policy as vindictive would increase.

The people most affected by diplomatic recognition, of course, would be those refugees who dramatically fled the country, with our help,

he detected signs of malnutrition and fever, especially among the children, and said medical care was sub-standard.

"They get just enough to keep them alive," he said of conditions at the Aranyaprathet border camp. "The people are literally packed together like in a concentration camp. They don't want these people comfortable, they want them out."

Least is known by Thai and American officials about the Laotians, the most recent of the refugee groups. One embassy official said about half of the estimated 4,000 ethnic Lao might qualify for entry to the United States.

HE SAID THE United States would probably not permit the Meo hill tribes people to go, especially since they would probably want to emigrate en masse.

To control the refugee population, Thailand has announced that all who fail to register and obtain proper identification papers by Sunday will be arrested and charged with illegal entry.

Statistics compiled by the U.S. Embassy and the United Nations give the following breakdown of Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in Thailand who were accepted by foreign nations as of early July: United States 6,500, Malaysia 700, France 600, Canada 300, Norway 83, Austria 29, Italy 8, New Zealand 1 and, Belgium 1.

One refugee official at the American Embassy said representatives of other nations occasionally stop by to enquire about procedures for accepting refugees but to date have taken no action.

NEW YORK TIMES

15 August 1975

Laotians Charge Two U.S. Diplomats With Spy Activities

BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug. 14 (UPI)—The Laotian Government has accused United States Embassy officials in a diplomatic protest of "spy and sabotage activities" in photographing a government compound.

The note was delivered yesterday by the Foreign Ministry's chief political officer to the chargé d'affaires, Thomas Corcoran. Embassy officials said there would be no answer.

The substance of the protest was broadcast by the Vientiane radio and printed in Laotian newspapers.

It said that two embassy officials had taken photographs on three occasions at Kilometer 9.1, the former compound of the Agency for International Development.

"The aforesaid acts of the two Americans are acts violating Laotian law as well as international law, in particular the Vienna Treaty of April 18, 1961 on diplomatic relations and privileges," the note said. It said the picture-taking constituted "spy and sabotage activities in Laos."

"The Laotian Foreign Ministry hereby demands that the United States Embassy be responsible for any consequences that might arise from the aforesaid acts," it added. "The Laotian Foreign Ministry warns the United States Embassy for the first and the last time to prevent the recurrence of such illegal acts."

Thieu regime.

If what are called "normal relations" were resumed, those people could communicate with their friends and families.

The administration last month decided to offer "voluntary repatriation" as an option to the refugees—some of whom were admittedly scooped up willy-nilly—and turned the whole matter over to the UN high commissioner on refugees.

Since that time, a UN spokesman said, the office has received and processed 3,000 applications. The Saigon government required each applicant to fill out a questionnaire.

Most put down "reunion with family" as their reason for seeking re-entry.

The UN has opened an office in Hanoi and made a written promise of another in Saigon. The new regime is so far, however, not holding out open arms.

"It has other priorities," says a UN refugee commissioner representative.

It would seem that self-interest as well as humanitarianism—not to mention the oft-voiced concern for the MIA's—might dictate a change from the present isolationism. After all, it was to avoid that sin, we were told, that we had to maintain for so long our disastrous and futile

LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 July 1975

AS THE TWO VIETNAMS ADJUST

Reunification Will Be Gradual

BY GARETH PORTER

The future relationship between North and South Vietnam remains unclear to outsiders. There have been indications in both public and private Vietnamese statements that formal reunification will not take place for years. Nevertheless, there has been much speculation that the North has already moved to take over the administration of the South, in the form of the Saigon Military Management Committee (MMC).

The assumption underlying this speculation is that the present administrative role of the revolutionary army in South Vietnam constitutes North Vietnamese hegemony. This widely accepted assumption is a measure of the gap between Vietnamese realities and the language which has governed American thinking about Vietnam for the past decade.

U.S. officials first convinced themselves and then convinced the American public that it was essentially a war between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The confusion of the leadership of the Lao Dong Party as well as the revolutionary armed forces in the South with North Vietnam continues to confound American understanding of the nature of the new regime in Saigon.

The misconception begins with a truth: The basic line of the Vietnamese revolution on problems of strategic importance is determined today, as it has been since the beginning of the revolution, by the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. Most of the members of the Central Committee—though by no means all of them—have been physically located in Hanoi for the past two decades, for obvious reasons. But that does not make it a "North Vietnamese" leadership or a "North Vietnamese" Communist Party in any meaningful political sense. For the Central Committee includes representatives of the party from all three traditional regions of Vietnam—north, center and south.

It is the political leadership of the party Central Committee over a nationwide organization which insures that, beneath the present formal division of the country, the two zones cannot drift apart or be posed in

sion of our country no longer exists."

But the Vietnamese leaders have long distinguished between their demand for the removal of external constraints on the two zones created by the Geneva accord of 1954 and the question of how formal reunification, would come about. On external constraints, they have been inflexible and unyielding in diplomatic contacts; on reunification, they have been willing to compromise from the beginning of the conflict. The political unity which has now been achieved by the victory of the revolutionary forces in the South does not mean, therefore, that the South will now be subsumed into a unitary administration, or subordinate to the North.

The Military Management Committee for Saigon and surrounding Gia Dinh province has often been identified as belonging to the "North Vietnamese Army," or "NVA," as officials and journalists called it during the war.

But the "NVA" was always a figment of the American imagination, necessary to the official position that the boundary line between the two zones corresponded somehow to the fundamental political cleavage in the country. No such term existed in the revolutionary vocabulary on either side of the line. The relationship between the Communist military structure and the geographical division of the country requires a brief historical resume for proper perspective.

The Vietnam People's Army (Quân Đội Nhân Dân Vietnam), which was the military arm of the Viet Minh movement during its resistance against the French, was a national army with units in every area of the country. Only because the Geneva agreement called for a temporary regroupment of the Viet Minh and the French forces was the entire Vietnam People's Army (VPA) physically concentrated in the northern zone after May, 1955.

The importance of its southern component is indicated by the fact that, by 1959, five full VPA divisions out of a total of 20 were made up entirely of southern regroupes.

When the struggle resumed in 1960 in South Vietnam, southern cadres who had regrouped to the North began to return to the South to help lead the military forces of the National Liberation Front. But instead of leading the struggle in the name of the Vietnam People's Army, which was clearly an all-Vietnamese institution, the party set up a "People's Liberation Armed Forces" command in the South in 1961, which was ostensibly independent of the VPA. The PLAF claim to separateness from the North was to become a major target of American propaganda, given the fact that many of the PLAF's officers and troops would come from the VPA.

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maintain an exclusively "southern" military command in the form of the PLAF? Central Committee member Hoang Tung, who participated in the decision, explained to me last January in Hanoi that they feared a direct American military intervention in the conflict in the South if there was any provocation. If the North was directly involved, he said, the United States probably would attack North Vietnam, which was then in the midst of an ambitious five-year development plan.

Nevertheless, the entire military leadership from South and South Central Vietnam from the first resistance war were all still in the North. They would be needed as the military conflict in the South steadily escalated. Gen. Tran Van Tra, a native of South Vietnam's Quang Ngai province who had been secretary of the party committee for the South as well as commander of the entire interzone of Eastern Cochinchina, or Nam Bo (roughly the southern half of South Vietnam) from 1950 to 1954, returned to the South in 1963 to become commander in chief of all armed forces in the South and secretary of the party military committee once more. Some zone commanders also were southerners.

There was thus a high degree of continuity in the PLAF command and staff with the military leadership of the earlier Viet Minh resistance in Nam Bo. But while it favored officers who were natives of the South, the VPA Command did not hesitate to send northerners to the battlefield when their experience was needed.

As larger numbers of northern troops moved into the South, the United States portrayed their presence as an instrument of northern domination of the South. What few Americans knew but most Vietnamese remembered vividly was that northerners had come to the South to fight in the anti-French resistance as well. In December, 1945, when the resistance had just begun in the South but there was no French presence in the North, the Ho Chi Minh government had sent 10,000 northern volunteers to the South in what was proudly called the "Nam Tien" (March South). In the Vietnamese historical context, therefore, the arrival of northern troops after 1965 had a precedent as an act of solidarity rather than of domination.

In the last stage of the war, U.S. officials carried the argument of northern hegemony over the South to its ultimate conclusion, claiming that southerners no longer played a significant role in the Communist military forces in the South. Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified last January that southerners had

Why did the party attempt to

constituted only 20% of the Communist forces in the South after the Tet offensive and that by 1975 the number of southerners in the PLAF was "negligible".

But this testimony is contradicted by National Security Memorandum No. 1, compiled in January, 1969, which revealed that the CIA officially estimated at the end of 1968 that there were somewhere between 145,000 and 210,000 southern Communist troops, including the support troops and guerrillas, normally included in the order of battle, or about 60%.

The number of indigenous southern troops fell sharply from 1968 to 1972 because of the hundreds of thousands of casualties from U.S. firepower, the depopulation of the South Vietnamese countryside, and the decision by the Lao Dong Party leadership against continuing to throw its main force units against the Americans while U.S. troop withdrawal proceeded. But the role played by southerners in the PLAF was still vital.

Official Administration estimates of Communist troop strength included 80,000 southern main-force troops and another 50,000 guerrillas by the beginning of 1975, or about 40% of the total estimated Communist force in the South.

Once Saigon surrendered on April 30, moreover, northern troops essentially faded into the background. According to an eye-witness account, in the first days after the takeover by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the North Vietnamese soldiers were ordered to turn in their weapons and wandered around the city as civilians. It was the southern guerrillas and cadres who came into the city to reestablish and maintain order. It was southerners who went into the neighborhoods to talk with the people and acquaint them with the new regime, according to this eye-witness.

The members of the Military Management Committee are certainly no strangers to the Saigon area. Chairman Tran Van Tra has spent nearly

two decades commanding troops in the region. And while the MMC's specialized sections in the various ministries include a number of northern officers as well as northern technicians brought in to assist in postwar tasks, they are supplementing rather than replacing southern officers and technicians. The MMC is only a temporary body whose mandate is establishment of the social, economic and administrative basis for the work of the PRG.

The rumors that the PRG will no longer have a political or administrative role are premature. While the PRG has stayed in the background since the April takeover, it has not been idle. According to the well-informed correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Nayan Chanda, PRG officials have been studying long-term problems, making observation trips to the countryside and planning policy guidelines. Saigon radio broadcasts on a June 4 session of the PRG cabinet in Saigon make it clear that the MMC is responsible to the PRG.

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The prospect for the next few months, therefore, is not for a sudden move to reunite the two zones under Hanoi's administration, but for a southern government which would begin the slow evolution toward a society more compatible with the northern zone. The party leadership has no desire to impose a Socialist system on the South while there is substantial opposition to it. "We are in no hurry to establish socialism there," said Hoang Tung in a conversation with American visitors in 1973, noting "the reality in the South that a large part of the population still doesn't approve of socialism."

For the foreseeable future, South Vietnam will have a mixed economy in which those industries already in government hands under the old regime or which do not have sufficient private investment will be nationalized, while small industry and agriculture will remain in private hands.

This mixed economy in the South will remain for a "relatively long period," Hoang Tung told recent visitors to Hanoi, even after reunification.

On the political plane, the revolutionary government will also try to accommodate non-Communist political groups and personalities which were not connected directly with the United States and the former Saigon regime. Like the Union government after the American civil war, it will prevent those who were active supporters of the Saigon government from immediately reentering political life. But some of those who were opposed to American intervention will be able to form parties, publish newspapers and run for office.

What was formerly called the "third force" can be expected to be represented in a reorganized PRG when it assumes full responsibilities, as well as in a new assembly when it is elected. PRG officials in Canada recently confirmed that the PRG would "broaden the basis of government in the future," by adding those who had been anti-United States during the war. Gen. Tra has reaffirmed the PRG's intention of holding an election for a new government at an unspecified time in the future, after which the PRG could remove the "provisional" from its name.

The Vietnamese revolutionaries feel strongly about reunification of their country, believing, with Ho Chi Minh, that "Vietnam is one country, the Vietnamese people is one people." Rivers may dry up, mountains may erode, but this truth will not change.

But after 80 years of French colonialism and 20 years of American dominance in the South, they are prepared to move with deliberation and patience on the problem of bringing the two zones under a single administration, avoiding policies which would suggest the imposition of the system in the North on the South. The result, they hope, will be the development of a consensus in the South on the terms under which the two zones would once more be reunited.

Latin America

WASHINGTON POST
10 August 1975

The President's Turn in Panama

THE PRESIDENT'S delay in moving to consummate negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty threatens to produce at least three kinds of damage. First, despite the Panamanian government's efforts to maintain control, it may be impossible to prevent riots or sabotage that would deny the United States and other nations the continued, efficient use of this major, international waterway. Second, failure to negotiate a treaty would inflame American relations not only with Panama but also with all other Latin American nations that are united on this issue as on no other—in both philosophy and diplomatic position. American failure to set aside the "big stick" with which Teddy Roosevelt acquired the Canal Zone, and to move into a new association respecting Panama's sovereignty, would be condemned everywhere. Finally, Mr. Ford, by having created a messy and unnecessary crisis on the U.S. doorstep, would project the image of a President unable to handle foreign affairs—an image that can only hurt his prospects for re-election next year.

With these negative prospects so unmistakable, why then is Mr. Ford dragging his feet on a new treaty? It has been 18 months, after all, since his Secretary of State promised, in Panama: "In the President's name, I hereby commit the United States to complete this negotiation successfully and as quickly as possible." And it has been more than four months since negotiations with Panama were effectively suspended. The reason for the suspension was a disagreement between the Defense Department and the State Department over how the U.S. relationship with Panama ought to be changed.

The Pentagon's attitude is perhaps best conveyed by the fact that, though seaplanes went out of use years ago, the Navy has wished to retain a seaplane ramp site in Panama for "contingency planning." With just such inflated and over-anxious conceptions of its own defense responsibilities, the Pentagon has resisted efforts to return control of the Canal Zone and canal to Panama. The period of return contemplated in a new treaty, by the way—a period in which the United States would retain major rights—stretches out over several decades. It is not as though the American flag were to be hauled down tomorrow. And it is not as though, once the Panamanian flag alone were flying in the Zone, that the United States would allow itself to be shut out of the canal. On that point surely the Panamanians have no illusions: Unrestricted transit will remain a vital interest that the United States can be expected, at almost any cost, and by almost any means, to protect.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 August 1975

The Forgotten Americans

By James Reston

MEXICO CITY, Aug. 16—In the last few days, the Foreign Secretary of Mexico, Emilio O. Rabasa, has been in Moscow signing an economic, scientific and technological agreement with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Communist economic bloc.

At the same time, President Echeverria of Mexico, whose term of office ends next year, and who is building support as a "third world" candidate

The State Department, on the other hand, has argued—persuasively, in our view—that the best way to ensure continued American use of the canal is to make a new treaty that will drain off the nationalist bitterness that the Panamanians feel about the old one. Teddy Roosevelt's Secretary of State conceded, at the time, that the 1903 treaty was "vastly advantageous to the United States, and we must confess, not so advantageous to Panama." What hurt the Panamanians most was the treaty provision granting the United States control over its most vital resource—a swath cutting the country in half—"in perpetuity." No modern nation can be expected to tolerate such a legacy of imperialism. And since riots or sabotage are the only likely threat to the canal, it makes all the more sense to take a diplomatic step—a new treaty—that will at least reduce if not eliminate the possibility that the threat will become a reality. Not making the new treaty, in our view, very nearly guarantees that this threat will in fact materialize, and under conditions that promise no sympathy for the United States from the rest of the hemisphere.

Mr. Ford, however, so far has not chosen to break the bureaucratic impasse that preparation of an American negotiating position has reached. The apparent reason is that he fears a political backlash from the rightwing conservative elements that are tightly organized to maintain the status quo. Some of his political advisers have been telling him that it would be "political suicide" on the eve of an election year to hand to the likes of Ronald Reagan the ammunition that an enlightened treaty stance might provide. We submit, however, that Mr. Ford ought not to allow himself to be intimidated by the specter of a backlash on this issue. Just before Congress went on holiday, for instance, more than 60 senators agreed to oppose an anti-treaty resolution being prepared by Sen. Harry Byrd (I-Va.)—an impressive display of pro-treaty strength. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to swing publicly behind a reasonable negotiating position, then the opposition in Congress and the country would surely be reduced to a manageable hard core.

President Ford, then, has no good reason that we can see for allowing questionable political and bureaucratic considerations to stand in the path of an action that the national interest plainly requires. He should stop following a course—delay—that could provoke canal-closing riots and that could cost the United States heavily in its international relations, especially in Latin America. He should move promptly to complete negotiations on a new treaty with Panama.

to succeed Kurt Waldheim as Secretary General of the United Nations, was completing a three-week trip across the world from India, the Middle East, and Northern Africa to Cuba.

These widely ignored events are reminders of two significant facts: First, that while the United States has been preoccupied with other parts of the world, our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere have been strengthening their ties with Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union; and second, that while

the Soviet Union has been steadily building its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and China has been attempting the same in Southeast Asia, the United States "special relationship" with Latin America has been steadily declining.

Ten years ago, when the cold war was in full swing and the Cuban crises were bitter memories, Latin America acquiesced, though grudgingly, in the economic and political dominance of the United States and tended to follow Washington's lead in the United Nations.

The situation is quite different now. Politically, the cold war has abated. Cuba is less of a public issue, while the U.S. domination of Panama and the Canal has become the most alarming and divisive issue since the Bay of Pigs—and is now regarded here and elsewhere in Latin America as a major threat to Henry Kissinger's Latin American policy.

Economically, with the increase of industrialization of the major Latin American states, the direction, volume, and terms of trade in the hemisphere are changing dramatically. Latin America seeks more access to the United States markets—the United States trade surplus last year was \$1.2 billion—and Latin America's markets are becoming more important to the big multinational U.S. corporations, the control of which is causing new problems and tensions in this part of the world.

The Linowitz "Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations," headed by Sol M. Linowitz, former United States

Ambassador to the Organization of American States, summed up the problem as follows: In the last decade, "Latin America has changed; the relations between Latin America and the U.S. have changed; the role of the U.S. in world affairs has changed. . . .

"Lack of sustained official and general public interest in Latin America by the U.S. makes it hard to impress on our country's citizens, or even on its officials, how much has been happening in the Americas. But unchanging policies in the face of rapidly changing conditions is a sure recipe for trouble."

Secretary of State Kissinger and William D. Rogers, his intelligent and well-informed Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, are aware of all this, but Mr. Kissinger is preoccupied with other problems: of arms control with the Soviet Union, the price of oil, the problems of peace in the Middle East, and the latest crisis in Portugal.

In the short run he is probably right. He is dealing with the immediate turmoil of world affairs and this requires 48 hours every day. But in the long run, the security of the United States and even its relations with the rest of the world, may very well depend on the stability of the Americas as a whole—perhaps even more than almost anything else. Ideology is a matter of transitory opinion, but geography is an enduring fact, and this is an immediate problem in our relations with the rest of the hemisphere.

For there is much criticism in this part of the world about Washington's

excessive rhetoric. Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy, Johnson and Secretary Kissinger, in his offer of a "new dialogue," have all recognized the importance of a new deal for the new world, but it has been a long time coming, and the problem remains and deepens.

It is immensely complicated, for most of these countries are producing more people than food or goods, and they are at different stages of development, with alarming gaps between the very rich and the very poor.

The danger of a guerrilla war against United States control of Panama is very real and a threat to our entire hemisphere policy. The danger of illegal Mexican immigration into the United States—710,000 illegal Mexicans were arrested in the United States last year—is even more of a menace for the future, with Mexico's population expected to go from sixty million at the present time to 125 million by the end of the century.

So one fact is fairly obvious. The hemisphere is not getting the attention and priority it deserves from the United States.

This may be one reason why Panama is bringing the Canal to the point of crisis, and why the Mexicans are making agreements with the Communist economic bloc and identifying themselves with the organization of the underdeveloped "third world." They are in trouble at home, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they are trying by new alignments and sharper confrontations to get our attention.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1975

Hopes of Nicaraguan Opposition Rise With Shift of the U.S. Envoy

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua—The imminent replacement of the controversial United States Ambassador to Managua, who over five years has become a friend and adviser of the long-time dictator, Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, is both raising hopes and causing concern here.

Opposition groups are hoping that the withdrawal of Ambassador Turner B. Shelton will mark the end of the total identification of the United States with the regime and perhaps lead Washington to press General Somoza to liberalize his Government.

President Somoza, on the other hand, is reportedly so worried that the change of ambassadors could affect his relationship with Washington that he campaigned to have Mr. Shelton's assignment extended. When this failed, according to diplomats here, he arranged for the Ambassador to remain in Managua until the last possible moment.

As a result, Mr. Shelton will leave Nicaragua on the morning of Aug. 1, several weeks behind schedule and just hours before the arrival of his successor, James D. Theberge, former director of Latin American studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic

International Studies. Normal diplomatic practice is for one or two months to pass between the departure of an ambassador and the arrival of his successor.

Diplomatic sources said that General Somoza, who was trained at West Point and whose family has ruled this Central American republic for the last 40 years, has also tried to influence Washington to offer Ambassador Shelton a prestigious new assignment on the ground that his abrupt demotion or dismissal would imply censure of his close ties with the Nicaraguan President.

But well-placed sources said the State Department had no intention of offering the 59-year-old Mr. Shelton, a former movie industry executive, another diplomatic post and that his only hope for a government job lay with the White House. They added that Mr. Shelton's relations with the State Department had long been strained and that he had taken to sending his reports to Secretary of State Kissinger in his capacity as head of the White House's National Security Council.

What His Critics Charge

The controversy that has constantly surrounded Ambassador

Shelton of the United States' immense political influence over Nicaragua. The United States occupied and governed the country between 1912 and 1925 and again between 1927 and 1933, and since then Washington's backing has been a key factor in enabling the Somoza family to perpetuate itself in power.

"American ambassadors have always been seen here as sort of viceroys or proconsuls," a foreign official explained, "and both the Government and the opposition have always tried to win their support."

The main criticism of Ambassador Shelton has been that he has cultivated his relations with General Somoza to the exclusion of all other political figures, particularly well-known opponents of the regime. The fact that he speaks no Spanish has also helped isolate him from many Nicaraguan sectors.

"Shelton's biggest hero is Somoza," a diplomat said, "and Somoza obviously trusts Shelton completely. Shelton is probably more exposed to the local president than any other United States ambassador in the world. He spends at least 10 hours a week with Somoza and half the time they're alone and no one knows what they discuss."

ever, it was no secret that General Somoza relied heavily on Ambassador Shelton's advice. After the earthquake in December, 1972, that destroyed downtown Managua and took over 10,000 lives, Mr. Shelton not only arranged for 500 American soldiers to be flown from the Panama Canal Zone to help in the emergency and symbolize United States support; but he also spent long hours helping General Somoza re-establish a semblance of government.

In December last year, after 12 prominent Nicaraguans were kidnapped by leftist guerrillas, the Ambassador again acted as President Somoza's closest confidant and was constantly by his side.

General Somoza's appreciation of Mr. Shelton has been demonstrated by the large number of official going-away parties arranged in his honor, including one given by the President himself in the National Palace. The Ambassador's final days here are also being covered in the official newspaper Novedades with the solemnity of a space-mission countdown.

Opponents of the regime are not alone in being upset by the Ambassador's partiality. Sharp disagreements between Mr. Shelton and several senior officials of the United States

Embassy became common knowledge in local political circles.

Sitting in his office beside signed photographs of Presidents Nixon and Ford, the Ambassador defended himself against his critics. "It's the job of an ambassador to establish the best possible relationship with the president of a friendly country," he said in an interview. "I don't think of it in terms of a personal relationship, but I think President Somoza is a very nice man. He is friendly to the United States, he does a good job and he's a

hard-working leader who has done a lot to improve things in this country. I'm sure if there were elections supervised by the United Nations, General Somoza would win."

The announcement of Mr. Shelton's withdrawal sparked rumors in opposition circles that his successor would be more liberal, but embassy personnel have hastened to explain that Ambassador Theberge "may have a different personal style but will probably have the same politics." They point out that Mr. Theberge's recent publications in-

clude books entitled "The Soviet Presence in Latin America" and "Russia in the Caribbean."

Nicaragua's main opposition leader, Dr. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, publisher of the newspaper La Prensa and president of the Democratic Liberation Union, expressed the hope in an interview that Ambassador Shelton's successor "is a correct person who does not interfere in the struggle of Nicaraguans to obtain their liberation and who discontinues the policy of supporting corrupt dictatorships like that of the Somozas."

U.S. Reassures Nicaragua

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 —

State Department officials said the Ford Administration had recently assured Nicaragua that the replacement of Ambassador Shelton was "not to be taken as representing any change in United States policy" toward that country.

The officials said that Nicaragua had been told that American foreign policy was conducted "with countries, not with persons," and that a normal ambassadorial term was two years.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

4 August 1975

Details conflict

Chile leftists 'vanish' in Argentina

By James Nelson Goodsell

Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Buenos Aires

Some sort of collusion between Chilean security officers and groups in Argentina is thought to lie behind the mysterious deaths in Argentina of 119 Chilean leftists, who were known to have been under arrest in Chile.

The bizarre and complex details of the case, which could mushroom into a trans-Andean scandal, are coming to light here and in Santiago, the Chilean capital.

The case may well have been a factor in the decision last month of the Chilean military government to bar the planned visit to Chile of a United Nations human rights committee.

In the past months articles have appeared in Chile's controlled press indicating that the 119 were killed in guerrilla skirmishes in Argentina. But there is no word in these reports on how the Chileans got to Argentina while supposedly under arrest in Chile.

The information for these articles was said to come from two sources: an Argentine magazine, Lea, which put out its first and only issue on July 15 and a Brazilian newspaper that sources in Rio de Janeiro indicate does not even exist.

The same Chilean newspapers also reported in late July that the bodies of at least two of

those on the list had turned up in Buenos Aires.

But when family members of the two came to Buenos Aires to check the stories, they discovered that the bodies were not those of their loved ones. Further investigations disclosed that the identity cards with the bodies were not those of the missing Chileans and probably were fabrications.

The 119 were, in the main, one-time members of the now outlawed extremist Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). They were arrested at various times in 1974. Most were under 30, and at least one-fourth of them were women.

Once arrested, the majority simply dropped out of sight despite strenuous efforts by their families, human rights organizations, and others to get information on their whereabouts. In a few cases, information did come from specific sources — the International Red Cross, released prisoners, and, in at least one instance, from the Chilean Foreign Ministry.

The Foreign Ministry last year wrote the British Embassy in Santiago confirming that Christian von Yurick was being held under "preventive arrest" and that he was in "normal" health. But it made no mention of Mr. von Yurick's son, Edwin, and the son's wife, Barbara, who also were missing. All three now appear on the lists of those killed in Argentina. The British Embassy had inquired about the von Yuricks at the request of relatives in England.

The newspaper accounts of the Argentine deaths suggest that the Chileans in question were killed fighting with guerrillas in northwestern Argentina, but the battle is said by Argentine military sources never to have taken place.

Yet Chilean authorities continue to talk of the guerrilla skirmish as a major one. Chilean newspapers quote the Curitiba, Brazil, newspaper O Dia, as mentioning a battle near the Argentine city of Salta. But sources in Rio de Janeiro say there is no newspaper O Dia in Curitiba.